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ABSTRACT
The electric power grid is a complex, interconnected cyber-physical system
comprised of collaborating elements for monitoring and control. Distributed
controllers play a prominent role in deploying this cohesive execution and are
ubiquitous in the grid. As global information is shared and acted upon, faster
response to system changes is achieved. However, failure or malfunction
of a few or even one distributed controller in the entire system can cause
cascading, detrimental effects. In the worst case, widespread blackouts can
result, as exemplified by several historic cases.
Furthermore, if controllers are maliciously compromised by an adversary,
they can be manipulated to drive the power system to an unsafe state. Due
to the shift from proprietary control protocols to popular, accessible network
protocols and other modernization factors, the power system is extremely
vulnerable to cyber attacks. Cyber attacks against the grid have increased
significantly in recent years and can cause severe, physical consequences.
Attack vectors for distributed controllers range from execution of malicious
commands that can cause sensitive equipment damage to forced system topol-
ogy changes creating instability. These vulnerabilities and risks need to be
fully understood, and greater technical capabilities are necessary to create
resilient and dynamic defenses.
Proactive strategies must be developed to protect the power grid from
distributed controller compromise or failure. This research investigates the
role distributed controllers play in the grid and how their loss or compromise
impacts the system. Specifically, an analytic method based on controllability
analysis is derived using clustering and factorization techniques on controller
sensitivities. In this manner, insight into the control support groups and sets
of critical, essential, and redundant controllers for distributed controllers in
the power system is achieved.
Subsequently, we introduce proactive strategies that utilize these roles and
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grouping results for responding to controller compromise using the remain-
ing set. These actions can be taken immediately to reduce system stress
and mitigate compromise consequences as the compromise itself is investi-
gated and eliminated by appropriate security mechanisms. These strategies
are demonstrated with several compromise scenarios, and an overall frame-
work is presented. Additionally, the controller role and group insights are
applied to aid in developing an analytic corrective control selection for fast
and automated remedial action scheme (RAS) design.
Techniques to aid the verification of control commands and the detection
of abnormal control action behavior are also presented. In particular, an
augmented DC power flow algorithm using real-time measurements is de-
veloped that obtains both faster speed and higher accuracy than existing
linear methods. For detecting abnormal behavior, a generator control action
classification framework is presented that leverages known power system be-
haviors to enhance the use of data mining tools. Finally, the importance of
incorporating power system knowledge into machine learning applications is
emphasized with a study that improves power system neural network con-
struction using modal analysis. This dissertation details these methodologies
and their roles in realizing a more cohesive and resilient power system in the
increasingly cyber-physical world.
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The electric power grid is a complex, interconnected cyber-physical system
in which a variety of mechanisms, algorithms, and individuals work together
to power our modern society. In particular, power systems are critical in-
frastructures comprised of collaborating elements for monitoring and control.
Distributed controllers play a prominent role in deploying this cohesive exe-
cution and are ubiquitous in their presence in the grid. As global information
is shared and acted upon, if one distributed controller fails, the remaining
set is quick to respond and ensure the overall control objective is main-
tained. However, multiple failures can cause detrimental, cascading effects
(e.g., overloads leading to blackout) as the set struggles to automatically
meet the control goal. Furthermore, if the controllers are maliciously com-
promised, they can be manipulated to drive the power system to an unsafe
or unreliable operating state. Attack vectors for distributed controllers range
from execution of malicious commands that can cause damage to sensitive
equipment to forced system topology changes causing instability. Therefore,
this research seeks to provide analytic, proactive strategies for protecting the
power grid from distributed controller compromise or failure.
History of Automated Control
Automated control, including distributed controllers, has been in use for more
than 2000 years. Among the earliest developments were water clocks around
270 B.C. by the Greek inventor Ktesibios. The device was a servomecha-
nism, thus consisting of only one feedback loop. Time was measured by the
regulated flow of liquid into or out of a vessel and the collected amount was
subsequently measured to track time [1]. Onward from ancient times to 1900,
automatic devices were devised for controlling temperature, pressures, liquid
levels, and the speed of rotating machinery. However, the most significant
innovation was the steam engine governor by James Watt and its improve-
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ments in the subsequent decades [1]. This period also encompassed the work
of James Maxwell, involving the derivation of linear differential equations
for various governor mechanisms [2]. During the mid-1900s, the World Wars
motivated theoretical understanding of the control systems used and develop-
ment of systems, such as those used to aim anti-aircraft guns. Many classical
control techniques were established during this time, specifically for linear
single-input and single-output (SISO) systems.
Modern control theory started addressing the difficult problem of how to
choose the control structure that would give the best performance and how
to define “best performance,” thus optimal control theory [3]. More so-
phisticated design problems were studied with multi-input and multi-output
(MIMO) systems. This period also gave rise to the state-space approach and
the concepts of observability and controllability [4].
In this vast timeline, control systems moved from single-loop servomech-
anisms to large-scale, complex systems such as the power grid. When arc
lamps were in use in the early 1900s, constant voltage or current supply
was desired to sustain the gap in the electrodes, prompting the creation of
a power network [5]. Power system monitoring and control began to be de-
signed and implemented in the early 1900s, and central control rooms became
a commonplace at power plants in the 1920s. By the 1930s, the electricity
interchange, realized through interconnecting individual utilities and genera-
tors, was enhancing reliability and reducing operating costs. This motivated
analog computers for monitoring and controlling generator output, tie-line
power flows, and line frequency.
However, these computers were limited to small process control systems
or large mainframe systems. Digital control was introduced in the 1960s,
and with the great Northeast blackout in 1965, was catapulted to a primary
role [6]. Operator control could be significantly enhanced with the use of
advanced computer technologies to aid in emergency situations such as an
imminent blackout. The energy management system (EMS), the collection
of various computer-aided tools used by operators to monitor and control the
grid, was born. As time progressed and our processing power grew, graphical
user interfaces (GUIs) and visual displays were developed to further improve
the EMS [7]. Today, the industrial control system of the power grid comprises
complex feedback loops via the various interconnections of electric compo-
nents, a multitude of control algorithms, and numerous controllers.
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Power System Vulnerabilities
In power systems, the data pathways and vulnerability landscape can be
partitioned into three major areas: sensors, algorithms, and control. The
widespread sensors perform monitoring and provide real-time operational
awareness via a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) network.
The measurements are used to execute various algorithms such as state esti-
mation and real-time contingency analysis in an EMS at a control center.
Control action decisions are ultimately made, using the result of these
analyses. In this work, the emphasis is on control, rather than sensors or
algorithms. Attacks on situational awareness can instigate devastating con-
sequences by misleading grid operators. Yet, attacks on controllers and the
control channels are arguably worse as they can cause immediate and direct
impact without invoking additional actions from operators. Thus, in con-
sidering adversarial cyber attacks on the grid, this dissertation focuses on
distributed controllers.
Physical Consequences of Cyber Attacks
From February 28th, 2000, to April 23, 2000, one of the first widely known
cases of an adversary maliciously compromising a control system occurred. A
disgruntled, former employee of Hunter Watertech, an Australian firm that
installed SCADA radio-controlled sewage equipment for the Maroochy Shire
Water Services (Queensland, Australia), executed the attack(s) [8, 9]. The
attacker packed his car with stolen radio equipment and a computer, and
on 46 occasions during that period, issued radio commands to distributed
sewage equipment.
These malicious commands caused 800,000 liters of raw sewage to over-
flow into public parks, rivers, and the grounds of a hotel, resulting in death
of marine life, polluted water, and an unbearable stench for local residents.
Further details and analysis of this attack are provided in [8, 9]. Such se-
vere consequences were achieved by only one, knowledgeable attacker. This
severity motivates much-needed protection strategies for industrial control
systems (ICSs), including the power system.
Cyber-related risks and vulnerabilities have traditionally been thought to
remain in the cyber-world. The power grid’s ICS historically utilized pro-
priety controls and were difficult to attack using cyber-based methods. This
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difficulty was due to the proprietary protocol, device age, and inability to
find detailed technical information on the protocols/devices on the web or
from the technical vendors themselves—achieving “security by obscurity” [5].
However, modern ICSs are being outfitted with publicly available operating
systems and communicating via popular networking protocols TCP/IP [10].
Nevertheless, the perception of cyber attacks and their abilities began to
change in 2007, when the Aurora project at Idaho National Labs demon-
strated how a cyber hacker could inflict serious damage to a generator using
only cyber commands [11]. In 2010, a real-world case with very real and
severe physical consequences occurred: the Stuxnet worm traveled through
cyberspace undetected, maliciously modifying programmable logic controllers
(PLCs). This caused Iranian nuclear centrifuges to spin out of control, inflict-
ing substantial physical damage—about about 20% of the centrifuges were
destroyed [12]. These events demonstrated clearly that cyber attacks can
cause severe detriment to infrastructure and public safety, and that they are
a national security concern [13].
About 59% of power and utility companies have reported a recent sig-
nificant cybersecurity incident in EY’s Global Information Security Survey
for 2016-2017 [14]. Distributed controllers have increasingly cyber-physical
capabilities that involve automated actions from received or collected data,
and communication across many devices renders them vulnerable to cyber
attacks. These cyber attacks can have severe physical consequences; the com-
promise of distributed controllers can cause damage to sensitive equipment
or even cascading blackouts, as exemplified by the presented cases.
Such compromises can be masked to the operator by sending false reports
of a safe, normal state (cyber aspect) while detrimental effects are occurring,
such as overloaded lines (physical aspect). For example, as malicious modifi-
cations occurred, the Stuxnet computer worm caused the PLC to report back
a loop of normal operation values to the user [12]. Therefore, both the cyber
and physical impacts must be considered when addressing distributed con-
trollers. Furthermore, the compromise of a select few controllers can cause
serious consequences – an attacker does not need to gain access to all the dis-
tributed controllers. Background on distributed controllers is provided next.
Distributed Controllers
From new verification and validation techniques to algorithms to improve
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control and operation, as in this research, cyber-physical methods are key
in realizing the most effective cyber-physical power grid. Distributed con-
trollers are a prominent aspect of executing a cohesive cyber-physical imple-
mentation. Centralized control boasts one central controller with global in-
formation and, thus, causes much organizational and computational burden,
especially in large, geographically expansive systems [15]. Furthermore, this
centralized architecture increases vulnerabilities to security breaches as only
one controller needs to be compromised to topple the rest. With advances in
communication technologies, as well as increased needs in applications such
as microgrids, distributed control schemes are being increasingly studied and
implemented. In distributed control architecture, there exists no centralized
controller (with the global information) but the controllers can communicate
and share information with other controllers [15, 16].
The distributed control coordination of the cyber-physical power system
controllers is being used for a variety of applications, from distributed flexible
AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices for power flow control to AGC
schemes. The power system is benefiting greatly from its implementation,
as more flexibility and robustness are achieved. However, to maintain the
robust qualities of distributed control, insight into the control interactions in
each system as well as thorough assessment of vulnerabilities—including both
inadvertent failure and malicious compromise of distributed controller(s)—is
necessary.
Distributed Control Failures
The malfunction or failure of distributed controllers has played a historical
role in power system blackouts. For example, on July 13th, 1977, a collapse
of the New York Con Edison system occurred (affecting 8 million people,
for 5-25 hours) due to several factors: natural events, problematic design
features, operating errors, and equipment malfunction [17]. In particular,
the distributed protective equipment of each line operated incorrectly when
lightning struck two lines, resulting in multiple tripped lines.
In Italy, on September 28th, 2003, a major country-wide blackout tran-
spired where a tree flashover hit a tie-line (Italy-Switzerland), and connec-
tion was not re-established by the auto-recloser [17]. The auto-recloser was
previously heavily loaded before tripping and could not function properly;
thus, a cascading blackout occurred as tie-lines with other border countries
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also tripped. Essentially, the frequency decay was not controlled sufficiently
to prevent the tripping of generation. These two major cases illustrate how
the power system is dependent on the proper functioning of distributed con-
trollers.
The failure of one can cause severe impacts and, in the above situations,
blackouts. Failure can come from benign sources such as design glitches
or weather, but also from malicious entities. These sources have become a
more critical problem in recent decades, as cyber-adversarial presence has
increased. For example, cyber attacks in the automatic generation control
(AGC) are currently being studied by various researchers. AGC is used to al-
low many generator units to participate in regulation between generation and
load, with generator setpoints changed by distributed controllers. It tracks
the load variations while maintaining system frequency, net tie-interchanges,
and optimal generation levels close to the scheduled values [18,19].
AGC is integral to the operation of the grid, but is susceptible to failure due
to certain cases of measurement noise, as studied by Zhang and Dominguez-
Garcia [20]. They demonstrated that attackers are capable of malicious ma-
nipulation to the measurements, but even regular noise in the communication
channels can contribute to the damaging distortions. Ultimately, the class
of random noise with state-dependent intensity can destabilize the system
model and cause divergence in the AGC scheme [20]. Vrakopoulou et al.
discussed how the cyber-physical interaction of the power system (physical)
and SCADA system (cyber) gives rise to security issues. The links between
these physical and cyber components are vulnerable to attack. Specifically,
the authors provide impact analysis of a cyber attack on the AGC signal
and conduct feasibility analysis to determine the attack patterns that will
harmfully disturb the power system [19,21].
AGC is only one example of an integral power system function rendered
vulnerable due to the unprotected links between the cyber and physical sys-
tems. These links are heavily comprised of distributed controllers and re-
quire protection and defense. The malicious compromise of distributed con-
troller(s) can drive the power system into unsafe states and cause damage. In
particular, the physical consequences of cyber attacks are of significant con-
cern, as demonstrated by the Maroochy Shire sewage and Stuxnet attacks
discussed earlier [8, 9, 12].
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Distrusted Control
Attack vectors for distributed controllers range from execution of malicious
commands that can cause damage to sensitive equipment to forced system
topology changes that cause instability. Distrusted control describes the
situation in which controller(s) have been compromised and are under the
command of a sophisticated attacker. That is, the attacker can craft control
tasks or commands in a legitimate format and successfully transmit them.
If the adversary is able to intercept the network packets sent to the control
center in response to the execution of the control tasks, the attacker may
even be able to mask the alterations and, thus, hide their presence [22]. In a
severe case, the attacker could command all the controllers or gain significant,
inside access to the control center.
Defenses must be developed to both prevent a distributed controller from
being compromised and to mitigate adverse effects when controller compro-
mise has occurred. Factors that must be considered in these designs are:
• The attack vector: the capabilities of the attacker in what they can
gain access to or control and what type of attacks they can execute
(e.g., concurrent access to certain devices not possible)
• What can be trusted (e.g., intrusion detection systems (IDSs))
• The impact on controllability and stability of the system under various
attacks; the resilience of the system, under how much stress and for
what duration the grid can maintain service and safe operation
• The interaction of the cyber and physical components, which needs to
be included in the attack vector and defense strategies
Specifically, the cyber-physical vulnerabilities must be studied and mitigated.
Both the cyber and physical aspects of the system must be leveraged to de-
velop effective protection and defense strategies. For example, a relay that
is maliciously controlled by an attacker could be opened, but then closed
with the cyber-side close command. However, it could remain under the at-
tacker’s control, necessitating a physical, power-side action of changing the
system topology to isolate the controller. Yet, to permanently mitigate this
compromised relay, cyber tolerance mechanisms are needed to “clean” the
system from the malicious control resulting from cyber vulnerabilities [23].
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The Need for Resilient, Dynamic Defenses
The issues listed above indicate the adverse vulnerabilities in distributed con-
troller security. Conversely, even if the controllers are not maliciously com-
promised, they can be subject to failure or malfunction. For both of these
cases, insight into their interactions with each other and impact on system
controllability is significantly helpful; the cyber and physical attributes of the
system must also be leveraged, as discussed in the following section. Nonethe-
less, this detailed information about the role of each controller allows for the
powerful development of techniques to improve control as well as protect sys-
tem controllability. In addition to these controllability analysis techniques,
distributed controller vulnerabilities must be addressed from a detection and
verification standpoint to comprehensively improve their defense.
The power grid is a critical infrastructure that is a prime target for ma-
licious attackers. It is susceptible to cyber attacks, as vulnerabilities in the
current ICSs exist due to generalized communication protocols and operating
systems—deep, system-specific knowledge is no longer necessary. As demon-
strated in various blackout cases, as well as research findings, the failure
of distributed controllers can impact the power system severely—including
physical impacts. These distributed controllers can be compromised with
cyber attacks, causing them to fail or act maliciously. These vulnerabilities
and risks need to be fully understood, and greater technical capabilities are
necessary to create a resilient and dynamic defense [13]. The work in this
dissertation seeks to contribute to that effort, providing the essential insight
into how control should be maintained or regained in a cyber-adversarial
environment.
Distributed controller focused control and defense strategies need to be
developed, and the interactive characteristics—both between the cyber and
physical layers as well as the individual controllers—must be taken into con-
sideration. These attributes are key in analyzing distributed controllers, and
their inclusion is a novel contribution of this dissertation work. This research
provides the analytic methods to gain insight into the control support groups
and sets of critical, essential, and redundant controllers for distributed con-
trollers in the power system. Using these results, response strategies are
formulated using the remaining, operational controllers to minimize system
stress and prevent damage. Furthermore, the role and groups have versatile
application and aid analytic corrective control selection for fast, automated
8
remedial action schemes (RAS). Additionally, techniques to aid the verifi-
cation of control commands and the detection of abnormal control action




2.1 An Interdependent Future
Distributed controllers are vulnerable to cyber attacks, and effective defenses
must be developed using detailed information on the possible attack vectors,
controllability, and cyber-physical interactions. This work provides these in-
sights, specifically on the role of each distributed controller within the device
set as well as within the entire, interconnected system. These results are
applicable broadly, not only to malicious compromise situations; controllers
can malfunction or fail due to benign reasons—strategies to maintain or re-
gain system control and mitigate adverse consequences are still necessitated
and highly desired. Therefore, using the role and groups results, control
response strategies are developed to respond to such events and minimize
system stress.
Additionally, effective controller placement can be performed such that
maximal, spanning control is achieved. With knowledge of the controller
roles and their control spans, integral power system protection mechanisms
such as remedial action schemes (RAS) can also benefit. Verification and
detection techniques need to be improved and developed, specifically focused
on distributed controllers. These methods are developed and augmented
in this dissertation, providing a comprehensive view of the security of dis-
tributed controllers. With greater insight into the effect and span of each
controller, the control and defense schemes can be significantly improved, in
particular, by leveraging the cyber-physical attributes of the power system.
For instance, the real-time measurements obtained from all across the power
system can be analyzed in combination with specific control functions, re-
sulting in powerful sensitivity information. Such information can be used to
deconstruct controller critical, essential, and redundant sets, as detailed in
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later chapters. The plethora of system data can be investigated for classifi-
cation of control actions (to flag abnormal behaviors) and other applications
by applying machine learning algorithms. Enhancing traditional power sys-
tem analyses with cyber-focused data mining methods and other techniques
enables resilient protection, situational awareness, and improved control.
2.2 Contributions
Specifically, this research develops methods for improved control and defense
of distributed controllers in cyber-physical power systems. Insight on con-
trol support groups and controller redundant, essential, and critical sets is
achieved using clustering and factorization techniques. Ultimately, we can
use these results to design defensive strategies to maintain or regain control in
a cyber-adversarial environment and best mitigate adverse consequences. A
control response framework is developed to respond to distributed controller
compromise using the remaining, operational set. Additionally, versatile ap-
plication of the controller role and group results is demonstrated with an
analytic corrective control selection algorithm for fast, automated remedial
action schemes (RAS).
Further insight is obtained using an augmented DC power flow method
(augDC-PF) to backsolve for control input safety ranges in a control in-
put verification case study. This is motivated and used in the overall Dis-
tributed Just-Ahead-of-Time Verification of Cyber-Physical Critical Infras-
tructure project, discussed in Section 2.3.2. Given an abnormal event (due
to failure or compromise) does occur, a generator control action classifica-
tion scheme was developed using support vector machine (SVM). The SVM
model was enhanced using only localized voltage measurements, reducing
the training while obtaining an effective classification model. This idea of
leveraging power system knowledge and analyses to improve machine learning
methods is exemplified with an additional study of improving neural network
construction using modal analysis.
This comprehensive study of distributed controllers in power systems seeks
to offer greater insight into the span and effect of control, how such informa-
tion benefits response strategies to counter controller compromise, and how
expansive real-time measurements can be leveraged with various data mining
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methods. The following chapters detail these methodologies and their roles
in realizing a more cohesive and resilient power system in the increasingly
cyber-physical world.
The main contributions of the work presented in this document are:
1. Analytic algorithm that processes controller sensitivities using cluster-
ing and factorization techniques to derive insight into the distributed
controller set
• Discovers control support groups via clustering, that is, which
controllers are highly coupled with the control objective and each
other
• Introduces a novel algorithm for determining the number of con-
trol support groups (clusters) using a sensitivity-based threshold
• Identifies the critical, essential, and redundant controller sets via
factorization, and thus, the role each controller plays in overall
system controllability
2. Application of discovered role and group results for responding to con-
troller compromise in a cyber-adversarial environment
• Decomposes transformed basis to determine content of equivalent
line flows and ranking of redundant controllers from transformed
sensitivities
– Aiding placement to avoid critical roles and eliminating ex-
cessive redundancy
• Studies dependence of role and control group results on system
operating point
– Observed pattern of recurrent controller roles over all oper-
ating points; certain controllers frequently assigned specific
role
– The recurrent essential or critical controllers repeatedly have
expansive control span and can be leveraged in response to
compromises
• Develops a control response framework for the distributed con-
troller compromise given compromise or failure of device(s) within
the set
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– This response can be immediately deployed to reduce system
stress and mitigate compromise consequences while the ac-
tual cause and removal of the compromise is investigated by
security mechanisms
• Incorporates stability assessment in the overall control response
framework
– Framework reacts whenever a setting change is observed with
the compromised control and assesses impact on stability
– Maintaining stability must be prioritized and its inclusion in
the framework is necessary for a comprehensive response
3. Analytic corrective control selection for fast, automated remedial action
schemes
• Demonstrates versatility of distributed controller role and interac-
tion discovery algorithm, specifically for remedial action schemes
(RAS) and generation redispatch
• Finds critical generators which enable significant reduction in vi-
olation index and computation time
4. Augmented DC power flow method with real-time measurements
• Achieves both speed and accuracy compared to existing linear
algorithms, which is especially useful for real-time operations such
as control input verification
5. Generator control action classification based on localized voltage mea-
surements
• Leverages known power system behaviors (e.g., localized voltage
sags) to enhance classification of control actions using support
vector machine (SVM)
6. Improved neural network construction using modal analysis
• Utilizes power system analyses and behavioral knowledge to en-
hance machine learning algorithms, specifically neural network de-
sign
13
• Seeks to eliminate trial-and-error methods for selecting number of
neurons in architecture, reducing training time and contributing
to overall goal of a systematic approach of constructing neural
networks for power systems
2.3 Cyber-Physical Systems: The Role of Distributed
Controllers
2.3.1 Cyber-Physical Systems
Cyber technologies, from the computers that perform state estimation calcu-
lations to phasor measurement units (PMUs), have been steadily integrated
into the power system for decades. The seamless integration of the compu-
tational algorithms and physical components is what cyber-physical systems
such as the power grid are built from and depend upon [24]. In the power
system, the physical entities range from generators to protection devices and
the computer-based algorithms that control or monitor them involve taking a
control action such as changing generator setpoint or detecting when a fault
occurs. These algorithms automate many processes in the power system and
have significantly improved efficiency and situational awareness, allowing the
grid to function more cohesively.
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) integrate dynamics of the physical pro-
cesses with those of software and networking, creating a more powerful and re-
silient system. Unlike embedded systems, where computation is paramount,
CPSs seek to provide abstractions and modeling as well as design and analysis
techniques for the integrated whole, combining the physical focus on dynam-
ics (evolution of system states over time) and the cyber focus on processes
of transforming data [25]. The challenges lie in dealing with these discrete
and continuous dynamics, from increasing complexity to failures with cyber
and physical actions [26].
CPSs have already begun to be and will be the foundation of our criti-
cal infrastructure. Examples include personalized healthcare and traffic flow
management—CPS technologies impact many aspects of our core infrastruc-
ture. Capability, adaptability, and scalability as well as resiliency and secu-
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rity are improved and enabled by advances in CPSs. CPSs are advanced by
innovations such as low-cost, increased capability sensors, more efficient com-
puting devices, wireless communication, increased internet bandwidth, and
power domain advances such as renewables, energy harvesting, and improve-
ments in energy capacity [26]. The power grid plays an integral role in this
CPS mission and, therefore, requires thorough investigation and development
of novel CPS-focused methods and technologies.
2.3.2 Related, Motivating Project
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) integrate the dynamics of the physical pro-
cesses with those of software and networking. The interdependencies between
the cyber and physical layers of the power system are exemplified when con-
sidering distributed controllers. Figure 2.1 shows an overview of the design
of a cyber-physical response system (CPR) (detailed in [23]).
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Figure 2.1: Overview of cyber-physical response system (CPR) and its
interaction with the cyber and physical layers of the power system [23].
The CPR mechanism, the middle layer, must interact and glean informa-
tion from both the cyber and physical sides of the power system to make
the most effective response decision. The physical layer consists of the vari-
ous actuators and sensors while the cyber layer possesses the controllers and
human-machine-interfaces (HMI). This emphasis on considering both cyber
and physical layers is important not only when developing response strate-
gies, but for any methodology or design involving the power system. Thus, it
must also be studied and integrated when analyzing distributed controllers
in the power system. In particular, programmable logic controllers (PLCs)
that are distributed throughout the power system play a significant role.
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PLCs are industrial digital computers that are used to provide controls of
any industrial system by replacing switchboards of relays to perform the op-
eration [27]. They are able to automatically control the system by acquiring
input signals from the operator or substation and then appropriately com-
manding the actuators of the controlled entities (e.g., generation output). In
this manner, the reliability is improved and ease of programming is achieved
across various actuators.
In the context of distributed controllers, a malicious attacker could up-
load detrimental control codes to the PLCs and cause severe consequences.
For example, the attacker could command all the relays to be opened—as
communicated by the code sent to the PLCs to all the relays—resulting in
overloaded lines and damage to sensitive equipment. Within the cyber-side
of the power system, the attacker can also mislead the control room operators
by reporting that nothing has changed, that the relays are still closed.
This scenario is one of many that motivated the Distributed Just-Ahead-of-
Time Verification of Cyber-Physical Critical Infrastructure project, funded
by the National Science Foundation (NSF), Award Numbers 1446229 and
1446471 [28]. The work of this dissertation is a part of this overall project,
though the results are versatile and broadly useful. Nonetheless, the project
focuses on the cyber-physical verification (CPV) of control commands sent
to PLCs in a power system.
The CPV project aims to ensure that no unsafe code will run on any
PLC in the system, given a malicious adversary has already gained access to
the system. A distributed Just-Ahead-of-Time (JAT) verification technique
is being developed that is mathematically rigorous and practically deploy-
able. JAT is able to check running PLC code for a rich set of security or
safety properties and provide advanced warning of any code that would lead
to unsafe states (violating the safety properties). The overall approach is
illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2 includes a temporal execution graph (TEG) that shows all the
possible execution paths of a PLC program from a given initial state. A fixed
number of states into the future is shown (shallow TEG) and any branches
not reachable (as deemed from the actual measurements) are pruned while
each reachable branch is expanded. In other words, the JAT tool acts as a
bump-in-the-wire between the human-machine interface (HMI) and the PLC
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Figure 2.2: Just-Ahead-of-Time (JAT) verification technique overview.
TEG, employing a variety of innovative concepts and methods from partially
observable hybrid automata integration to real-time, data-driven power sys-
tem model estimation. The full solution approach and details are found
in [23,28,29].
The control logic code is analyzed to determine if any unsafe state will be
encountered in its execution path in any future state if that code is run on the
PLC. The states encountered by the paths are deemed safe or unsafe using
power system analyses; e.g., constraints such as voltage or line flow limits
must be satisfied. Thus, if a control input drives the system to an unsafe
state (e.g., violates constraints), as gleaned from the power flow results, that
control input is flagged as unsafe and is not executed. Symbolic executions
of these analyses are utilized to explore all possible control logic execution
paths. The symbolic execution, explained further in Chapter 7, uses symbols
as control inputs and contains logical path conditions, such as satisfying the
power system constraints.
This highly interdisciplinary project focuses on the verification of control
inputs, via PLCs, in a power system. More importantly, it emphasizes the
need to consider both cyber and physical layers of the power system together
to create the most effective and robust solution when considering secure con-
trol. The algorithms and techniques developed in this thesis approach the
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problem of control in the cyber-physical grid, and specifically from the per-
spective of distributed controllers. The placement of controllers, the impact
and defense from distrusted control, and the verification of control commands
encompass the full, 360◦ view and analysis of power system distributed con-
trollers.
By designing cyber-physical, data-driven methods to improve control of
distributed controllers in power systems, this dissertation aids the protection
and control efforts highlighted by the CPV project and previous work in
controllability analysis, placement, and distrusted control. Within the CPV
project, this work seeks to develop:
1. The power system analyses needed to assess each state of the TEG—
fast and accurate methods to determine whether safety constraints have
been violated
2. Data mining techniques to analyze control actions (e.g., flag abnormal
behavior), augmenting the JAT approach
3. A detailed controllability analysis to deliver crucial insight into the
flexibility and redundancy of control within the power system
Using these results, strategies to respond to compromises such as malicious
control logic program execution can be derived such that system controlla-





3.1 Controllability Analysis in Power Systems
There are various components and behaviors we would like to control in the
power system. We may seek to mitigate the impact of a disturbance (large or
small) and prevent the loss of service or damage to equipment. Or, perhaps,
we would like to alter supply at various buses due to load change. Control
systems and controllers allow us to enact these changes in system properties
such as topology or equipment settings (e.g., tap settings on transformers)
and system behaviors (e.g., power flow control using FACTS devices).
However, the effectiveness of these controls, especially to influence behav-
iors, within the power system depends on the controllability of the system.
This relies on the controllers (location distribution, extent of abilities) and
the power system itself (topology, constraints). For example, if the power
system is at the brink of voltage collapse, we would like to utilize the avail-
able controls to avoid realizing the collapse and other detrimental effects.
Yet, can we be guaranteed that applying the appropriate controls will shift
our power system from its dire, nearly unstable state to a safe, normal state?
It depends on the controllability region of the system.
In power systems, the controllability region is the subset of the state space
on which the available controls can be used to steer the power system from
one state to any other state [30]. In general, the power system dynamical
equation can be written as:
x˙ = f(x) +
m∑
i=1
gi(x)ui, x ∈ Ξ (3.1)
where x is an n-vector of dynamic variables (e.g., generator rotor angles), f(x)




represents the effects of the controls on the system. The scalars ui, i =
1, ...,m, are the system controls (e.g., generator mechanical power injections)
and are usually piece-wise constant in time, due to device physical charac-
teristics. System state space, Ξ, is an open subset of the n-dimensional
Euclidean space. If we have X(x0, u, t) ∈ Ξ representing the system move-
ment with the initial state x0, control u, and 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞, the controllability
region satisfies:
X(s1, u, t) = s2, u ∈ U and 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞ (3.2)
where every pair of states s1 and s2 ∈ Z satisfies (3.2). Z is the control-
lability region, a subset of Ξ. Therefore, the system presented in (3.1) can
be steered from a state to any other state within the controllability region.
Further proofs and other references can be found in [30]. This formulation
is developed in more detail in later chapters.
Nonetheless, the calculation of the controllability region is more difficult
for a nonlinear system than a linear system. The power system is nonlinear
in nature, as most physical systems are, but is often approximated as a linear
system to simplify and achieve more tractable analysis. As Satchidanandan
et al. stated when developing an active defense strategy for networked cyber-
physical systems, they assumed linear systems because it results in more
tractable, useable calculations; the results are not specific to a nonlinear
system (and its many intricacies) but can be generalized to a broad class of
systems [31].
Thus, controllability analysis in power systems has primarily been derived
for linear systems. Classic linear methods developed for controllability and
observability are the Popov, Belevitch, and Hautus (PBH) eigenvector tests
using rank conditions [32]. Yet, these tests only provide answers in a “yes
or no” fashion—e.g., yes the system is observable or no, the system is not
observable. Although useful, more detail and having a measure of control-
lability (or the dual, observability) are desired. Hamdan and Elabdalla [33]
and Hamadan and Nayfeh [34] proposed using the cosine of the angle between
appropriate subspaces to develop a quantified measure for controllability and
observability of linear systems. Linear systems provide the means for more
clear-cut formulation and provide results that are, for the most part, effective
in application to the real, nonlinear systems.
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3.1.1 Review of Controllability Analysis Techniques
Nonlinear Controllability Analysis
The importance of discovering controllability region(s) within the power sys-
tem has motivated many analysis methods and frameworks. As the calcula-
tion is complex and can be burdensome (especially for the nonlinear power
system), various techniques have been derived to improve it. Differential
geometry concepts were applied by Hong et al. to characterize and con-
struct the complete controllability region of a power system using a nonlinear
model [35].
As the application of differential geometry had produced significant results
in the area of nonlinear control, Hong et al. sought to apply it to power
system controllability. Presented in 1999, such a systematic approach using
a nonlinear control model was new and, to the best of their knowledge, one
of the first applications of nonlinear controllability theory in power systems.
They modeled the power system as a nonlinear controlled dynamical system
with unbounded and bounded controls such as tap changers, capacitor banks,
and mechanical power input to generators.
By characterizing the entire control state space as an open manifold, Ω,
they used differential geometry concepts of foliations and leaves to discover
the complete controllability region. A controlled dynamical system is com-
pletely controllable on Ω if any two states on Ω are reachable from each other.
This is usually only achieved on a subset of the state space. A foliation of a
manifold, Ω in this case, refers to a parallel decomposition of the manifold.
Thus, if Ω is m-dimensional, the foliation of Ω is a family of disjoint sub-
manifolds of Ω, necessarily of equal dimension, whose union is Ω. Further,
the submanifold of the foliation is called a leaf of the foliation.
These leaves of the foliations contain the trajectories of the system, so
the possible directions of motion from any state are tangential to the leaf.
This is the basis for constructing the complete controllability region for un-
bounded controls. Next, they consider the equilibrium set of the system that
also meets the rank condition and prove that any state on that set is locally
controllable—any two states on a connected component of the set are reach-
able from each other. Further lemmas and proofs, as well as definitions of
local controllability, reachability, etc., are provided in [35].
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Since any two states on the rank condition-satisfied equilibrium set, E ′, are
reachable from each other, a finite sequence of controls can be constructed
to move the system to a neighborhood of intersection between the leaves of
the foliation (the trajectories of the system) and E ′. This is represented
conceptually in Figure 3.1, where Lλ is a leaf of the foliation. Thus, the
E'
Lλ
Figure 3.1: Representation of the complete controllability region with the
intersection of the leaves of the foliation and the equilibrium set, based on
an image from [35].
complete controllability region for a controlled dynamical system with un-
bounded controls is a union of the leaves of the foliation that intersect with
the rank condition-satisfied equilibrium set. Within this region, the system
can be steered from any other state if the controls (e.g., var compensation
levels or OLTC reference voltage values) can be adjusted without limitation
(unbounded control). The authors also derive the case for bounded controls
where similar analysis was applied but cannot geometrically be described
with foliations. Nonetheless, the complete controllability region is found to
be the intersection of the reachability and incident regions [35].
All in all, the developed theory gives sufficient conditions for complete
controllability of a power system with a nonlinear control model with un-
bounded and bounded control. These results are significant in applying the
differential geometry to achieve the controllability regions, especially for the
unbounded control case. Nonetheless, it is not realistic to have unbounded
control, although its theoretical results are very interesting and meaningful
for other branches of research.
The bounded control complete controllability region was calculated, but
the authors state more work is needed in making the computation of the in-
cident and reachability regions more feasible and less burdensome. It is very
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difficult to compute these regions and systems with more complexity and in-
creasing number of controls may not scale well. More tractable controllability
analysis for a nonlinear, controlled power system is needed.
Linear Controllability Analysis: Quantified Measures of Controllability
Within linear controllability analysis, we can utilize techniques such as the
aforementioned PBH eigenvector tests to determine whether a system is con-
trollable. This is a “yes/no” answer but remains very useful when analyzing
a system’s capabilities. Nonetheless, it is even more helpful to have a quan-
tified measure of controllability, that is, to be able to determine just how
controllable a system is—a range of controllability. Specifically, modal con-
trollability is studied where the impact of inputs on modes (associated with
the system’s eigenvalues) is analyzed.
Assume the following linear model of a power system:
x˙ = Ax+Bu (3.3)
y = CTx (3.4)
where x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm, and y ∈ Rl. If qi is a left eigenvector of A (pi is
a right eigenvector of A), the PBH eigenvector tests check whether qi and
bj (the jth column of B) are orthogonal. If orthogonal, the ith mode is not
controllable from the jth input. To achieve a measure of controllability, we
cannot use the magnitude of qTi b as a measure of the modal controllability.
This is because the left and right eigenvectors, qi and pi, respectively, are
scaled arbitrarily and we cannot depend upon or use rescaling.
Thus, Hamdan and Elabdalla [33] propose using the cosine of the angle
between the A and B subspaces for a quantified measure of controllability
(A and C for observability). However, to use this measure, the system must
have distinct eigenvalues and a well-conditioned modal matrix. The authors
show that condition numbers can be calculated for each eigenvalue and how
to check that these conditions are satisfied (and that they usually are) [33].
Nonetheless, their proposition is that the controllability of the ith mode in





If the result is zero, meaning the vectors are orthogonal, the mode is said to be
decoupled from the input and completely uncontrollable. Otherwise, we have
a measure of how controllable the system is with the resultant range [0, 1]—it
is a continuous function of the distance between the two subspaces. We can
consider the matrix B as an energy injection map where the controllability
measure provides an indication of the energy level of the input signal.
A gross measure of modal controllability can also be derived, considering
all inputs impacting the mode. After calculating (3.5) for every mode and
every input, we have a matrix of controllability measures with the number of
rows equal to the number of modes and the number of columns equal to the
number of inputs. Thus, the norm of the ith row of the matrix is a measure
of the gross controllability of the ith mode from all inputs.
Hamdan and Nayfeh [34] use this information to compute the recovery
region of a system after a disturbance occurs. The recovery region is a set
of initial conditions that can be steered to the origin in a finite time using
admissible control—called controllability to the origin. This is related to the
complete controllability region presented by Hong et al., presented in the pre-
vious section. For a single-input-single-output (SISO) system, the recovery
region can be characterized as a parallelpiped in which each semiaxis has a
length proportional to the controllability measure of the corresponding mode.
This is easily extended to the multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) case
(and with many state variables). Thus, the measures of gross controllability
indicate the shape of the recovery region.
Hamdan and Nayfeh [34] also determined that the product of the control-
lability and observability measures provides a joint measure of controllability
and observability of the mode and input (which can be an input from a ma-
chine/generator such as mechanical power). They also relate this concept to
generator coherency (group of machines that are strongly coupled to some
modes and weakly coupled to the rest) and residue matrix derived from the
transfer function of a MIMO system where the magnitude of the residue
can also be considered an indication of the joint modal controllability and
observability. These observations are detailed further in their 1989 paper.
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3.2 Distributed Controllers in Power Systems
3.2.1 Effective Placement of Distributed Controllers
When placing distributed controllers in a given power system, understand-
ing controllability and observability is essential to study to achieve effective
control. For this application, Messina and Nayebzadeh [36] formulated a
design procedure using modal analysis to derive controllability and observ-
ability measures to place multiple controllers. Specifically, they aimed to
place static var compensators (SVCs, a type of FACTs device) for power os-
cillation damping. The SVCs affect damping directly by modulating terminal
voltages as well as indirectly with the response to the voltage, affecting the
load and tie-line power. Expense of SVCs and the need to prevent adverse
controller action require systematic placement; damping improvement using
SVCs is also very location dependent.
The authors motivate the use of a linear system with their solution ap-
proach: damping is a linear phenomenon, warranting the analysis of a linear
system. Modal analysis of the linear system is utilized where the modal bus
voltage deviations and modal power oscillation flow are derived. The most
effective bus for damping a particular oscillation mode and the patterns of
oscillation energy exchanged are gleaned from these quantities, respectively.
To assess the effectiveness of SVCs to enhance damping of a specific mode,
controllability and observability concepts are applied. A system is control-
lable or observable if the appropriate matrices (from the state space repre-
sentation, as detailed in the previous section) are full rank. Another way
to check the matrix rank is based on the insight that it equals the number
of nonzero singular values; from this, the authors use the magnitude of the
nonzero minimum singular value (MSV) to measure how far the matrix is
from a matrix of lower rank—it is a quantitative measure of controllability
and observability.
An augmented matrix, for both observability and controllability, is formed
and its MSV is interpreted as a location index to indicate the effectiveness
of SVCs to enhance damping of a particular mode. In this manner, the
controllers (e.g., SVCs) can be sited across the power system such that ef-
fective control is achieved (e.g., oscillation damping) and adverse controller
interactions avoided (no competing devices due to effective placement).
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This work is similar to that of Hamdan and Elabdalla [33] in developing
a quantitative measure but for the specific application of placing distributed
controllers. However, it is worth investigating if scaling affects the MSV
measure and if that can cause incorrect controllability or observability mea-
sures. Nonetheless, effective placement constitutes a significant portion of
distributed controller research.
The placement of FACTS devices was also studied by Sharma et al. [37] for
which they proposed using an extended voltage phasors approach (EVPA).
Their method identified the most critical segments or buses in the power
system from a voltage stability perspective. The EVPA method modifies
the traditional voltage phasors approach (VPA) [38] by identifying not only
the critical transmission paths but also the critical segments or buses. They
hypothesize that the segment with the maximum corrected voltage drop in
the critical path is the best location for placing a FACTS controller. In par-
ticular, they studied SVCs, static synchronous compensators (STATCOM),
and thyristor-controlled series compensators (TCSCs). The EVPA method
was successful in its correct identification of critical transmission paths and
critical segments, as tested with various systems and validated with a known
algorithm. However, the placement of the FACTS device, although effective
from a voltage stability viewpoint, may not be for transient stability.
Leung and Chung [39] developed an optimal placement method for FACTS
controllers using genetic algorithms. Genetic algorithms are search tech-
niques that inherit their name from studying the concept of species evolu-
tion through generations. Essentially, the search is conducted starting from
a population of points rather than a single point. Only the objective func-
tion’s value and information are utilized, and the calculation concentrates
on obtaining a coding of the parameter sets, not the parameters themselves.
All in all, the authors seek to find the minimum generation cost by placing
the FACTS device while satisfying various power system constraints (e.g.,
power flow, line flow). Essentially, they studied the placement of FACTS
controllers from an economics standpoint and formulated a multi-objective
optimization problem using genetic algorithms (allowing multiple objectives
to be solved). The main drawback was the time consumption when consid-
ering a large system—the method did not scale well.
Besides FACTS controllers, research has also been conducted for the place-
ment and control of Mvar (Q) controllable buses, or Q-C buses, by Rogers
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et al. [40]. Their overall framework sought to develop a comprehensive form
of reactive power control that extends from the transmission level to the
customer level. Leveraging the coupling of reactive power and voltage, the
developed methodology identified the low-voltage buses and, subsequently,
the Q-C buses identified as most effective are instructed to provide reactive
power support. Thus, system voltages can be restored [40]. The Q-C bus
locations must be selected so that the most effective reactive power support
can be provided. Sensitivity analysis (voltage magnitude to reactive power
injection) and classification of the loads are used to determine the best, most
effective control placement of the Q-C buses.
As exemplified by this review of distributed controller placement algo-
rithms, it is a topic of prime importance when deploying effective control.
There are various techniques (e.g., modal analysis, optimization) that can
be applied, but accurate controllability analysis, consideration of stability
from many perspectives, ability to encompass various control objectives, and
scalability are key challenges that need to be addressed to develop the most
effective placement strategy for distributed controllers. This dissertation aids
those endeavors, especially by leveraging sensitivity analysis to capture the
intricate relationships between the controllers and system behaviors.
Nonetheless, these endeavors are in parallel with the efforts for preventing
distrusted control and maintaining full system control. These works are
reviewed in the following section.
3.2.2 Distrusted Control
Cascading Failures in Interdependent Networks
To address why distrusted control or failure of a small fraction of power
system nodes can have such significant, devastating effects, it is important to
study the nature of interconnected systems. Buldyrev et al. [41] discussed the
catastrophic cascade of failures that can occur in interdependent networks
in their 2010 Nature paper. They motivated the need for cyber-physical
system analysis, rather than focusing on single, non-interacting networks.
A framework to understand the robustness of the interacting networks (e.g.,
communication and control in power systems) subject to cascading failures is
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presented. They demonstrated how the failure of a small fraction of nodes of
one network can lead to the complete fragmentation of the system of several
interdependent networks.
An analytic approach to determine the critical fraction of nodes is devel-
oped. The removal of these nodes will lead to a failure cascade and complete
fragmentation of the interdependent networks. Buldyrev et al. demonstrate
that the broad degree of distribution increases vulnerability to random fail-
ures, unlike single networks. Graph theory, specifically Erdos networks and
power law, and percolation concepts are applied to determine the critical
threshold of the interconnected system in regards to splitting or remaining
intact. These ideas and formulations are elaborated further in [41].
A motivating example of the September 18th, 2003, Italy blackout is pro-
vided and analyzed [42]. Figure 3.2 displays the iterative process of the cas-
cade of failures in the interconnected power network (overlaid on the Italy
map) and Internet network (shifted from the Italy map). Buldyrev et al.
drew the networks using real geographical locations and the nearest Internet
servers are connected to each power plant.
Figure 3.2: From a-c, a power node is removed resulting in connected
Internet nodes being removed (highlighted in red). The nodes that will be
subsequently fragmented are highlighted in green within each network.
Ultimately, a cascade of node removal occurs due to disconnection of a
power or Internet node, increasing system fragmentation [41].
Within this dissertation, we focus on the removal of nodes within the
distributed controller network, either from failure or compromise. It must be
recognized that a fraction of the set can cause cascading failures or significant,
detrimental impact, as demonstrated by Buldyrev et al. Node loss affects not
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only controllability but also phenomena such as stability, as will be discussed
in Section 3.3, and has severe consequences in the form of distrusted control
and other cyber attacks, as examined next.
Cyber Attacks on Distributed Controllers
The impact of cyber attacks on distributed FACTS controllers has been stud-
ied by Chen et al. [43]. The paper discusses several attack scenarios and
stability indices to quantify the impacts. Using a 39-bus system and simu-
lations, they found that modification attacks, when measurement values are
changed (e.g., added bias), can cause severe consequences especially when
followed by a contingency; the system voltage or angle can become unstable.
Further consequences related to the type of FACTS device (STATCOM vs.
SVC) and type of bias (positive vs. negative) are also presented.
Similarly, Xiang et al. [44] examined the impact on power system reliability
of unified power flow controllers (UPFCs). These devices control active and
reactive power flows and their operation depends on both the physical and
cyber systems. With this insight, the authors develop an integrated analysis
and reliability model that encompasses both cyber and physical parts as well
as the four operation states of the UPFC. The expected energy not supplied
(EENS), an index for quantifying the reliability of the power system, was the
focus of their study. The comprehensive model was then analyzed and it is
shown that cyber attacks against UPFC may have an adverse influence. The
system reliability can be decreased with increased frequency of successful
attacks.
Both of these works involve the compromise of distributed controllers in the
power system. Yet only the consequences of these cyber attacks are discussed,
specifically in the context of power system transient stability and reliability.
Studies such as these are foundational in establishing the need for protection
of controllers in power systems, as severe consequences can occur. The need
must now be addressed in the form of schemes and analyses for the protection
of distributed control devices. By examining the impact of compromised
controllers on the system controllability, we will gain greater insight into
how to protect the controllers to maintain system control and avoid serious
damage to reliability and transient stability. Furthermore, proactive defenses
such as verification of the control commands before execution are motivated,
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as discussed in Section 2.3.2.
Compromises and Malfunctions within Control Systems
The impact of misbehaving controllers is explored from both a malicious
standpoint (e.g., infections with malware) and a benign standpoint (e.g.,
malfunctions due to failures). Gawand et al. [45] developed control-aware
techniques using data stream analysis concepts for the protection of indus-
trial control systems (ICSs) from malware. The authors claim that complete
protection against malicious software in power control systems is exceedingly
difficult in practice. These systems are often uniquely configured based on
deep knowledge of the particular controllers, the power system under con-
trol, and without much consideration of potential malicious adversaries. Yet
the use of data stream analysis in their detection techniques can become
time-consuming in large systems.
De Lima and Yen [46] proposed a supervisory system capable of detecting
controller malfunctions before the stability of the plant is compromised. It
is also able to differentiate between controller malfunctions and faults within
the plant. However, the occurrence of multiple faults cannot yet be handled.
They concentrate on the identification of plant disturbances to best decide
remedial actions. This dissertation work seeks to leverage the relationships
between the controllers and the power system—the cyber-physical system—
to protect and mitigate any plant disturbance identified for any size system.
Nonetheless, it is evident that controller malfunction and/or compromise is
a significant issue that can severely impact the power system.
Active Defenses
Given the attacker has already gained access to the power system and is
able to execute certain actions within it, active defense mechanisms become
integral for protection and mitigation. Davis et al. [47], from the perspective
of false data injection attacks, introduce a proactive defense method to detect
such attacks. The false data injected by an attacker can mislead the power
system operator or any automated, data-dependent devices to make decisions
and perform control actions based on a false state of the system [48–50].
Therefore, using a probing approach, their work proposes a perturbation-
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based detection strategy that is able to identify false data injection attacks.
By using the value of the data over time via a sequence of probes, they are
able to detect that an attack is occurring, at which meters and what the
changes in the values are [47]. Although this work focuses on unobservable
attacks (as the false data injections still satisfy system model equations),
the concept of probing signals can also be extended to controller commands
specifically.
Satchidanandan and Kumar [31] addressed the issue of secure control in a
networked cyber-physical system. They developed a protocol where honest
or uncompromised controller nodes superimpose stochastically independent
probing signals on top of the control law they intend to apply. Malicious
nodes can forward packets not actually received, introduce intentional delays,
alter packets before forwarding, and/or impersonate a different node in the
system.
Essentially, the key idea was to inject into the actuation signal a component
that is not known in advance. This idea is captured through the use of
physical watermarking where the controller commands actuators to inject
into the system a component that is random (and not known in advance).
The random variables are the actuator node’s privately imposed excitation
(distribution public but value is not disclosed) and, thus, force the sensor
(communicating with the actuator node) to report measurements that are
correlated with the random variable. In this manner, any attempt from
the sensor to distort the process noise (e.g., alter the data packets) will also
distort the watermark. This allows the honest nodes to discover the malicious
activity. To avoid this detection, the malicious sensors are restricted to only
minimal distortion and cannot cause any viable damage. The full protocol
framework is detailed in [31].
Satchidanandan and Kumar, and Davis et al., utilize the intuition that
they expect the system to react or behave in a unique way after a certain
action (e.g., probing or watermarking). They use this intuition to their ad-
vantage and observe the responses to their probing actions to detect malicious
or abnormal activity. In a cross-checking approach, Lin et al. [22] developed
a framework that relies on distributed IDSs to perform semantic analysis on
SCADA network packets. The execution consequences of control commands
are analyzed and the distributed IDS instances create trusted communica-
tion to detect any compromise of sensor measurements or control commands.
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This involves combining system knowledge of both cyber and physical infras-
tructure to best estimate the execution consequences, which is a crucial need
in the modern power grid, as will be motivated and discussed in Section 2.3.2.
Lastly, Srikantha and Kundur [51] studied denial of service (DoS) attacks
in a cyber-enabled power grid and demonstrated that adversaries can disrupt
the grid by only targeting a subset of the cyber communication nodes. As
an active defense, they proposed a collaborative reputation-based topology
configuration scheme. Using game theoretic principles, it is proved that
the a low-latency Nash equilibrium routing topology always exists for the
system [51]. Therefore, during a DoS attack, where the delays introduced by
the attacks can cause the system to be unstable, their proposed algorithm
is able to maintain dynamic stability. The algorithm enables the remaining,
uncompromised cyber nodes to rapidly converge to an equilibrium topology
and maintain dynamic stability.
3.3 Impact on Stability
3.3.1 Classification of Power System Stability
When developing control defense strategies, the impact on both the system
controllability and stability must be considered. Within distrusted control,
the cyber attacks launched by the adversary can cause various control changes
in the power system. These malicious changes can destabilize the system,
even if we maintain full system control, unless we monitor the system stability
and react quickly with our uncompromised distributed controllers. Therefore,
it is necessary to perform stability assessments during detrimental events such
as failure or compromise of distributed controllers. If stability is lost, a very
serious situation is encountered and sophisticated, additional strategies are
needed to attempt to regain it or minimize damage.
Power system stability is integral to secure system operation, and as such,
has been studied and addressed for several decades. It is defined by Kundur
et al. [52] as follows:
Power system stability is the ability of an electric power system,
for a given initial operating condition, to regain a state of oper-
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ating equilibrium after being subjected to a physical disturbance,
with most system variables bounded so that practically the entire
system remains intact.
It is further elaborated as a property of the system motion around an equilib-
rium set—the initial operating conditions. Disturbances can be characterized
as small (e.g., load changes) or large (e.g., loss of generator, significant faults).
The larger finite region of attraction for a stable equilibrium set results in
a more robust system, especially against large disturbances. It is unrealistic
to design a system that is stable for every possible disturbance, so the most
probable disturbances are considered [52]. Resiliency and reliability must
always be maximized.
The grid is complex and interconnected; various stressed conditions may
occur and give rise to different types of instability. If not mitigated, insta-
bility can disrupt system operation, damage components, and, in the worst
case, instigate blackout. There are three main categories of power system
stability, considering its physical nature, size of disturbance, and devices,
processes, and time span, listed below:
1. Rotor Angle Stability
• The ability of synchronous machines in power system to remain
in synchronism after a disturbance
2. Frequency Stability
• The ability of a power system to maintain steady frequency given
significant imbalance between generation and load after a severe
disturbance (e.g., system upset)
3. Voltage Stability
• The ability of the power system to maintain steady voltages at
all buses in the system after a disturbance from a given initial
operating condition
Further explanation and details are provided in [52]. Within these cate-
gories, we study types of stability that are most suitable considering appli-





3. Stability of Linear Systems
4. Partial Stability
Definitions and formulations of these types of stability are provided in [52]
and various power system stability literature. The first two, Lyapunov and
input-output stability, are most applicable for studying power system nonlin-
ear behavior after large disturbances. The last, partial stability, is effective
in classifying power system stability into the different aforementioned cate-
gories. In this work, we concentrate on stability of linear systems, which is
often utilized for small-signal stability analysis in power systems. The clas-
sification of power system stability with the described categories and types
is visually represented in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Types and categories of power system stability considering time
spans [52].
To develop effective control defense strategies, as will be detailed in this
dissertation, we must consider stability in our formulation. Power system
stability is complex; strategies to mitigate or eliminate instability are com-
plicated and require intensive formulation and study beyond the scope of this
work. However, it is recognized that the stability of the system, under dis-
tributed controller compromise of failure, must be considered and monitored
34
within the developed strategies that seek to maintain system controllability.
In this manner, we apply linear system stability concepts to evaluate the
state of the system in regards to stability and, if instability arises, alert op-
erators to take appropriate action and/or apply suitable stability mitigation
strategies.
3.3.2 Cyber Attacks and the Evaluation of Stability
Amini et al. utilized linear system stability to evaluate dynamic load altering
attacks (D-LAA) against power system stability in [53]. Power system cyber
attacks target the generation sector, distribution and control sector, and
the consumption or load sector. Their work focused on the latter, in which
demand response (DR) programs that are used by utilities to control the
load at the user side of the meter in response to grid condition changes are a
prominent target. A D-LAA consists of an adversary attempting to control
and change a group of remotely accessible and unsecured controllable loads
in order to damage the system through circuit overflow or other mechanisms
[53]. The changes enacted by the D-LAA are not only in the amount of load,
but also in the dynamic trajectory of the load over time. The attack is based
on feedback from power system frequency.
The authors formulate and analyze a closed-loop D-LAA against power sys-
tem stability using feedback frequency. Subsequently, a protection scheme
is designed against various types of D-LAA by formulating and solving a
non-convex pole placement optimization problem. The objective is to mini-
mize the total vulnerable load that must be protected to assure power system
stability under D-LAAs against the remaining unprotected vulnerable loads.
Details on this optimization problem and D-LAA characterization are pro-
vided in the full paper [53].
Essentially, the protection scheme identifies which loads must be protected—
the critical loads. In this manner, with those critical loads (the minimum
amount) protected, power system stability is assured under D-LAAs against
the remaining unprotected vulnerable loads. The stability is assessed by
checking that the poles of the system remain in the left half plane (LHP)
during D-LAA attacks on unprotected vulnerable loads [54]. The system is
closed-loop system stable if there exists a symmetric positive semi-definite
35
matrix satisfying the inequality conditions. Using coordinate descent method,
the results identify the fraction of loads that need to be protected to main-
tain stability. An example result for the IEEE 39-bus system is shown in
Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Optimal load protection scheme for IEEE 39-bus system [53].
Therefore, identifying the critical loads and the fraction that needs to be
protected to maintain the loads is achieved by examining the linear system
model. In particular, the poles of the system are studied and the solution
approach is to “backsolve” for the vulnerable load amount settings.
3.4 Key Points
Moving forward, the key takeaways and points to address are:
1. The effective placement of distributed controllers to achieve flexible
control within the power system is significant and warrants the devel-
opment of accurate and scalable techniques.
2. Given the sited distributed controllers, the impact of distrusted, com-
promised controllers and subsequent defense mechanisms are necessary
to study.
• Insights into the roles of the distributed controllers and their con-
tributions to system controllability and interactions with one an-
other are needed.
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– Such information can benefit control response strategies to
mitigate and minimize compromise consequences.
• Nonlinear controllability analysis provides the most robust analy-
sis but is intractable for realistic cases of bounded control.
• Linear controllability analysis offers more computationally effi-
cient and widely applicable results for a broad class of systems.
3. When developing control defense strategies, the impact on both system
controllability and stability must be considered.
• There are various categories and types of stability that must be
appropriately chosen for study depending on the application.
• Strategies to mitigate or eliminate instability, which are beyond
the scope of this work, are complicated and require intensive for-
mulation; stability assessment needs to be included.
• Protection schemes are being developed to protect power system
stability from cyber attacks but mostly concentrate on the plan-
ning stage to reduce vulnerability.
4. Proactive defense requires real-time analysis, but to eliminate any ma-
licious control actions (no allowance of “minimal”), verification of the
control commands before execution is required.
• As the power grid is a cyber-physical system, the control com-
mands must be examined from the points of view of both the
cyber and physical layers.
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CHAPTER 4
DISTRIBUTED CONTROLLER ROLE AND
INTERACTION DISCOVERY
4.1 Problem Statement
The smart grid initiative has driven the industry toward increasingly so-
phisticated systems of sensors, algorithms, and controllers that are involved
in widespread communications and online decisions in power systems. Dis-
tributed controllers play a prominent role in deploying this cohesive execution
and are ubiquitous in their presence in the grid. As discussed previously,
global information is shared and acted upon; if one distributed controller
fails, the remaining set is quick to respond and ensure the overall control
objective is maintained. However, multiple failures can cause detrimental,
cascading effects (e.g., overloads leading to blackout) as the set struggles to
automatically meet the control goal. Furthermore, if the controllers are mali-
ciously compromised, they can be manipulated to drive the power system to
an unsafe or unreliable operating state. Attack vectors for distributed con-
trollers range from execution of malicious commands that can cause damage,
to sensitive equipment, to forced system topology changes causing instability.
In this regard, distrusted control can be defined as when controller(s) from
the complete set are compromised and under the command of a sophisticated
attacker. This adversary can craft these commands in a legitimate format
and thus have them successfully executed in the system. Furthermore, these
alterations could be masked to the operator or any security systems. Cyber
attacks on the power grid are a serious issue, with about 40% of total criti-
cal infrastructure cyber incidents reported to the Department of Homeland
Security from 2009 to 2014 occurring in the energy sector [55]. In fact, one
of the first large-scale attacks on a power grid occurred in December 2015 in
Ukraine, where cyber attacks led to the disconnection of 7 substations and
power outage to 225,000 customers for several hours [56]. If not dealt with
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swiftly, these attacks can have a high cost to society and can cause serious
damage [57]. Additionally, the threat of physical consequences resulting from
these cyber attacks has become a serious concern, as demonstrated by [11,12].
Hence, security of the corresponding control systems is critical to trustworthy
grid operation as well as national security and public safety.
In preventing and mitigating these attacks, specifically on distributed con-
trollers, we must consider: the attack vectors, adversary capabilities, trusted
entities, and impact on system controllability and stability. With the modern
power grid increasingly being outfitted with publicly available operating sys-
tems, network or Internet communication, and third-party software, there
are many more access points for an attacker to gain entry. We no longer
have the benefit of “security by obscurity” as historically achieved by propri-
etary control protocols that varied utility to utility – the adversary no longer
needs to be deeply knowledgeable of the specific utility system to launch a
successful attack [5].
In this chapter, we focus on attacks which disrupt system control result-
ing from compromised or failed distributed controller(s). As mentioned,
controller-based threats include execution of malicious control commands
as well as changes to controller-level code and binaries which may drive the
system to an unsafe or unreliable operating state. In particular, this work
provides an analytic solution to help restore the control capability of a sys-
tem given a controller attack. By identifying the role of each controller,
whether they are critical, essential, or redundant to system controllability,
we can develop powerful techniques to improve control as well as protect the
system. Furthermore, discovering the control support groups that indicate
the interaction of the controllers with one another provides useful informa-
tion. This insight can allow development of systematic method(s) to ensure
or regain control of the system given compromise or failure. A control re-
sponse algorithm using the remaining, uncompromised controllers is provided
in Chapter 5.
4.2 Power System Controllability
As discussed in Section 3.1, the controllable region is the subset of the state
space on which the available controls can be used to steer the power system
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from one state to any other state [30]. In general, the power system dynamical
equation can be written as:
x˙ = f(x) +
m∑
i=1
gi(x)ui, x ∈ Ξ (4.1)
where x is an n-vector of dynamic variables (e.g., generator rotor angles), f(x)
is a vector consisting primarily of the power flow equations, and
∑m
i=1 gi(x)ui
represents the effects of the controls on the system. The scalars ui, i =
1, ...,m, are the system controls (e.g., generator mechanical power injections)
and are usually piece-wise constant in time, due to device physical charac-
teristics. System state space, Ξ, is an open subset of the n-dimensional
Euclidean space. If we have X(s1, u, t) ∈ Ξ representing the system move-
ment with the initial state s1, control u, and 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞, the controllable
region satisfies:
X(s1, u, t) = s2, u ∈ U and 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞ (4.2)
where every pair of states s1 and s2 ∈ Z satisfies (4.2). Z is the controllable
region, a subset of Ξ. Therefore, the system presented in (4.1) can be steered
from a state to any other state within the controllable region. Further proofs
and other references can be found in [30]. For this work, we will focus on
decomposing the set of controls
∑m
i=1 gi(x)ui into the controller role and
control support group sets.
4.2.1 Controllability Analysis Techniques
Classic linear methods developed for controllability and observability are the
Popov, Belevitch, and Hautus (PBH) eigenvector tests using rank conditions
[32]. Yet, these tests only provide answers in a “yes or no” fashion—e.g.,
yes the system is observable or no, the system is not observable. Although
useful, more detailed measures of controllability (or the dual, observability,
as discussed in Section 4.2.2) are desired.
Hamdan and Elabdalla [33] and Hamadan and Nayfeh [34] proposed using
the cosine of the angle between appropriate subspaces to develop a quantified
measure for controllability and observability of linear systems. Given the
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linear system
x˙ = Ax + Bu; y = CTx (4.3)





In this manner, the measure is a continuous function of the distance be-
tween the two subspaces. Thus, instead of the pass/fail controllability re-
sult per mode as provided by the classic PBH eigenvector tests, a measure
for the range of controllability is achieved. Further work by Hamadan and
Nayfeh [34] demonstrated joint measures of controllability and observability
and generator coherency relations.
Messina and Nayebzadeh [36] formulated a design procedure using modal
analysis to derive quantitative controllability and observability measures to
place multiple controllers. To check if the controllability or observability
matrices, A or B in (4.3), are full rank, they examined the number of nonzero
singular values. Thus, the magnitude of the nonzero minimum singular value
(MSV) is used to measure how far the matrix is from a matrix of lower rank.
Further details on these methods as well as nonlinear controllability analysis
are provided in Section 3.1. Nonetheless, our proposed methodology delves
into the relationships between the controllers to determine control support
groups and, with the subsequent placement, extends to identifying critical
and essential controllers that ensure system controllability.
4.2.2 Observability Analysis Techniques of Interest
Unlike controllability, system observability analysis has been investigated in
the cyber security context, particularly data attacks. A system is observable
if at time t0 there exists a finite time t1 > t0 such that for any initial state s0
at t0, knowledge of the input u(t) and the output y(t) for t0 ≤ t ≤ t1 suffices
to determine s0. Observability and controllability are dual concepts; if the
dual of system is observable, the original system is controllable. Conversely,
the original system is observable if and only if the dual is controllable [58].
41
Bobba et al. [59] explored the detection of false data injection attacks.
They identified a set of basic measurements to protect what is necessary and
sufficient for detecting such attacks and ensuring system observability. The
system measurements were mapped to a new equivalent state space where
lower-upper (LU) matrix decomposition was applied to determine the sets
of basic and redundant measurements, as in [60]. Kosut et al. [61] studied
malicious data attacks and developed a graph-theoretic security index to find
the smallest set of attacked meters capable of causing network unobservabil-
ity. Both papers focus on observability, essential in protecting against data
attacks on sensors. However, these analyses do not extend to and are in-
adequate when dealing with system actuation and compromised controllers.
Controllability analysis must be applied to gain the necessary insights into
protecting against loss of system control.
4.3 Solution Overview
In this chapter, we focus on distributed control devices and the impact of
compromised controllers on system controllability within a cyber-adversarial
environment. We study how to determine the amount of flexibility and redun-
dancy of control available for any given power system topology and controller
configuration. Similar to the work of Bobba et al. [59] that determined the
sets of basic and redundant measurements, we seek to motivate and invoke
the use of these and other observability-based methods to also study control.
Using clustering and factorization techniques, the proposed work identifies
the essential and critical controllers for maintaining controllability of the sys-
tem as well as the redundant ones. With this classification, the compromise
of controllers can be analyzed to determine how the remaining controllers
should react to restore the system to its normative state.
• Critical controllers (gCi(x)uCi): devices that are irreplaceable and
mandatory for system controllability
• Essential controllers (gEi(x)uEi): minimal set of devices required to
maintain system controllability
• Redundant controllers (gRi(x)uRi): devices that can be removed with-
out affecting system controllability
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Our method performs power system controllability analysis to provide an
analytical solution to restore or maintain system control given a controller
attack. Specifically, the controlled dynamical power system (4.1) can be
described with each controller identified as critical, essential, or redundant:
x˙ = f(x) + {gC1(x)uC1 + gC2(x)uC2 + ...+ gCTC(x)uCTC}
+ {gE1(x)uE1 + gE2(x)uE2 + ...+ gETE(x)uETE}
+ {gR1(x)uR1 + gR2(x)uR2 + ...+ gRTR(x)uRTR}
(4.5)
where x ∈ Ξ and C1 to CTC represents the critical controllers where TC is the
total number. Similarly, E1 to ETE represents the essential controllers where
TE is the total number and R1 to RTR represents the redundant controllers
where TR is the total number.
Figure 4.1 shows the high-level architecture of the proposed method. The
algorithm uses clustering and factorization along with sensitivity analysis
and provides a general power grid controllability analysis that can be ap-
plied to any control parameters and any deployed controller devices (only
the appropriate sensitivities are required).
Obtain sensitivity 
matrix ???
•Must reflect control 
parameter and 
controlled quantity
Process rows of ???
with clustering
• Calculate coupling index 
and data-dependent 
cluster number
•Determine Line Flow 
and Control Support 
Groups
Process columns of ???
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Figure 4.1: Proposed methodology that applies clustering and factorization
methods to process controller sensitivities.
In the following sections, we provide the details on the methodology using
clustering and factorization techniques. The algorithms calculate and process
the sensitivities to determine the control support groups.
• Control support groups : the controllers that are highly coupled for
impact on both the control objective and each other
Controller coupling is discussed further in Section 4.5. For example, given
8 controllers (one on each transmission line in an 8-line system), we can
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describe the system using the control support groups:
x˙ = f(x) +
GROUP 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
g1(x)u1 + g4(x)u4 +
GROUP 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
g3(x)u3 + g6(x)u6 + g8(x)u8
+
GROUP 3︷ ︸︸ ︷
g2(x)u2 + g5(x)u5 + g7(x)u7
(4.6)
Each of the square bracket pairs, GR1 − GR3, embodies a control support
group—there are 3 in total. In this case, we achieve information on which
controllers work most effectively together on controlling a specific group of
transmission lines. Using these grouping results, a target set of lines/devices
can be determined that encompass the necessary control, one from each in-
dependent group. This target set’s sensitivity matrix is then analyzed to
determine the critical, essential, and redundant sets of controllers. Further
insight into the use of these results will be detailed throughout the chapter,
specifically Section 4.8. The novel contributions of this work are as follows:
1. Determining controllability-equivalence sets, the control support groups,
via clustering
2. Computing the number of equivalence sets (clusters) using a novel
sensitivity-based method
3. Identifying the critical, essential, and redundant controller sets via fac-
torization
4.4 Leveraging Sensitivities
A system’s sensitivity matrix (A
′′
in Figure 4.1) is often used for robust con-
trol to ensure controller parameters are chosen in such a way that the closed
loop system is not sensitive to variations in process dynamics [62]. With
such sensitivity information, placement of the control devices to achieve var-
ious objectives is facilitated as well as details on the impact of compromised
controllers on overall system controllability.
For our application, we require knowledge of the independently controllable
lines as well as the controller role sets. The sets of those lines can be defined
as:
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• Line flow groups : the sets of transmission lines that can be controlled
independently
The control support groups, as defined in Section 4.3, provide the correspond-
ing control. To obtain these groups, we cluster the rows of the sensitivity
matrix and then investigate which lines are most affected by each other as
well as those that are not and have no relation. Additionally, we decompose
the transposed sensitivity matrix to determine the critical, essential, and
redundant sets of controllers.
The appropriate sensitivities to be utilized depend on the control device
and objective. To exemplify the framework, we use distributed flexible AC
transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. The versatile array of D-FACTS
devices for power flow control includes distributed series reactors (DSRs) and
distributed static series compensators (DSSCs), and is currently deployed by
SmartWires Inc. [63,64]. We focus on DSSCs in this work, but are motivated
by the flexibility of D-FACTS and the various sensitivities that can be de-
rived. The results presented in this chapter will be broadly useful and clearly
indicate how any controller and control objective may be interchanged. This
controller acts as a synchronous voltage source in series with the line, chang-
ing the line’s effective impedance and thus its power flow [64–66]. Therefore,
we concentrate on sensitivities considering power flows. Specifically, we use
the total power flow to impedance sensitivity matrix. It reflects both direct
(i.e., change in impedance of a line and its direct impact on that line’s power
flow) and indirect (i.e., change in impedance of a line and its indirect im-
pact on all other lines’ power flows) sensitivities. This sensitivity matrix is
represented as Ω.
∆Pflow.total = [Ω] ·∆x (4.7)
where ∆Pflow.total are the changes in the line power flows and ∆x are the
impedances. Including the indirect power flow sensitivities in the calculation
of Ω allows the representation of the impact of lines on all other lines, which
is very useful for our analysis in determining line flow groups. Nonetheless,
other sensitivity matrices can be used depending on the desired application;
further sensitivity formulations for D-FACTS devices are developed in [67].
With the calculated sensitivity matrix, we can apply clustering to deter-
mine the control support and line flow groups. The matrix is represented
as A
′′
in Figure 4.1. It is important to note that the algorithms presented
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Figure 4.2: Completely decoupled line flows (a) and completely coupled line
flows (b) [67].
in this work are applicable to any controller and control objective; only the
appropriate sensitivity matrix needs to be selected, or more precisely, one
that reflects the controlled quantities and the control objective.
4.5 Controllability-Equivalence Sets
By obtaining sets of line flows that can be independently controlled with
respect to other sets in a system, we can gain valuable insight on the influence
of various controllers and the control support groups. Identifying these line
flow groups is a key step in achieving comprehensive power flow control.
Within each set, it only makes sense to control one line flow, as they are
all highly coupled given the power system topology; controlling one line flow
will always strongly impact the others in a predictable way. The example
application is the placement of D-FACTS devices, where the goal is to achieve
the most comprehensive control over the greatest number of lines.
4.5.1 Control Support Groups
To provide the most complete and effective control for the entire system, it
is necessary to identify how the controlling of different line flows are related
to each other by determining the control support groups [67]. We can study
a trivial example shown in Figure 4.2 where line flow vectors are illustrated
as completely coupled or decoupled. When the vectors are orthogonal, the
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line flows are completely decoupled as shown in Figure 4.2(a.), and can be
controlled independently. Conversely, in the completely coupled case in Fig-
ure 4.2(b.), the row vectors are aligned and the angle between them is 0◦.
When line flows are highly coupled, only one needs to be controlled, as the
others will respond as well. Independent control of those lines cannot be
achieved. When the row vectors are exactly aligned but point in opposite
directions (angle of 180◦), the lines are still completely coupled [67].
The ability of certain lines to exhibit this independently controllable prop-
erty is discernible from the relationships in the sensitivities. We can com-
pare the cosine of the angles between vectors and determine the coupling sets.
Subsequently, grouping of line flows can be determined using any appropriate
clustering algorithm.
4.5.2 Coupling Index
We leverage the line flow vector angle relationships, to determine the controllability-
equivalence sets by comparing the angles between row vectors of the sensitiv-
ity matrix to find the coupled and decoupled sets of lines flows. To calculate
and compare these angles, we utilize the coupling index (CI) and measure
the cosine similarity [68]. The CI is equal to the cosine of the angle between






The clusters identified using the CI are approximately orthogonal to each
other. The CI has values between −1 and 1. By clustering on the rows of the
sensitivity matrix using CI, the coupled and decoupled sets of line flows can
be determined. Thus, each cluster will be independent and decoupled from
the other sets. Within the cluster, the line flows are coupled and dependent
on one another.
4.6 Number of Clusters
Our solution will determine the controllability-equivalence sets through clus-
tering using the coupling indices, CI, calculated from the sensitivity matrix.
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A well-known challenge for clustering algorithms (i.e., k-means or k-mediods)
is the selection of the number of clusters k [69, 70]. For our application, it
is difficult to arbitrarily select k as it will change on a system by system
basis. We want to find the clusters that most accurately reflect how we can
effectively control lines that are either highly dependent on or independent
of each other. Thus, we require highly cohesive clustering.
We chose to use hierarchical agglomerative clustering as it groups data by
creating a cluster tree or dendogram. The goal was to avoid strict man-
ual selection of k. When cutting the hierarchical tree into clusters, the
algorithm requires either a cutoff value c (where to cut the tree) or max-
imum threshold value km for the number of clusters to form [71]. Thus, even
if we assign km, it provides a maximum number of clusters rather than a
strict rule to form exactly (possibly non-optimal number of) k clusters as
in k-means. The proposed framework implements a solution based on the
sensitivity matrix to determine the number of most significant clusters that
represent controllability-equivalence sets.
4.6.1 Sensitivity-based Threshold
The controllability-equivalence set methodology computes the coupling in-
dices that indicate the cosine similarities between lines. In this section, we
describe our method of deriving km from the system sensitivities so that we
can achieve the most suitable clustering for the line flow groups.
To leverage the sensitivity matrix and its inherent groupings, singular val-
ues are studied and are computed using singular value decomposition (SVD).
The SVD of a m× n matrix A is
A = UΣVT (4.9)
where U is a m × m orthogonal matrix, V is a n × n orthogonal matrix,
and Σ is a m × n diagonal matrix with the singular values listed in de-
creasing order [72, 73]. The method applies SVD to obtain a rank reduced
approximation of a data set to generalize some properties or structure. One
interpretation of the singular values is information on the largest contribu-
tions to the matrix and its general structure. Therefore, the most significant
or largest singular values represent the most significant groups present in the
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data, which in our case is the sensitivity matrix.
Using the number of most significant singular values from the sensitivity
matrix, we can achieve an initial guess for the number of clusters and for
our choice of hierarchical clustering threshold, i.e., km. To determine which
singular values are most significant, our methodology calculates an optimal
hard threshold using the techniques detailed by Gavish and Donoho [74].
Henceforth, we will call their algorithm the hard threshold singular value
(HTSV) method. HTSV considers the recovery of low-rank matrices from
noisy data by hard thresholding singular values. The HTSV thresholding
rules adapt to unknown rank and noise level in an optimal manner and
provide better results than truncated SVD (TSVD) [75].
For a nonsquare m × n matrix with an unknown noise level, the optimal
threshold value τˆ ∗ is:
τˆ ∗ = ω(β) · ymed (4.10)
where ymed is the median singular value of the data matrix Y and the optimal
hard threshold coefficient is dimension-dependent (β = m
n
) and calculated
using a numerical formula, ω(β). If the matrix is square, ω(β) is simply
replaced by 4√
3
[74]. The final result is not a fixed threshold chosen a-priori
but a data dependent threshold, which is preferred in our case.
4.6.2 Silhouette-Based Refinement
With the number of singular values from the sensitivity matrix that satisfy
the hard threshold, an initial minimum number of clusters kin is found. Since
we seek high cohesiveness within our clusters for effective control, we then
iterate on kin by evaluating (1) silCV , the coefficient of variance (the ratio of
standard deviation to the mean) and (2) silavg, the average of the resultant
cluster’s silhouette values for kin. Satisfying these conditions, low silCV and
high silavg, ensures the objects within the clusters are well-matched and
cohesive.
The silhouette technique is used to evaluate how well each object lies within
its cluster. That is, silhouettes compare how similar an object is to the other
objects in its cluster when compared to the objects in other clusters. The
silhouette value, sili for the i-th object, ranges from −1 to 1; thus, the closer
sili is to 1, the more well matched it is to its own cluster and poorly-matched
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to neighboring clusters [76].
By iterating on kin and satisfying the above mentioned conditions to achieve
highly cohesive clusters, we obtain kf to input as the final maximum number
of clusters km for the hierarchical clustering or as k for other methods. This
process is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Singular values





• Calculate ??? with 
the HTSV method
• Apply to ?? to 
determine most 
significant
• Set as ???
Number of clusters
• Iterate on ??? by 
evaluating ?????
and ??????
•Obtain ?? , the 
final maximum 
number of clusters
Figure 4.3: Cluster number selection calculated using the sensitivity matrix
singular values and silavg, silCV results.
4.7 Critical, Essential, and Redundant Controller Sets
With the resultant control support and line flow groups, the power grid
operators and security administrators can specify the number of controllers
to consider as well as an objective for each group of interest. The devices
can be placed for maximum controllability such that the most independent
controllability of groups is achieved. A target set of lines can be derived, as
only one line from each independent group needs to be controlled. Hence,
the target set is analyzed to discover the critical, essential, and redundant
sets of controllers.
Consequently, the protection of critical controllers would be necessary in
maintaining system controllability. If a controller from any set is compro-
mised, we can determine how to recover the system controllability using
controllers from its support group. This requires examining the coupling of
the columns of the sensitivity matrix (of the target set), henceforth generally
labeled as A
′′
, or the rows of [A
′′
]T, to identify candidate lines with the best
spread (linearly independent) to meet the objective.
As mentioned previously, such as the work by Bobba et al. [59], detailed
observability analysis has been investigated by many research groups. Par-
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ticularly, Chen and Abur [77] defined a critical measurement as one whose
elimination from the measurement set results in an unobservable system.
A similar methodology can be applied to identify critical controllers as
well. We apply the analysis on our sensitivity matrix to study controllabil-
ity, the dual of observability. The idea is to perform a change of basis to
obtain a mapping from measurements to equivalent states. Instead of using
this decomposition to examine the redundancy of measurements for estimat-
ing states, we use it to examine the set of control devices needed to control
equivalent line flows. Define [A
′′
]T, where the rows correspond to control
devices and columns correspond to the variable being controlled. For sim-
plicity, we continue to use the example of D-FACTS devices with columns
corresponding to the real power flows to be controlled. Again, we only con-
sider the real power flows of the target set of lines, as determined from the
clustering results.
LU factorization is applied to obtain the change of basis, decomposing
the transposed sensitivity matrix to lower and upper triangular factors; [78]













Using the Peters-Wilkinson [78] method, we are able to decompose [A
′′
]T into
its factors, where P is the permutation matrix and LF and UF are the lower
and upper triangular factors of dimension n, respectively. M is a sparse,
rectangular matrix with rows corresponding to redundant controllers. The









The new basis, shown in (4.13), must be full rank for a controllable system
and this requires the m× (n− 1) matrix to have a column rank of (n− 1) to
be a controllable n-bus system with m-measurements. Since LF and UF will
be nonsingular for a controllable system, the rank of [A
′′
]T can be confirmed
by checking the rank of the transformed factor LCER. Also, LF has full rank
and with (4.13) multiplied by L−1b from the right, the row identities will be
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preserved in the transformed matrix LCER. Each row of the matrix will,
therefore, correspond to the respective controllers [77].
Rows of In correspond to essential controls that are sufficient to assure
independent controllability of the equivalent line flows. If the essential con-
troller is the only non-zero entry of an equivalent line flow column, it is the
only controller that can control it and is irreplaceable. There is only one en-
try for that line flow and it is in In. Thus, the control corresponding to that
row in In is critical, since that equivalent line flow cannot be independently
controlled by any of the other devices. Rows of R correspond to redundant
controls. These roles were defined in Section 4.3. Columns correspond to the
equivalent flows which can easily be mapped back to the original flows using
the permutation matrix P obtained from the LU decomposition step.
4.8 Evaluations
The proposed methodology to discover the distributed controller role and
interaction (controllability-equivalence sets) was tested on several systems,
as presented in this section. Detailed results are provided with the small,
7-bus system to exemplify the algorithms, and overall results are provided
for two large systems to demonstrate scalability and utility.
4.8.1 PowerWorld 7-bus System
We first evaluate a 7-bus system with 5 generators and 11 lines that is mod-
eled in PowerWorld as the B7 DFACTS DEMO case [79]. For this study, we
assume the controllers are D-FACTS devices whose control objective is to
change line flows by changing the effective impedance of lines. We first per-
form an a-priori grouping of parallel lines. In this case, there are two parallel
lines, lines 10 and 11. Whichever line flow group and critical or redundant
set line 10 is placed in, line 11 is also in. We also exclude the transformers as
D-FACTS controller placement options. Lastly, we posit there is a controller
on every allowable line for simplicity, but this can be easily altered as well.
Using the total power flow to impedance sensitivity matrix Ω, discussed
in Section 4.4, we compute the CI matrix to measure the cosine similarity
between row elements of Ω. Next, we perform SVD on Ω and obtain the
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Table 4.1: Singular Values yi of Ω
y1 y2 y3 y4 y5 y6 y7 ...
4.13 3.24 1.14 1.06 0.41 0.02 0.01 ...
Table 4.2: Line Flow Grouping Clusters
Clus1 Clus2 Clus3 Clus4 Clus5 Clus6
L1, L2, L6, L8 L3, L4 L5 L7 L9 L10, L11
singular values, yi, shown in Table 4.1 where y8, y9, and y10 are near zero.
With the calculated hard threshold τˆ ∗ = 0.503 for the n × n sensitivity
matrix Ω, we find that 4 singular values satisfy this threshold. Therefore, we
set kin = 4 and then iterate on it to achieve the most accurate clustering with
the coefficient of variance below 0.1 and the average silhouette value above
0.9. These are strict constraints that allow for cohesive clusters, as required
for our application. In this manner, the number of clusters is increased to 6
so we set km = 6 and achieve our line flow groups. The resultant line flow
groups, labeled Clus1-Clus6, are provided in Table 4.2.
Figure 4.4 displays the silhouette plots for varying maximum cluster num-
ber values (kin to kf ) and Table 4.3 summarizes average silhouette values for
the varying km. For comparison, we show the k-means clustering results as
well.
These results indicate that hierarchical clustering performs the best for
our application. Its accuracy increases consistently (unlike k-means) and
also achieves the required threshold rapidly. As mentioned in Section 4.6.2,
the closer silavg is to 1, the more accurate or well-matched the clustering is.
Note that line 11 (parallel with line 10) is also included in the final results.
The clusters are visually represented in Figure 4.5. The lines are colored
according to cluster membership, a black line indicates only that line was in
Table 4.3: Average Silhouette Values
km/k = 4 km/k = 5 km/k = 6
silavg,km 0.784 0.801 0.969
























































Silhouette Plot: k=6 (k−means)
Figure 4.4: Silhouette plots for varying max cluster km and k-means k.
the cluster – not grouped with any other line.
Now that we have the line flow groups, we can determine the the critical,
essential, and redundant sets of controllers. In fact, the cluster results can
be used to determine the target set of lines. Only one line in each line flow
group needs to be controlled, so one line from each cluster can be selected to
be analyzed with the controller sets. For example, a target set of lines that
encompasses control of the entire system can be L1, L3, L5, L7, L9, and
L10 (L: line). By applying the decomposition method on the transposed
sensitivity matrix, [A
′′
]T, comprised of the targeted lines and all possible
controllers, we achieve the new basis LCER shown in Table 4.4 and results
provided in Table 4.5.
By examining Table 4.4, we can determine the critical, essential, and re-
dundant controllers. An equivalent line flow column with only one non-zero
entry, as highlighted for EQ.L3, has only one device that can control it and
thus is a critical controller corresponding to row 3. The essential controllers
are discovered by examining the first 6 rows (In) and the remaining 4 rows
























Figure 4.5: 7-bus case with lines colored according to cluster group and
labeled with critical, essential, and redundant controllers.
Table 4.4: Transformed Basis
EQ.L1 EQ.L2 EQ.L3 EQ.L4 EQ.L5 EQ.L6
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0
0 1.0000 0 0 0 0
0 0 1.0000 0 0 0
0 0 0 1.0000 0 0
0 0 0 0 1.0000 0
0 0 0 0 0 1.0000
-0.0014 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0899 -0.0000 -0.0000
-0.0144 0.0000 -0.0000 0.9227 -0.0000 -0.0000
0.0000 1.5107 0.0000 -0.0018 -1.0644 0.7466
-0.1250 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.1865 0.0000 -0.0000
Table 4.5: Critical, Essential, and Redundant Controller Sets
Lines with Controllers
Critical Set L5
Essential Set L2, L3, L4, L7, L8
Redundant Set L1, L6, L9, L10, L11
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there are controllers on every line, the critical and essential controllers on
lines 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 would provide full system controllability. The loca-
tions of the critical, essential, and redundant controllers for the 7-bus system
are also illustrated in Figure 4.5.
Insights for Regaining Control
With these valuable results about the flexibility and redundancy of the con-
trol, we can effectively strategize regaining control of a given system after a
controller attack. The resultant line flow grouping clusters and critical and
redundant controller sets are shown in combination in (4.14).
x˙ = f(x) +
GROUP 1︷ ︸︸ ︷
gR1(x)uR1 + gE2(x)uE2 + gR6(x)uR6 + gE8(x)uE8
+
GROUP 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
gE3(x)uE3 + gE4(x)uE4 +
GROUP 3︷ ︸︸ ︷
gC5(x)uC5 +
GROUP 4︷ ︸︸ ︷
gE7(x)uE7
+
GROUP 5︷ ︸︸ ︷
gR9(x)uR9 +
GROUP 6︷ ︸︸ ︷
gR10(x)uR10 + gR11(x)uR11
(4.14)
The following situations could arise and, with our insights from this analysis,
we can respond in the corresponding manners:
#1 Redundant Controller(s) Compromised
If the controllers on L1 and L9 are compromised, we know from the clus-
tered line flow groupings that for L1 controller, we can most effectively use
the essential controllers in GR1 to best mitigate any adverse actions from L1
controller. The redundant controller on L6 can be used, additionally. Since
no critical or essential controllers have been compromised, we still maintain
full system control. We see that L9 controller is independently controlled
(no other members in cluster), so perhaps we need the efforts of multiple,
uncompromised controls to counter any malicious actions.
#2 Critical or Essential Controller(s) Compromised
If L2, L5, and L8 controllers are compromised, we know that L1 and L6
redundant controllers will be most effective in mitigating any actions of L2
or L6 essential controllers. However, since the critical controller on L5 is
compromised, we do not have full system control. All other “safe” controller
actions are necessary in trying to regain control of the system. This is true for
L5 controller as well, especially since it has no other controls in its support
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group. If combination of critical, essential, and redundant controllers com-
promised, a similar response of utilizing all uncompromised system controls
to regain system control is needed.
4.8.2 IEEE 118-bus and Synthetic Texas 2000-bus Systems
To further demonstrate utility and efficiency, two larger systems were tested:
the IEEE 118-bus system (54 generators and 179 lines, excluding parallel
lines and lines with transformers), shown partially with results in Figure 4.6
(full system cluster results shown in Figure A.1), and the Texas 2000-bus
system case, shown in Figure 4.7, that is entirely synthetic, built from public
information and a statistical analysis of real power systems (282 generators
and 3043 lines) [80–82]. The system is color-coded according to areas (8 to-
tal) in Figure 4.7. The proposed methodology was evaluated with both cases
and effectively provided the controller role and control support group (and
line flow groups, continuing the D-FACTS devices example) results. The
computation time of calculating the controller roles remained low, 0.009 s to
5.22 s, for all cases including the 7-bus system. The computation time for
the clustering algorithm, to determine the control support groups, also was
within a few seconds for the 7-bus and 118-bus cases but became excessive
(16.16 min) for the 2000-bus case. This indicates the clustering algorithm
must be improved with computation time in mind, which is within our fu-
ture work. Currently, the iterative evaluation of the silhouette values during
clustering is computationally burdensome. This aspect will be studied fur-
ther to either improve upon (only evaluate periodically) or remove from the
clustering process.
4.9 Conclusion
The presented methodology provides significant insight on how to best re-
gain or maintain control given controller compromise or failure. We gain
information on 1) the control support groups, the controllers that are highly
coupled for both impact on the control objective and each other, 2) which
controllers are critical and essential in maintaining system controllability,











































Figure 4.6: Partial 118-bus system where each line is colored according to
cluster membership and labeled with critical (red), essential (orange), and
redundant (green) controllers.
Figure 4.7: Synthetic Texas 2000-bus system [82].
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if compromised. Thus, if a given controller in a redundant set is compro-
mised, a set of essential and critical controllers can be used to restore the
system and mitigate any adverse consequences. Conversely, if an essential or
critical controller is compromised, immediate remedial actions are necessary
as full system controllability is no longer maintained, especially for critical
controller compromise.
These insights can allow for strategic protection schemes, as well as a pri-
oritization of cyber (and physical) defense mechanisms surrounding critical
and essential sets of controllers. System restoration strategies and further
security measures on critical control points are aided significantly with the
results of this analysis. In this dissertation, the controller role and group re-
sults are leveraged to develop a control response framework for the remaining
set of distributed controllers after a compromise occurs. This is subsequently
detailed in Chapter 5. Furthermore, the presented method can be applied to
develop an analytic corrective control selection algorithm that can be used
with remedial action schemes (RAS) to effectively respond to contingencies
and significantly reduce computation time. The formulation and demonstra-






5.1 Application of Discovered Role and Group Results
The controllability analysis-based clustering and factorization methodology
for distributed controller interaction and role discovery, presented in Chap-
ter 4, provides two main results:
1. Control support groups : the controllers that are highly coupled for
impact on both the control objective and each other; obtained by clus-
tering the sensitivity matrix
2. The roles of each distributed controller in a given set; identified through
factorization of the sensitivity matrix
• Critical controllers : devices that are irreplaceable and mandatory
for system controllability
• Essential controllers : a minimal set of devices required to main-
tain system controllability
• Redundant controllers : devices that can be removed without af-
fecting system controllability
With these groups and roles identified, they can be utilized for distributed
controller placement methods and control response strategies for compro-
mise or failure. In this chapter, the transformed matrix presented in Equa-
tion (4.13) is deconstructed and studied to determine the composition of the
equivalent line flows and ranking of the redundant controllers. With the de-
composed composition of the equivalent line flows, placement strategies for
distributed controllers can be improved. For example, if an essential con-
troller becomes compromised, we know which original lines will be affected
the most and can focus on recovering their control and minimizing overloads.
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Subsequently, with the ranking of the redundant controllers and the main
control support group and controller role results, strategies for responding
to controller compromise or failure are developed. The D-FACTS controller
example is continued from the previous chapters. Response strategies using
D-FACTS are formulated for cases of compromise or failure of devices within
the set. However, the D-FACTS compromise scenarios considered in this
work do not have significantly detrimental impact on the power system, due
to device limits. Although more severe scenarios can be developed by consid-
ering sophisticated, coordinated attacks, we demonstrate more detrimental
scenarios with compromised generator outages.
In particular, generation redispatch calculated for power system remedial
action schemes (RAS) after generator outage, from compromise or benign
causes, is explored. After contingencies that result in stressed conditions
in the power grid, corrective actions are deployed to prevent or mitigate
system instability as well as maintain system reliability—these actions may
be calculated and implemented with RAS. Cyber contingencies warrant fast,
online RAS schemes, as they are difficult to predict and cannot be resolved
using look-up tables.
The distributed controller role and interaction discovery methodology is
employed to analytically determine the critical controls that would be most
effective to use when designing automatic RAS. In this manner, the criti-
cal controls selected would reduce the contingency violations efficiently and
ignore controls with minimal impact. Specifically, generation redispatch for
RAS is studied, where the generators are the distributed controllers and the
line real power flows are the controlled quantities. The aim is to reduce
line overloads after a contingency has occurred using generator redispatch;
this redispatch is calculated with the analytic corrective control selection.
Chapter 6 presents the formulation and results for this work.
By exploring the application of the control support group and controller
role results, for placement as well as control response, an overall framework
for monitoring and governing power system distributed controllers is derived.
This framework dictates the calculation of the roles and groups, uses the roles
to formulate responses to compromise or failure in terms of maintaining sys-
tem controllability, and, ultimately, is extensible for incorporating intrusion
detection/recovery and stability control strategy mechanisms. The stabil-
ity of the power system must be assessed both after compromise or failure
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and during control response by the distributed controllers. If the system
approaches instability, appropriate stability control strategies must be de-
ployed. Such strategies are beyond the scope of this work but can be used in
conjunction with the overall framework, as will be discussed later in this chap-
ter. Thus, this chapter details the application of the distributed controller
role and control support group results and presents the overall framework
formulation for governing distributed controllers, providing a comprehensive
view of the utility of this research.
5.2 Basis Decomposition
In Section 4.7, LU factorization is performed on the sensitivity matrix to










This transformed basis provides the critical, essential, and redundant con-
troller roles. We achieve the equivalent lines flows of the studied system and
the controllers that provide the corresponding control. Further information
can be gleaned from the matrix by deconstructing the equivalent line flows
(i.e., which lines they are composed of) and understanding the basis values
for the redundant controllers (e.g., are they the original sensitivities?). This
will be elucidated with an example, but first, a review of LU factorization is
pertinent.
5.2.1 LU Factorization Review
LU factorization is the matrix form of Gaussian elimination, where a matrix
is factored as the product of a lower triangular matrix (L) and an upper trian-
gular matrix (U). Gaussian elimination solves systems of linear equations by
using elementary elimination matrices to reduce a system into upper triangu-
lar form and using back-substitution to solve the original, linear system [72].
If we have the following linear system:
Ax = b (5.2)
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then choose an elementary elimination matrix, M1, to eliminate (zero) all the
entries in the first column, below the first row, such that only a11 remains
and is our pivot. Therefore, we have performed the operation shown in
Equation (5.3).
M1Ax = M1b (5.3)
The solution remains unchanged and we continue the process with a22 and
successively zero all the subdiagonal entries. The resulting system is upper
triangular and can be solved with back-substitution.
Mn−1...M1Ax = Mn−1...M1b (5.4)
MAx = Mb (5.5)
Gaussian elimination is achieved using the elementary elimination matrices
M; LU factorization is based on M as well, where L is composed of:
L = M−1 = M−11 ...M
−1
n−1 = Ln...Ln−1 (5.6)
Furthermore, U is achieved with:
U = MA (5.7)
Thus, we obtain the LU factorization of Equation (5.2).
Ax = b (5.8)
MAx = Mb (5.9)
M−1MAx = M−1Mb (5.10)
LUx = b (5.11)
∴ A = LU (5.12)
5.2.2 Deconstructing the Transformed Basis
With this understanding of LU factorization, we can return the transformed























Figure 5.1: The LU factorization of the transposed sensitivity matrix is
illustrated, ultimately resulting in the transformed basis.
ther in Chapter 4).
[A
′′







As mentioned previously, [A
′′
]T is the transposed sensitivity matrix, and with
LU factorization we obtain P, the permutation matrix, and LF and UF as the
lower and upper triangular factors of dimension n, respectively. M is a sparse,
rectangular matrix with rows corresponding to redundant controllers. The
transformed basis has the subsequent structure that is further decomposed









The formulation of the transformed matrix using LU factorization is vi-
sualized in Figure 5.1. Next, we address the question of the composition of
the equivalent line flows. For example, the resultant basis for the Power-
World 7-bus system was presented in Chapter 4, shown in Figure 5.2 [79].
























Transformed sensitivity of 𝐶𝑅2 to EQ.L4 
Figure 5.2: Transformed basis LCER with labeled controller roles for



















Figure 5.3: Visual representation of LU factorization of transposed
sensitivity matrix where UF maps the original line flows to equivalent line
flows in the transformed basis.
flows, which are linear combinations of the original quantities. For example,
in Figure 5.2: For the highlighted (in purple) transformed sensitivity of the
redundant controller CR2 to the equivalent line flow 4, what is the original
line flow composition of EQ.L4?
From Equation (5.7), it is apparent that the upper triangular factor U
maps the original matrix, using the product of elementary elimination ma-
trices M, to its new basis. The lower triangular matrix, L, is only the product
of the inverse M and does not involve the original A, in the general linear
system example. In terms of the equivalent line flows and controllers (e.g.,
D-FACTS), this relationship can be visualized as presented in Figure 5.3.
Therefore, UF maps the original transposed sensitivity matrix [A
′′
]T and




Table 5.1: Upper Triangular Factor UF
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6
EQ.L1 1.9165 -0.3014 0.6138 0.4783 -0.7696 1.3766
EQ.L2 0 -1.6761 -0.5473 -0.7116 -0.9459 0.4046
EQ.L3 0 0 -1.4221 0.7592 -0.7507 -0.6497
EQ.L4 0 0 0 1.2547 -1.2407 1.2444
EQ.L5 0 0 0 0 -0.0041 0.0113
EQ.L6 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0063
represents the sensitivities of controllers to the real power line flows in the
system. The sensitivity matrix formulation is detailed in Section 4.4. The
equivalent line flow composition is captured in UF, as shown in Figure 5.3.
The entries in UF signify the presence of each original line flow in the equiv-
alent line flows. The UF for the example 7-bus system is shown in Table 5.1.
Using the UF entries, we can determine the composition of the equivalent
line flows, which are linear combinations of the original line flows. The
coefficients of each equivalent line flow linear combination are provided by
UF and are shown in Equations (5.16)-(5.21).
EQ.L1 =1.9165 · L1 − 0.3014 · L2 + 0.6138 · L3+ (5.16)
0.4783 · L4 − 0.7696 · L5 + 1.3766 · L6
EQ.L2 =− 1.6761 · L2 − 0.5473 · L3 − 0.7116 · L4 (5.17)
− 0.9459 · L5 + 0.4046 · L6
EQ.L3 =− 1.4221 · L3 + 0.7592 · L4 − 0.7507 · L5 − 0.6497 · L6 (5.18)
EQ.L4 =1.2547 · L4 − 1.2407 · L5 + 1.2444 · L6 (5.19)
EQ.L5 =− 0.0041 · L5 + 0.0113 · L6 (5.20)
EQ.L6 =− 0.0063 · L6 (5.21)
5.2.3 Ranking Redundant Controllers
Thus, the composition of each equivalent line flow is obtained and can aid
controller placement and response efforts. Another crucial insight we obtain
from the transformed basis in Figure 5.2 is how the redundant controllers
CR1 − CR4 (corresponding to Controllers # 6, 1, 9, 10, respectively) should
be ranked for each equivalent controller. With this information, when com-
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promise or failure occurs for one of the essential controllers (in In), we know
which redundant controllers to respond with effectively. The entries of R rep-
resent the transformed sensitivities: sensitivity of each redundant controller
to each equivalent line flow.
If the essential controller corresponding to EQ.L4 is compromised, we
learn from the transformed basis that CR2 has the highest sensitivity to
EQ.L4 and is the top redundant controller candidate for responding to the
compromise. CR4 has the next highest sensitivity (magnitude) and can be
used in conjunction or following CR2. Yet, CR1 and CR3 have low sensitivities
and will not be very effective in solo response. Depending on the compromise
or failure situation, we can utilize this information to either use the most
sensitive redundant controllers (cannot spare all due to multiple situations) or
utilize all redundant controllers in response, but prioritize changing settings
of the highly ranked controllers. Essential controllers with no redundant
controllers (entries of 0 in corresponding column of R) are critical controllers.
5.2.4 Improving Controller Placement
An equivalent line flow’s decomposition is known from the UF entries, an
example of which was shown in Equations (5.16)-(5.21). This is particularly
useful when a critical controller is discovered (no other controller can provide
needed control to the corresponding equivalent line flow) and we want to
convert it to essential. In this section, an intuitive example is detailed of
how this conversion would occur in a brute-force manner. Ultimately, the
equivalent line flow decomposition results could be paired with optimization
algorithms to determine effective controller placement and avoid critical roles.
Such techniques have been developed for PMU placement and observability,
but can be extended to controllers utilizing the insights presented [77].
In the 7-bus system example, the controller corresponding to Row 3 and
EQ.L3 of the transformed basis is critical, as shown in Figure 5.4. The
critical controller is controller 5 (alternatively labeled, the controller on L5),
which we derive from the LU factorization permutation matrix. The compo-
sition of EQ.L3 is shown in Equation (5.22).


















Figure 5.4: Transformed basis LCER with labeled critical controller for
PowerWorld 7-bus system [79].
Table 5.2: Transformed Basis with Added Redundant Controller to Line 5
EQ.L1 EQ.L2 EQ.L3 EQ.L4 EQ.L5 EQ.L6
1.0000 0 0 0 0 0
0 1.0000 0 0 0 0
0 0 1.0000 0 0 0
0 0 0 1.0000 0 0
0 0 0 0 1.0000 0
0 0 0 0 0 1.0000
-0.0014 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0899 -0.0000 -0.0000
-0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000
-0.0144 0.0000 -0.0000 0.9227 -0.0000 -0.0000
0.0000 1.5107 0.0000 -0.0018 -1.0644 0.7466
-0.1250 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.1865 0.0000 -0.0000
The equation indicates that L3 has the most significant presence in EQ.L3.
L3 corresponds to L5 in the original 7-bus system, due to the selection of
target line flows for factorization, as illustrated in Figure 5.5. The use of
target line flows is explained in Section 4.7. Therefore, line flow 5 would be
most severely impacted if critical controller 5 was compromised. To remedy
this and convert the controller to essential, we need to add another controller
(in this example, D-FACTS) to be redundant to line 5. Therefore, by adding
a second controller to line 5, the transformed basis (after re-factorizing the
sensitivity matrix) shown in Table 5.2 is obtained.
























Figure 5.5: PowerWorld 7-bus system with lines colored according to
cluster group and labeled with critical, essential, and redundant controllers.
line) and an additional controller on L5. This is illustrated in Figure 5.6.
Controller 6 is redundant to EQ.L3 and converts controller 5 from critical
to essential—with magnitude 1 in the transformed basis, controllers 5 and
6 are now interchangeable for controlling EQ.L3. As a result, there are no
critical controllers and the loss of system controllability risk is reduced.
This is just an intuitive example that demonstrates the utility of the trans-
formed basis. In this small system, we have already assumed a controller is
on every line and the existence of multiple controllers on one line is not real-
istic, for most controller types. Nonetheless, in a larger and realistic system,
we would not have controllers on every line and the addition of controllers to
certain lines (not multiple) would actually eliminate critical roles. An opti-
mization algorithm could be developed that aids a system to have a desired
level of redundancy and eliminate all critical roles in the system. Chen and
Abur formulated a method to perform the optimization for the placement
of PMUs considering system observability that could be extended to this
application [77].
Lastly, if there was a redundant controller set for which the transformed

























Figure 5.6: PowerWorld 7-bus system with lines colored according to
cluster group and labeled with essential and redundant controllers;
highlighted in the yellow box is added controller, C6, that converted C5
from critical to essential.
excessive redundancy is indicated. If a redundant controller does not have
much impact on any other equivalent line flow (especially if the actual line
composition overlaps with other equivalent line flows) and other significant
redundant controllers are present for that equivalent line flow, it can be
removed. Thus, this type of study can be performed as a planning tool
for placing distributed controllers in the power system. In this manner, the
minimum set of controllers can be placed and selected such that there exist no
critical controllers and unnecessary controllers are not used (reducing cost).
All in all, two main insights are achieved from the study of the transformed
basis:
1. The composition of the equivalent line flows in terms of the original
line flows
• Aid controller placement to avoid critical roles and eliminate ex-
cessive redundancy
2. Ranking of redundant controllers from the transformed sensitivities
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𝑥𝐿𝑂𝑊 𝑥𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸 𝑥𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻
𝑥𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸 − 0.3 ∙ 𝑥𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸 𝑥𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸 + 0.3 ∙ 𝑥𝐿𝐼𝑁𝐸
Figure 5.7: Range of settings for D-FACTS devices and its change to line
impedance to test state-dependence of controller roles and control support
groups.
• During essential controller compromise or failure, respond with
most effective redundant controllers and avoid using controllers
that have no or very minimal impact
5.3 State-Dependence of Roles and Groups
The previous section demonstrates the insight gained from the transformed
sensitivity matrix basis and how that information can be leveraged. Next,
we examine how the controller roles and control support groups change with
varying operating points. Originally, we calculated the roles and groups for
a specific operating point, usually normal operation, and sought to apply
those results generally. Nonetheless, that approach may not be correct if
the results do, in fact, change significantly for different states of the power
system.
To test the state-dependence of the results, the 7-bus system was studied
with different settings of D-FACTS controllers, which in turn were changing
the line power flows. The settings, the effective impedance of each device,
were varied from±30% of the line impedance. This is illustrated in Figure 5.7
and the ±30% variation is derived from the D-FACTS controller limits de-
fined in PowerWorld [83]. The subsequent settings for the D-FACTS, xDF ,
can be derived from:
xline,new = ±0.3 · xline + xline (5.23)
xDF = xline,new − xline (5.24)
Essentially, for this specific range example, the setting for the D-FACTS
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devices will vary within the range:
xDF = [−0.3 · xline 0 0.3 · xline] (5.25)
where 0 indicates that the controller is not in use and the line is at its
original impedance. For testing the different operating points, we consider
two situations: when two D-FACTS are in use and when four D-FACTS
are in use. Therefore, for two D-FACTS, we determine combinations of the
entire set, two at a time, for the various settings. For example, in the 7-bus
system, we consider 10 lines with a D-FACTS device on each. For different
pair combinations of the devices, we have 100 combinations. For each of
these pairs, there can be 3 different settings ([xDF,LOW xDF,0 xDF,HIGH ]),
for a total of 3x3 or 9 setting combinations. Thus, there are 900 different
D-FACTS pair and setting states; this is graphically represented in a cell
format in Figure 5.8. Additionally, we test combinations of 4 controllers in
the same manner, and the visualization is shown in Figure 5.9. There are
81, 000 device and setting combinations in this case. We consider 4 device
combinations as the maximum for this study due to the severe computational
burden that results for a higher number. A possible method for reducing this
computation time while testing a broad range of operating points is to only
consider one controller from each control support group.
With these various operating points, for both 2 and 4 D-FACTS device
combinations, the controller role and control support groups can be calcu-
lated and compared across different states. These results are illustrated in
Figures 5.10-5.13. Figures 5.10 and 5.11 show the number of occurrences of
each controller as essential or critical over all the operating points. As indi-
cated for both combination sets, a pattern of recurrent essential or critical
controllers emerges. Controllers # 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 have a significant presence as
essential or critical over all the operating points (varied with ±30% of the
D-FACTS settings). Similarly, in Figures 5.12 and 5.13, the number of oc-
currences for each controller as critical over all operating points, for both 2
and 4 device combinations, is provided. It is apparent that Controller #5
has a critical role frequently, especially compared with the rest of the set.
These results highlight two main points:
1. The controller role results do change as the operating point varies.
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Graphical Display Structure of Cell Array for 2 D−FACTS
Figure 5.8: Cell structure visual representation of D-FACTS pair and
setting combinations.
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Graphical Display Structure of Cell Array for 4 D−FACTS
Figure 5.9: Cell structure visual representation of 4 D-FACTS device and
setting combinations.
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Figure 5.10: 2 D-FACTS combinations: occurrences of each controller as
essential or critical over all operating points.
























Figure 5.11: 4 D-FACTS combinations: occurrences of each controller as
essential or critical over all operating points.
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Figure 5.12: 2 D-FACTS combinations: occurrences of each controller as
critical over all operating points.






















Figure 5.13: 4 D-FACTS combinations: occurrences of each controller as
critical over all operating points.
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Figure 5.14: 2 D-FACTS combinations: occurrences of each controller as
essential or critical over all operating points, with ±90% change in xLINE.
2. Some controllers are frequently a certain role; a pattern exists over all
the operating points
To further explore these observations, the effective impedance of each de-
vice was varied ±90% of the line impedance. This is not physically possible
for the D-FACTS devices due to limits, but in the coded device model, it was
used to obtain dramatically different operating points to test. The controller
role results are shown in Figures 5.14 and 5.15, as tested with 2 D-FACTS
device combinations.
For this broader range of operating points, the same pattern emerges with
Controllers # 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 as essential or critical, frequently, and Controller #5
as critical. However, it is useful to note that Controllers # 8, 9 increase in fre-
quency as critical, although they are not the highest. These additional results
reinforce the observation points aforementioned and are particularly useful
when designing a control response framework for distributed controllers when
compromise or failure occurs.
For the 4 D-FACTS combinations, the results vary more dramatically, as
shown in Figure 5.16 and Figure 5.17. Controllers # 1, 2, 3, 8, 9 still have
high frequency as essential or critical and Controller #5 has the highest
number of occurrences as critical. Yet, these controllers do not exhibit the
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Figure 5.15: 2 D-FACTS combinations: occurrences of each controller as
critical over all operating points, with ±90% change in xLINE.
distinct pattern as previously observed with the ±30% testing. The essential
or critical controller pattern remains similar, with the addition of Controller
#5. This is expected, as we already observed Controller #5 to be frequently
critical. However, Controllers # 4, 6, 8, 9 exhibit high numbers of occurrences
as critical, as shown in Figure 5.17. This behavior indicates that there are
certain operating points for which the recurrent pattern is not dominant
and recalculation of the roles is necessary for formulating the most effective
control response. This point will be elaborated upon in the next section.
Results were also obtained for the clustering of the different controllers.
Again, the clusters or control support groups varied for different operating
points but general patterns still emerged (e.g., this controller is often assigned
to this cluster or this cluster is usually composed of these controllers).
Figure 5.18a compares results for the membership of Cluster 2, for the 2
D-FACTS ±30% scenario, in which controllers 3 and 4 are frequent members.
This observation is further reinforced when examining the occurrence of con-
troller 3 being assigned to Cluster 2 in Figures 5.18b (similar results were
obtained for controller 4). The D-FACTS controllers are placed on each line;
clustering the controllers also provides results for the clustering of the lines,
as indicated by the plots. For simplicity, we will only refer to controllers.
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Figure 5.16: 4 D-FACTS combinations: occurrences of each controller as
essential or critical over all operating points, with ±90% change in xLINE.





















Figure 5.17: 4 D-FACTS combinations: occurrences of each controller as
critical over all operating points, with ±90% change in xLINE.
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(a) 2 D-FACTS combinations:
occurrences of each controller in
Cluster 2 over all operating points,
with ±30% change in xLINE .




















(b) 2 D-FACTS combinations:
occurrences of controller 3 in each
cluster over all operating points,
with ±30% change in xLINE .





















(c) 2 D-FACTS combinations:
occurrences of controller 4 in each
cluster over all operating points,
with ±30% change in xLINE .





















(d) 2 D-FACTS combinations:
occurrences of each controller in Cluster
2 over all operating points, with ±90%
change in xLINE .
Figure 5.18: Frequency of cluster membership for various operating points.
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When the system state is varied dramatically, as in the 2 D-FACTS ±90%
case, controllers 3 and 4 remain highest in frequency but other controllers
also increase in occurrence, as shown in Figure 5.18c. This behavior is also
illustrated with Figure 5.18d, where controller 3 is assigned to Cluster 2 most
frequently. Nonetheless, its assignment to other clusters has also increased
in frequency.
The IEEE 118-bus system was also tested with varying operating points,
for both ±30% and ±90% changes in xLINE. D-FACTS were presumed to
be on every line (186 lines) and a change in a single device was considered,
rather than 2 or 4 D-FACTS combination. The computation time was ex-
cessive for more than 1 device change. This can be avoided by not assuming
there is a device on each line or only analyzing a controller from each con-
trol support group. Nonetheless, it was found that as the operating point
changed, the resultant controller roles remained the same, for both ±30%
and ±90% changes in xLINE. This is exemplified by Figure 5.19.
This is expected, as the change in a single D-FACTS device will not im-
pact the large 118-system substantially. However, more significant system
changes such as line outages or faults will impact the controller role and con-
trol support group results. A recurrent set of controller roles could emerge
depending on the extent of system change. If so, they can be used in re-
sponse, as detailed in the next section, but otherwise should be recalculated
for every operating point.
Also, there are no critical controllers, which is good for the system but may
also indicate that we have excessive redundancy. A device on every line is
unnecessary, but this analysis aids in determining what the control support
groups are and that only one controller from each is needed to control the
equivalent line flows. Therefore, we can nearly halve the number of controllers
from 186 to 91, where there were 91 control support groups for the 118-bus
system.
Therefore, the main observations from studying the frequency of cluster
membership over the different operating points are:
• For both the 2 D-FACTS and 4 D-FACTS combination cases, with
±30% change in xLINE, the results are similar with distinct cluster
membership.






































































































































setting for the device, but used to test dramatic change in operating
point), the cluster membership patterns are less discernible.
– The same controllers still appear dominant, but other cluster
member’s occurrences increase in frequency.
• Large systems are not substantially impacted by the D-FACTS changes,
so the controller roles are always the same.
All in all, intriguing results were obtained from testing different operating
points and comparing the controller role and cluster results. The patterns
that emerged, having certain controllers be recurrent in specific roles or as-
signed to specific clusters, can be leveraged for control response. A frame-
work can be designed in which these recurring essential or critical controls,
the ones that have the largest span of control over the equivalent line flows,
can be utilized when responding to controller compromise or failure. This
framework is demonstrated in the next section.
5.4 Responding to Compromise or Failure of
Distributed Controllers
Controller compromise or failure within the distributed controller set can
have serious consequences due to cascading, detrimental effects. Mitigation
requires rapid response such that sustained line overloads, sensitive equip-
ment damage, and, in the worst case, blackout are prevented. This disserta-
tion seeks to address this problem, particularly with the presented analytic
controller role and control support group methodology. Proactive strategies
must be developed using these results.
In Chapter 4, the controllability analysis based method that processed
the controller sensitivities using clustering and factorization techniques was
presented. The resultant controller roles and control support groups were
demonstrated in their use with several compromise scenarios. In particular,
comparison between critical, essential, and redundant controller compromises
is presented as well as how the response should differ. In this section, dif-
ferent scenarios are tested with the proposed responses in simulation, using
PowerWorld [84], and a general response strategy is developed.
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To address the difference in response, from the remaining, uncompromised
set of distributed controllers, critical controllers are a crucial aspect. As
defined previously, critical controllers are devices that are irreplaceable and
mandatory for system controllability. Thus, when a critical controller is com-
promised, we have lost full system control and have no redundant controllers
to salvage some control of the now uncontrolled equivalent line flow. As such,
this situation is severe and requires immediate response from other system
controllers and defense mechanisms.
However, it is important to note that the priority of responding immedi-
ately to the compromise or failure of a critical controller is dependent on the
type of device. For example, if a D-FACTS device on a line was compromised
but the most malicious change incurred only increased the line flow slightly
(not overloading), perhaps immediate response is not necessary. A more se-
rious situation could arise if multiple D-FACTS devices were compromised
at once, or if a different type of controller was compromised, such as a static
var compensator (SVC) that can destabilize system voltage or angle with
modification attacks [43].
Nonetheless, assuming that the critical controllers do require immediate
response and detrimentally impact system controllability, we must be proac-
tive and seek to eliminate their critical role in the planning stage. This was
demonstrated in Section 5.2, where redundancy was added to the correspond-
ing equivalent line flow and transformed the critical controller to essential.
Yet, critical roles can result due to changes in system state after failure and
compromise, and in those cases, the compromised critical controller(s) must
be prioritized and additional defense mechanisms are needed.
5.4.1 Distributed Control Response Framework
When the compromise of any distributed controller (critical, essential, or
redundant) occurs, an appropriate response must be formulated from the
remaining set. Yet, the true response to the cyber-physical compromise of
the targeted controller, the “cleaning” of the system from the intrusion, and
overall diagnosis must be performed by actual cyber-physical defense mech-
anisms. The response of the remaining, uncompromised set of distributed
controllers seeks to minimize stressed conditions and prevent damage to sen-
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sitive equipment. The distributed controller response is immediate, as soon
as a compromise or abnormal behavior is detected, and occurs while the event
is investigated through security protocols. Examples of these protocols were
provided in Section 3.2.2 as well as in Section 2.3.2 where a cyber-physical
response system (CPR) design was presented as a related, motivating project.
The compromise of a distributed controller is realized through the intrusion
detection system (IDS) or just general monitoring. The rapid changes in
settings of a specific controller and lack of need or logic, as observed from
the current system state, should flag the operator, the remaining distributed
controller set, and security systems that something is amiss. Thus, with the
flag or alarm that a controller has been compromised, the main pieces of
information at hand are:
• A controller has been compromised and its identity is known
• The settings of the controller are changing for some unknown objective.
– The setting change is not warranted by the state of the system
because there is no apparent need.
– This behavior is abnormal.
• The identity of the compromised device may or may not be known.
– If the controller identity is known, the role of the controller as
critical, essential, or redundant is known, and its control support
group is known.
However, in some cases, there may be no IDS or security system in place
that can identify the compromised controller. In that case, the changing
of controller settings that worsen the system state and were not warranted
can flag abnormal behavior. The distributed controller set can respond in
the meantime, to minimize overload and system stress, while the abnormal
changes are investigated. In fact, the recurrent essential or critical controller
results discovered by the state-dependence testing in the last section could
prove useful when the identity is unknown. The failure of a controller can
benefit from the same control response, where the failed controller is known,
and if the quantity it was controlling is severely impacted, the remaining
distributed controller set can respond effectively.
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To formulate a general control response for the set of “safe”, uncompro-
mised distributed controllers, the results from testing the role and group
methodology over many operating points can be leveraged. As presented in
Section 5.3, it was observed that although the role and group assignments
do change over different operating points, a pattern of recurrent results does
emerge. This pattern indicates that certain controllers frequently take on
specific roles over all the system states tested. This implies that those re-
sults can be generally applied to be most effective for any operating point,
especially when it is not feasible to recalculate the roles and groups in real-
time.
The application of these general results compared to current system state
roles and groups can be demonstrated with the PowerWorld 7-bus system
[79]. Using the D-FACTS controller example, we have a set of 10 controllers
(excluding parallel line 11) of which Controller #2 is compromised. This
controller, on Line 2, is set to +30% of its line impedance, the maximum, to
increase Line 2 from 44% MVA to 55% MVA. As this abnormal behavior is
investigated by security mechanisms, the remaining set of D-FACTS devices
can be used to respond and reduce the line flow increase. Table 5.3 lists sev-
eral selection methods for the subset of the remaining D-FACTS controllers
that should be used to respond to the Controller #2 compromise. The min-
imum, effective number should be used such that system disruption is low.
For each selection of response controllers, the corresponding settings must
be calculated to most effectively reduce the line loading increase. For the D-
FACTS devices, the setting of the injected effective impedance, xDF , must be
calculated for each of the selected devices. For the D-FACTS line power flow
control application, a control algorithm developed by Rogers and Overbye
in [67] was applied. The method utilizes an optimization framework where
the objective was to determine line impedance settings of the selected devices
and minimize the differences between the actual and desired power flows.
The objective function, f0, in Equation (5.26) represents this goal where L





Rogers and Overbye stated the line flow control optimization problem as
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shown in Equations (5.27)-(5.30).
min f0 (5.27)
s.t. f(p,q)(s(θ,V )) = 0 (5.28)
x ≤ xmax (5.29)
x ≥ xmin (5.30)
Equation (5.28) represents the first constraint of the AC power balance equa-
tions and Equations (5.29) and (5.30) provide the device limits for change in
line impedance. This line impedance is the altered impedance after the D-
FACTS device xDF has been injected, as shown previously in Equation (5.24).
This minimization problem is solved using steepest descent, and the D-
FACTS settings for each selected controller are found such that the best
attempt at achieving the desired power flows is achieved [85]. The conver-
gence of the power flow solution, with the implemented D-FACTS settings
found by the algorithm, is checked for every set. Full details on this control
algorithm for D-FACTS devices are provided in [67].
Returning to selection of controllers for responding to compromise or fail-
ure, Table 5.3 presents the selected response controllers using various meth-
ods and the calculated settings for each. These xDF settings are computed
using the control framework presented by Rogers and Overbye [67]. For
this response application, the line flow targeted for control was set as the
compromised line and the control framework calculated the settings, with
the specified response set, to best mitigate the compromised line flow. The
Recurrent CE and Recurrent R selection algorithms are derived from the
state-dependence tests in the previous section, where the controller role and
group results were calculated across various operating points. For the 7-bus
system, the recurrent controllers were Controllers #1, 2, 3, 8, 9. For the com-
promise of Controller #2, we exclude it from the list of response controllers.
Table 5.3 displays the resultant % MVA of L2 after each of the response
controller sets and their corresponding settings are applied to the system to
reduce the line flow.
The Recurrent CE selection algorithm performs best, where the loading of
Line 2 is reduced from 55% MVA to 48.9% MVA, where the original loading
was 44% MVA. Recurrent CE and R represent the general (highest frequency
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of occurrence over the operating points) controller roles, for critical/essential
roles or redundant roles, respectively. The Current CE, R, and Ranked R
methods are calculated with the current operating point of the system, in-
cluding the compromise. The Current Ranked R algorithm considers only
the redundant controllers with high sensitivity to the equivalent line flow
that corresponded to Controller #2.
Nevertheless, the Recurrent CE method is most successful in reducing the
line flow increase and can be used as a general response to controller compro-
mises. However, the recurrent critical or redundant controllers became less
distinct and significant when the system state changed dramatically when
the line impedance was varied by 90% in Figure 5.14 versus the 30% case.
Therefore, a threshold of change in system state from normal operation to
a compromised state, for the quantity of interest (e.g., line flow), can be
used to determine when to use the Recurrent CE or the Current CE set.
The Recurrent CE is effective and applicable for a smaller range of operating
points; beyond that, the current system state should be used to calculate the
roles and groups. Additionally, it is useful when the compromised controller
identity is unknown, as the response is broadly useful for most operating
points. This control response method is illustrated in Figure 5.20. This con-
trol response algorithm for the distributed controllers is tested for different
controller compromises in the PowerWorld 7-bus system, including Controller
2. Again, the D-FACTS example is continued and an adversary changes the
injected effective impedance xDF by the maximum increase of 30%, according
to device limits, such that the line flow of the targeted controller is increased
as much as possible [83]. Due to the 30% change in impedance, the change
in the system state, especially the compromised line, was low and under 15%
for this system. Therefore, a threshold value related to the device limits for
the change in impedance, such as 20%, can be set and the recurrent results
for the controller roles can be used for response for each compromise below
the threshold. This threshold selection can be explored and validated further
in future work.
Table 5.4 presents the results for each compromise, comparing the original,
compromised, and response % MVA of the line of interest. The correspond-
ing settings for the response set (excluding compromised controllers) are
discovered with the D-FACTS control algorithm formulated by Rogers and
























































































































































































































































reduce the line flow % MVA closer to the original flow. For example, for the
compromises of Controllers #2, 4, 5, the response set reduced the deviation
from the original loading of 11−12% to 2−5%. Compromises at Controllers
7, 9, 10 induced smaller deviations, but Controllers 7 and 9 were successful
in reducing it from 0.8 − 4% to 0.6 − 2%. The only case for which the
response set was not effective was the compromise of Controller 9 when the
line flow was increased by 2.7% MVA and response set further increased it
to 3.1% MVA. This result could be due to the system topology and/or the
settings chosen for the response set. The optimization method for selecting
these control settings for D-FACTS can be improved on and designed to be
more fine-grained for small changes in line flows. Finally, the compromise
of multiple controllers was also tested with Controllers 2, 10 and Controllers
4, 5, 9. For both cases, the increases in line flow were reduced satisfactorily.
Nevertheless, as observed from the compromised line flow results, the D-
FACTS can disrupt the line flows in the power system but do not severely
impact the operation of the grid. Their compromise must be mitigated, and
perhaps using an automatic response strategy, as presented, is sufficient to
address the compromises as the intrusion or failure is investigated. However,
there are classes of distributed controllers for which compromises can cause
significant and immediate consequences for the power system. An exam-
ple is if we consider generators as distributed controllers and evaluate the
impact of generator outages. In particular, we can study Remedial Action
Schemes (RAS) that employ generator redispatch to mitigate power system
contingencies. In Chapter 6, an analytic corrective control selection for fast,
automated remedial action schemes is formulated using the controller role
and group techniques. It identifies the critical or most effective generators to




When developing control defense strategies, the impact on both the system
controllability and stability must be considered. Within distrusted control,
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the cyber attacks launched by the adversary can cause various control changes
in the power system. Despite full system control, these malicious changes
can destabilize the system, unless we monitor the system stability and react
quickly with our uncompromised distributed controllers. Therefore, it is
necessary to perform stability assessments during detrimental events such as
failure or compromise of distributed controllers. If stability is lost, a very
serious situation is encountered and sophisticated, additional strategies are
needed to attempt to regain it or minimize damage.
Developing these stability control strategies is beyond the scope of this
work, but those methods can be used in conjunction with the presented
framework. The overall framework, including stability control strategies,
will be provided later in this section. Nonetheless, it is pertinent that the
stability is monitored after the compromise and also after the response of the
remaining distributed controllers. If system instability or near instability is
detected, a stability control method must be employed immediately.
As discussed in Section 3.3, there are various categories and types of sta-
bility. For this application, we apply linear system stability concepts—often
used for small-signal stability analysis in power systems. Depending on
the distributed controller being studied, the stability type and monitoring
method will vary (i.e., generators and transient stability or D-FACTS and
angle stability). Nonetheless, for the example D-FACTS device, linear sys-
tem stability is performed as a simple approach and is applied by monitoring
the eigenvalues of the system.
Small-signal stability analyzes the ability of the power system to main-
tain synchronism after a small disturbance. It is utilized to determine how
close the system is to instability and understand the system response to these
disturbances. The system is linearized about an equilibrium point and eigen-
values are calculated from the linear system matrix [86]. This model-based
calculation of small-signal stability can be calculated in the following manner.
The power system is described by:
x˙ = f(x,y) 0 = g(x,y) (5.31)
where x is the vector of state variables and y is the vector of the algebraic
variables. Subsequently, the system is linearized about the equilibrium point
91
as:
∆x˙ = A∆x + B∆y (5.32)
0 = C∆x + D∆y (5.33)
Next, variable ∆y in (5.32) is substituted using (5.33) to derive a differential
equation consisting solely of variable ∆x:
∆x˙ = (A−BD−1C)∆x (5.34)
Asys := A−BD−1C (5.35)
∆x˙ = Asys∆x (5.36)
Equation (5.36) represents the deviation of the system’s state away from the
equilibrium point. Thus, small-signal analysis is performed by studying the
eigenvalues and other properties of Asys. For simplicity, matrix Asys will be
referred to as A from hereon. The eigenvalues λi, i = 1..n, correspond to the
modes of the system and are the solutions of the following equation:
det(A− λI) = 0 (5.37)
Assuming all the eigenvalues are distinct, for each λi there exists a right
eigenvector vi such that:
Avi = λivi (5.38)
Similarly, for each eigenvalue there exists a left eigenvector wi and the right




Twi = λiwi (5.39)
Equation (5.36) needs to be decoupled to clarify the effect of the matrix A’s
parameters to the state vector x. The decoupling can be conducted using














Equation (5.38) is rewritten as:
AV = VΛ (5.41)
where
Λ = Diag(λi) (5.42)
It follows that
V−1AV =Λ (5.43)
To decouple the variables, define vector z as
∆x = Vz (5.44)
∆x˙ = Vz˙ = A∆x = AVz (5.45)
z˙ = V−1AVz =Λz (5.46)
Since Λ is a diagonal matrix, Equation (5.46) can be uncoupled as:
z˙i = λizi (5.47)
After applying (5.47) to (5.44), the response ∆x(t) can be rewritten as an






The resultant complex eigenvalues are then analyzed to determine the state
of the system, in terms of stability, after a small disturbance. The following
characteristics are utilized in judging the eigenvalues [87]:
• Positive real part of an eigenvalue indicates potentially unstable states.
• Negative eigenvalue with significantly large magnitude can indicate ex-
tremely fast system states that may cause numerical instability.
– Often caused by specific exciter models that contain extremely fast
feedback loops; special consideration in the numeric integration
algorithm is warranted
Therefore, the eigenvalues of the power system can be calculated and used
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to determine the stability. To incorporate into the control response strat-
egy presented earlier, specifically for D-FACTS devices, PowerWorld [84]
was used to automatically compute the eigenvalues. In particular, the sin-
gle machine infinite bus (SMIB) eigenvalue tool was applied. Essentially,
small-signal stability analysis is performed with a system associated with a
single generator connected to the rest of the system through an equivalent
transmission line. The equivalent line’s impedance is computed using the
driving point impedance looking into the system and the rest of the system
is assumed to be an infinite bus. The infinite bus voltage is set to match the
generator’s real and reactive power injection and voltage [86,87].
PowerWorld builds this dynamic model of the SMIB and it includes all the
generator’s dynamic models: machine model, exciter, governor, and stabi-
lizer. The linear matrix of the SMIB and all its dynamic states is composed
and eigenvalue analysis is performed on the derived Asys, as formulated ear-
lier. Table 5.4 compromise scenarios are augmented with the stability assess-
ment of monitoring the eigenvalues after compromise and response. Exam-
ples of these assessments are presented in Tables 5.5-5.7 for the compromise
of Controller #4 and in Tables 5.8-5.10 for the compromise of Controller
#10. The details of the compromise and response were provided previously
in Table 5.4.
For this D-FACTS compromise example, the eigenvalues are not signifi-
cantly impacted, though slight variations can be observed from the SMIB
eigenvalues. The controllers do not considerably change the system state,
thus, their impact is minimal on the overall stability. However, this impact
depends on the type of controller, so stability assessment must always be
performed generally for the control response framework. We also observe
that Gen.6 has a positive real part for Eigenvalue 1, which could indicate po-
tential instability, but the value is quite small and remains between 0.03 and
0.04 for all of the tested compromise cases. It exists during normal operation
and does not change dramatically as the compromise and response situations
are applied. Nonetheless, SMIB eigenvalue analysis is a simplistic approach
that was chosen to illustrate the type of assessment needed; more sophisti-
cated methods are needed to gain more accurate eigenvalue results such that
positive eigenvalues, small or large, can be assessed more rigorously.
All in all, the overall framework for addressing the compromise or failure





























































































































































































































































































































































The distributed control response framework, given the stability assessment
does not detect instability, responds to the compromise of a critical or essen-
tial controller and uses either recurrent or current CE controllers to respond.
The settings for the controllers are selected using a controller-specific con-
trol algorithm and applied to the system to best reduce system stress and
maintain operation during the compromise. If an additional setting change is
detected in the compromised controller, the response framework continues.
If a redundant controller is compromised, this framework can be applied,
but since the redundant device can be removed without affecting system
controllability, resources can be conserved and we can avoid changing other
controller settings unnecessarily. In fact, the redundant controller should be
taken oﬄine as the compromise is investigated.
Therefore, the control response framework can be utilized when a device,
within a distributed controller set, is compromised or fails. It employs the es-
sential or critical controllers to provide effective response, as these controllers
have the largest control span over the system—they encompass all the equiv-
alent line flows, excluding that of a compromised device. Initially, in Chap-
ter 4, it was suggested the control support group members could be utilized
in response. This remains true, but is less effective in a smaller system. The
response controllers need to have wide control span, which is not observed in
a small system in which only a couple or a few controllers compose a control
support groups. Nonetheless, as the essential or critical controllers encom-
pass all the line flows (via equivalent line flows), they will always provide the
control necessary to best mitigate the compromise. Redundant controllers
to the corresponding compromised controller can additionally be used, if not
already within the response set, only if the transformed sensitivities are high.
Therefore, the main contributions of this chapter are summarized as:
1. The transformed basis resulting from the factorization of the sensitiv-
ities can be decomposed to discover the composition of the equivalent
line flows and to rank redundant controllers.
• Can aid controller placement to avoid critical roles, avoid excessive
redundancy, and also rank the redundant controllers.
2. The system state or operating point dependence of role and group as-
signments is explored and the results exhibit recurrent behavior.
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• The recurrent essential or critical controllers repeatedly have ex-
pansive control span and can be leveraged in response to compro-
mises or failures.
3. A control response framework can be developed for the distributed
controller compromise given compromise or failure of device(s) within
the set.
• This response can be immediately deployed to reduce system stress
and mitigate compromise consequences, while the actual cause
and removal of the compromise are investigated by IDS, intrusion
recovery methods, or other security mechanisms.
4. The overall control response framework reacts whenever a setting change
is observed with the compromised control and should include stability
assessment.
• Maintaining stability must be prioritized and its inclusion in the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SELECTION FOR FAST, AUTOMATED
REMEDIAL ACTION SCHEMES
6.1 Problem Statement
When abnormal, stressed conditions occur in the power grid, corrective ac-
tions are necessitated to prevent or mitigate system instability. The North
American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) defines a remedial ac-
tion scheme (RAS) as an automatic protection system that detects those
conditions and takes corrective actions to maintain system reliability, not
limited to only component isolation [88]. These actions may include changes
to demand, generation, or system topology to maintain stability, acceptable
voltage levels, and allowable power flows. Corrective actions are used to
restore the power system’s safe operational mode; further details on these
actions are described in [88–91].
These violations can occur for a variety of reasons, including increas-
ing penetration of renewables to the micro-grids that connect or disconnect
smaller entities to or from the bulk power grid infrastructure. Furthermore,
cyber attacks have become a serious concern in the recent years. In fact,
the Department of Homeland Security reported that from 2009 to 2014,
about 40% of total critical infrastructure cyber incidents occurred in the
energy sector [55]. In December 2015, one of the first large-scale attacks
on a power grid occurred in Ukraine, where cyber attacks led to the dis-
connection of seven substations and power outage to 225,000 customers for
several hours [56]. Power system cyber vulnerabilities have increased due to
the shift from proprietary control protocols to popular, accessible network
protocols, and other modernization factors. An adversary can exploit these
unsecured access points and can potentially drive the power system to an
unsafe state. Even more disconcerting is the ability of cyber attacks to cause
physical damage to the grid, as demonstrated by [11].
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The electric power grid is a complex, interconnected cyber-physical system,
and as such, RAS procedures must be capable to protect against accidental
failures and malicious endeavors such as cyber attacks; especially, when se-
vere physical consequences can result. Therefore, techniques that provide the
most effective response, are computationally efficient, and are suitable for on-
line RAS applications (e.g., cyber attacks) in large-scale power systems are
desired. Conventional RAS designs use oﬄine calculations to determine the
best control action for the most credible contingencies with different topol-
ogy, generation, and load scenarios. These actions are subsequently stored
and executed in real-time when the contingency occurs [92,93]. Cyber attack
contingencies cannot be accounted for in a look-up table—these incidents are
often unpredictable, and their characteristics are constantly changing. Pre-
defined tables may not encompass all possibilities and require extensive data
management. Thus, online RAS is necessitated as the most current system
state and real-time calculation of corrective controls are required to provide
the most suitable and effective response.
For online RAS applications, computation time is paramount. In the
conventional implementation, various control actions and settings calculated
with the post-contingency state must be iterated through to determine the
most suitable action without significant concern for running time. However,
online RAS designs require the computation time to be as fast as possible,
as the corrective control must be executed immediately. It quickly becomes
computationally burdensome to iterate through control actions and settings
in real-time.
There have not been many efforts to design online RAS, though there
are some strategies that consider system dynamics when selecting corrective
control actions [94–96]. Transient stability, although allowing more thorough
analysis, considerably increases the computation time. A Smart RAS scheme
[97] was developed by Wang and Rodriguez that utilizes synchrophasor-
measurements of real power on tie-lines between two grid areas to trigger
RAS. They are motivated by intermittent renewable generation and load
mutability and design a no-parameter model and no-setting criteria to best
predict and mitigate instability (by effectively triggering RAS). Atighechi et
al. [98] designed a fast load-shedding RAS method for the British Columbia
(BC) Hydro system that applies dynamic and steady-state responses for dif-
ferent contingencies to best mitigate transient stability and voltage collapse.
103
Lastly, Hitachi is working with Bonneville Power Administration (BPA)
to build [99] a new RAS prototype that uses synchrophasor input and on-
line contingency to account for new sources of power system disturbances
from renewable energies and electric vehicles. Their design, summarized
in [99], computes every 30 seconds and automatically calculates response ac-
tions against contingencies by using historical snapshots. The Hitachi-BPA
project is the most prominent online RAS project, to our knowledge, and mo-
tivates the need and application of such designs. An automated RAS method
was recently developed by Kazerooni [100], within our research team, that
contributes to that effort and seeks to use steady-state analysis techniques
to increase speed.
As the online RAS design by Kazerooni is one of the few works that con-
siders online RAS design and full details of the algorithm are available, it
is utilized to develop the analytic corrective control selection (ACCS) algo-
rithm. ACCS seeks to further improve speed and efficiency by identifying
the most effective corrective controls to use and avoiding calculation with
all available controls. This chapter presents an algorithmic solution that
processes sensitivities and applies clustering and factorization techniques to
determine the critical controls that should be used for fast, automated RAS.
In the literature reviewed, RAS designs do not employ ACCS or similar al-
gorithms. This is due to the dearth of online RAS methods and thus, lack
of need to narrow the corrective control search space as the calculations are
performed oﬄine. In particular, for generation redispatch, which is the focus
of this work, usually economics are the primary concern and the cheapest
generators are selected [101].
The fast load-shedding RAS design by Atighechi et al. [98], mentioned pre-
viously, selects load shedding candidates using sensitivity analysis, similar to
ACCS. Their method utilizes dynamic performance and steady-state voltage
sensitivity analysis at each bus and the final load shedding sequence is de-
termined by the combination of those analyses, load level, type, and system
topology. Another algorithm for control strategies against voltage collapse
using relays is presented by Song et al. in [102] where critical relays are
identified using sensitivity analysis. These relays are critical in a negative
sense, meaning their operation may significantly deteriorate the system in
terms of voltage stability. In both of these works, although sensitivity analy-
sis is leveraged, controllability analysis concepts are not applied to determine
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the most effective controls. Specifically, the corrective controls with largest
control span and, thus, most significant impact on the system are not found.
In this work, the analytic corrective control algorithm (ACCS) determines
critical controls to be utilized with fast, automated RAS given a power system
contingency. The critical controls identified comprise the minimum set that
is most effective in reducing the violations at various, stressed areas of the
system and significantly improves computation time, indicating suitability
for online RAS applications. The controllability-analysis based formulation
utilizes clustering and factorization techniques that process sensitivities, as
was introduced in Chapter 4. Thus, this application further demonstrates
the versatility and utility of the distributed controller role and interaction
discovery algorithm, as will be detailed in the following sections.
6.2 Solution Overview
Kazerooni [100] developed an automated RAS procedure to protect large-
scale power systems against accidental failures or malicious endeavors such
as cyber attacks using steady-state analysis techniques. Specifically, the pro-
cedure focused on generation redispatch techniques [94,103,104]. This work
was developed within our research team and as one of few online RAS de-
signs with fully available details; we thus utilize its framework to develop
the analytic corrective control selection algorithm. Nonetheless, this novel
online RAS algorithm offers fast computation and proposes a fast, greedy al-
gorithm through control subspace synthesis that utilizes heuristics to narrow
the search space, which will be discussed further.
The RAS algorithm is capable of online execution for rapid analysis while
providing resilient solutions. Since RAS designs that utilize transient stabil-
ity analysis are computationally expensive and not yet appropriate for online
applications, this steady-state analysis based RAS algorithm is favorable for
situations in which control actions need to be calculated as quickly as possible
(e.g., during a cyber attack). Additionally, this automated RAS procedure
develops a security assessment measure, the violation index, that evaluates
the security of each candidate action. The violation index depends on the
aggregate of violations in the physical and operating constraints of the sys-
tem and is used by the online RAS to select the most appropriate controls.
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Further details on this algorithm are provided in Section 6.3.
The critical generators are identified to reduce the search space, thus re-
ducing the exhaustive search for generation redispatch calculation. The RAS
algorithm employs a proximity-based critical generator identification (PCGI)
method. Kazerooni leveraged insight that some generators may be signifi-
cantly more effective than others for system security. Empirical studies were
performed that indicated geographically clustered violations (e.g., lines and
buses) and, as a result, generators nearest to these stressed areas were identi-
fied as critical. Graph theory and proximity measures are applied to discover
these critical generators, as described in Section 6.3.2. In this manner, in-
significant generators are eliminated from the search. Although this method
is effective in reducing the search space, it possesses several disadvantages:
• A user-specified default number of critical generators is utilized; a
smaller set of critical generators may exist and reduce search space
further.
• The PCGI method is based on empirical analyses and may not apply
to all systems and/or contingencies.
• The method does not consider effective generators that are located
away from the violated area(s).
The work presented in this chapter provides an analytic critical control
identification method. Rather than relying on proximity-measures derived
empirically, a controllability analysis-based formulation is developed. The
critical controls identified are the most effective in reducing the violations at
the various stressed areas of the system. In fact, they are essential for the
controllability of those violated areas. This is achieved by leveraging sen-
sitivities, considering the relationship between the corrective controls (e.g.,
generators) and the violations (e.g., overloaded lines). Clustering and fac-
torization methods are applied to analytically discover the critical controls.
While this chapter focuses on generators as the critical control for generation
redispatch, this methodology is broadly applicable to any corrective control
for which a sensitivity matrix in relation to the violated components can be
derived.
As presented in the evaluations (Section 6.7), the analytic corrective con-
trol selection (ACCS) algorithm not only utilizes a lower number of critical
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generators than the proximity-based method but also achieves significant re-
duction of the violation index. When PCGI is set to the same number of
resultant critical generators, a different set is found and is less effective in
reducing the violation index. Therefore, ACCS is able to significantly re-
duce the computation time while also identifying the most broadly effective
critical controls for all violations.
With the inclusion of the ACCS algorithm within the online RAS design,
fast and effective response is achieved for generation redispatch applications.
In particular, with its automated and online response ability, the overall de-
sign can be used as a defense mechanism to maintain system reliability when
cyber attacks occur. Characterized as a large disturbance, generator out-
age(s) can have significant impact on the system that range from overloaded
lines, to loss of service to load(s), to sensitive equipment damage. In the
worst case, cascading effects from the stressed system can lead to blackout.
Generator outages can be caused by certain system conditions and other
contingencies (e.g., faults or equipment malfunction), but also as a result of
cyber attacks.
Two real-world examples of generator outages caused by cyber adversaries
include the Ukraine event and the Aurora generator test. As mentioned
in the previous section, the December 2015 large-scale cyber attack on the
Ukraine power grid caused a blackout for thousands of customers by discon-
necting seven substations. Specifically, the attackers, after gaining remote
control of the SCADA distribution management system, caused unnecessary
“scheduled” maintenance outages of various generators (associated with the
targeted connected loads) [56, 105]. In the 2007 Aurora generator test, re-
searchers at Idaho National Laboratories (INL) demonstrated that using only
cyber commands, they could cause a generator to explode. The command
consisted of rapidly switching the generator’s circuit breakers out of phase
with the rest of the grid [11]. This case particularly demonstrates the serious
physical consequences that can result from cyber attacks.
Effective response to cyber attacks requires actions from both the cyber
and physical layers of the power grid. For example, a compromised, outaged
generator must be “cleaned” of the intrusion using cyber mechanisms such as
intrusion detection and/or recovery systems. Meanwhile, the physical power
system must react to maintain system reliability by maintaining continuous
service, relieving stressed components, and preventing damage. In the case
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Figure 6.1: Security-compliant generator dispatch subspace synthesis.
of generator outage, one approach is utilizing generation redispatch to ensure
system operation. A cyber-physical response (CPR) mechanism that employs
both layers to respond to various contingencies is being developed within our
research team as well, as detailed in [23].
The online RAS formulation with ACCS enables quick and effective re-
sponse to generator outage that utilizes the minimum set of generators with
the most impact in the system, for the specific outage(s). As the generation
redispatch is automatic and calculated online, it can follow the trajectory of
the cyber attack and update the redispatch to best maintain system relia-
bility. In this manner, this design can aid in defending the attacked system,
responding with the most suitable remedial actions even as the attack is
changing. This compromised, outaged generator scenario is further formu-
lated in Section 6.7.
Details on the automated RAS scheme and PCGI are given in Section 6.3,
and ACCS is presented in Section 6.4-6.6. Finally, evaluations are presented
in Section 6.7 with the IEEE 24-bus case and the IEEE 118-bus case, and
conclusions are provided in Section 6.8.
6.3 Automated Remedial Action Scheme Algorithm
The automated RAS procedure developed by Kazerooni, particularly the se-
lection of critical generators, is briefly described in this section, with the full
details provided in [100]. For generation redispatch applications, the feasible
control subspace of the power system with n generators is discretized into
equally distant n-dimensional cubes, as shown in Figure 6.1. Each point in
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the grid corresponds to one control action vector dependent on each genera-
tor’s allowed dispatch MW range. The power flow is solved for each action
and the resultant security constraints are evaluated. The actions that do not
violate any constraints are identified as possible RAS solutions.
6.3.1 Proposed Violation Index
It is possible that no control actions can be taken that will satisfy all of the se-
curity constraints. In this case, the actions that violate fewer constraints and
provide a more secure state are selected. A violation index may be defined
to evaluate the resultant security of the system after an action. Aggregate
MVA overload (AMWCO) is introduced in [106], which evaluates the system




max{0, P (k)ij − Pmaxij } (6.1)
where Pi,j is the active power on the line between buses i and j, P
max
i,j is the
flow limit of this line, and I is the set of all (i, j) for which there is a line
connecting bus i to bus j. This security index considers only the line flow
violations, and excludes the bus voltage or the generator power limits. To
account for additional types of limits, a general violation index is defined,
V iolation(k) = wIS
(k)
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(k)
Q are respectively the security indices of the line
flows, bus voltages, generator active power and reactive power for action k.
The corresponding weights wI , wV , wP and wQ capture varying importance
of different violation types. These weights are currently assigned heuristically
with generator limits weighed more heavily and current limits with the lowest
weight. A systematic approach for assigning weights will be developed in










In this case, the MVA overloads are normalized by the line flow limits. The
violation index for bus voltage and generator limits are defined similarly
and the aggregate violations are normalized by their upper bound limits. In
this manner, the terms corresponding to each constraint that appear in the
violation index reflect their actual importance to the system security.
Furthermore, the violation index in this design is static, though dynamic
versions can be incorporated. As the current focus is to reduce computa-
tion time to develop fast, effective RAS for online use, the static index was
applied. Indices based on transient stability analysis and dynamic response
may significantly increase calculation time, and future work will study how
this can be improved.
6.3.2 Proximity-based Critical Generation Identification
The computation complexity of the control subspace synthesis algorithm is
O(Rn), where R is the discretization granularity for the individual genera-
tors, n is the number of generators that can participate in the dispatch, and
O() is the big O time complexity notation. The complexity is exponential
in the number of participating generators, which results in significant com-
putational burden for large systems. To tackle this issue, one approach is
to reduce the number of participating generators. Individual generators may
have varying impact on the overall system security with some generators
crucial and others less significant. Excluding less significant generators from
the search reduces the number of candidates, while still providing enough
candidates to keep the performance near optimal.
A greedy algorithm is employed to identify the insignificant generators
based on graph theory and proximity measures. For every contingency, the
lines and buses at which the constraints are violated are identified. Based
on empirical analyses, it is observed the identified lines and buses are often
clustered at one or multiple locations in the network. The generators close to
the areas under stress are classified as crucial and the ones which are further
away are labeled as insignificant. The most critical generators are determined
in the first level of the algorithm and less critical ones are determined in
subsequent levels. The levels are executed consecutively until the number of
critical generators reaches a user-specified value. Algorithm 1 describes the
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procedure.
Algorithm 1 Proximity-based Critical Generator Identification (PCGI)
1: procedure PCGI(Network State and Limits)
2: U1Critbus = Set of busses with Violations
3: U1Critgen = UPV ∩ U1Critbus
4: k = 1
5: while Size(UkCritgen) < CritgenMax do
6: UkCritbus = Uk−1Critbus ∪N(Uk−1Critbus)
7: UkCritGen = Uk−1CritGen ∪ (UPV ∩ UkCritbus)
8: k = k + 1
9: end while
10: end procedure
In Algorithm 1, UkCritbus and UkCritbus are respectively the set of critical buses
and critical generators at level k, CritGenMax is the maximum number of
critical generators defined by the user and Size(x) returns the size of the set
x. This heuristic technique provided decent results for the cases tested by
Kazerooni but does not provide the best selection of critical generators, as
discussed in Section 6.2. Therefore, a systematic approach with theoretical
guarantees to identify the truly optimal set of critical generators is desired.
ACCS seeks to provide this analytic solution based on controllability analysis,
subsequently identifying the most effective generators in controlling and thus
reducing the stress of the post-contingency overloads or other violations.
Finally, computation time can be further reduced through using DC power
flow (DCPF) instead of AC power flow to get the system states for each
possible action. Since the DCPF solution is not accurate, it could be used
as a fast screening tool before detailed ACPF analysis is performed on the
top candidates. The violation index of all the candidate actions is calculated
based on their DCPF solutions and the top candidates are selected. AC
power flow is solved for only the top candidates; exact violation indices are
calculated and the best action is obtained accordingly.
6.4 Analytic Corrective Control Selection
The proposed method leverages the sensitivities between the available cor-
rective controls and the violated components. Clustering is performed to
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discover violation groups, discussed in Section 6.5, and factorization tech-
niques are applied to identify the critical corrective controls, presented in
Section 6.6. The algorithm is controllability analysis-based as rank condi-
tions are applied in the factorization process. The critical corrective control
selection can be alternatively described as discovering the most effective con-
trols in controlling the violated components and reducing the overall system
stress. This interpretation and derivation of techniques was introduced for
the distributed controller role and interaction discovery algorithm presented
in Chapter 4.
The ACCS algorithm is general and can be applied to any type of cor-
rective control and violations, as long as the appropriate sensitivity matrix
is computed. To aid in the explanation of the method, this work utilizes a
generator outage example, where the violations are line overloads and the
corrective controls are generators.
6.4.1 Sensitivities of Critical Controls and Violations
A system’s sensitivity matrix provides powerful information about the rela-
tionships between components in a system [107]. For generation redispatch,
sensitivities provide insight into the interaction between available generators
and violations. Considering generator outage(s) and line overload(s), the
sensitivity of each line’s real power flow to each available generator’s real
power changes is represented in the matrix Ψ.
∆Pflow.line,overloaded = [Ψ] ·∆GMW (6.4)
With Ψ, the sensitivities pertaining to the available generators and over-
loaded lines can be processed to discover which generators cause the greatest
impact on the line flows. A subset of the sensitivity matrix is used in the cur-
rent approach, where rows are associated with overloaded lines and columns
with the available generators (excluding the slack bus and outaged genera-




ACCS clusters the rows of Ψ, the overloaded lines, and determines which
overloaded lines impact each other and which do not. The results of this
step provide:
• Violation groups : for generation redispatch, the sets of overloaded
transmission lines that can be controlled independently
Each violation group discovered is comprised of overloaded lines that im-
pact each other significantly; they are highly coupled. Within each set, it
only makes sense to target one overloaded line to control, as controlling one
line flow will always strongly impact the others in a predictable way. The
generator(s) selected to reduce the overload of that one line will also be effec-
tive for the rest of the overloaded lines within the violation group, whereas a
different violation group will have different sensitivities and require calcula-
tion for generator(s) most effective for those overloaded lines. In this manner,
a target set of overloaded lines, the most sensitive from each violation group,
can be selected to further process and determine the critical generators that
can provide the best corresponding control.
To determine these violation groups, we perform k-means clustering upon
the cosine similarities between the different overloaded line sensitivities [68].
By comparing the angles between row vectors of Ψ, the overloaded lines, the
coupled and decoupled sets of overloaded lines and their real power flows are
found. To calculate and compare these angles, we utilize the coupling index
(CI) and measure the cosine similarity [68]. The CI is equal to the cosine of





The clusters, or violation groups, identified using the CI are approximately
orthogonal to each other. The CI has values between −1 and 1. By clustering
on the rows of the sensitivity matrix using CI, the coupled and decoupled
sets of overloaded line flows can be determined. Thus, each cluster will be
independent and decoupled from the other sets. Within the cluster, the line
flows are coupled and dependent on one another.
For k-means clustering, we must provide k, the number violation groups
we seek. However, we do not want to arbitrarily select k, as it will not be
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unlike the PCGI default number of critical generator specification. We would
like an analytic solution that can determine the most suitable number of
violation groups that is dependent on the system topology and current state,
involving the generator outage and line overloads. The resultant clusters
should be highly cohesive, the overloaded lines within each violation group
should be very dependent on each other.
To leverage the sensitivity matrix and its inherent groupings, the proposed
ACCS method uses the singular values that are computed using singular value
decomposition (SVD). The SVD of a m× n matrix Ψ is:
Ψ = UΣVT (6.6)
where U is an m ×m orthogonal matrix, V is an n × n orthogonal matrix,
and Σ is an m × n diagonal matrix with the singular values listed in de-
creasing order [72, 73]. The algorithm uses SVD to obtain a rank reduced
approximation of a data set to generalize some properties or structure. One
interpretation of the singular values is information on the largest contribu-
tions to the matrix and its general structure. Therefore, the most significant
or largest singular values represent the most significant groups present in the
data, which in our case is the sensitivity matrix.
Using the number of most significant singular values from the sensitivity
matrix, ACCS achieves an initial guess for the number of clusters, k, for
k-means clustering. To determine which singular values are most significant,
ACCS calculates an optimal hard threshold using the techniques detailed by
Gavish and Donoho, rigorously derived in [74], and henceforth referred to
as the hard threshold singular value (HTSV) method. HTSV considers the
recovery of low-rank matrices from noisy data by hard thresholding singu-
lar values. The HTSV thresholding rules adapt to the unknown rank and
unknown noise level in an optimal manner and provide better results than
truncated SVD (TSVD) [75]. The final result is not a fixed threshold chosen
a-priori but a data-dependent threshold, which is preferred for ACCS.
For a nonsquare m × n matrix with an unknown noise level, the optimal
threshold value τˆ ∗ is:
τˆ ∗ = ω(β) · ymed (6.7)
where ymed is the median singular value of the data matrix Y and the optimal
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hard threshold coefficient is dimension-dependent (β = m
n
) and calculated




6.6 Identifying Critical Corrective Controls
With the clustered violation groups, ACCS selects one line from each group
to form a target set of overloaded lines to process. Within each violation
group, ACCS examines each overloaded line’s average sensitivity to all avail-
able generators. The most sensitive overloaded line is selected for inclusion
in the target set. Subsequently, the critical generators that are selected for
this target set will be effective in reducing the violation index for all the over-
loaded lines. Furthermore, the sensitivities to be processed via factorization
are further reduced and computation time is lowered.
With the target set’s sensitivity matrix, ΨTAR, with target overloaded
lines on the rows (one from each violation group) and available generators
on the columns, the factorization method is applied to determine which of
the generators are critical. These critical generators, defined below, are to
be used with the automated RAS scheme, particularly with the continued
example of generation redispatch after generator outage(s).
• Critical generators : for generation redispatch, the minimum set of
available generators needed to effectively respond to control the tar-
get overloaded lines and reduce violations
This determination requires examining the coupling of the columns of
ΨTAR, or the rows of Ψ
T
TAR, to identify which generators will be most effec-
tive in reducing the violation index of the overloaded lines. This analysis is
motivated by observability analysis-based algorithms that sought to identify
critical measurements to protect against data injection attacks [59,77]. This
can be similarly applied to identify the critical generators, where controlla-
bility analysis is used to determine which of the generators are essential in
controlling the overloaded target lines, reducing the violation index. Back-
ground on power system controllability is provided next, in Section 6.6.1.
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6.6.1 Power System Controllability
In power systems, the controllable region is the subset of the state space
on which the available controls can be used to steer the power system from
one state to any other state [30]. In general, the power system dynamical
equation can be written as:
x˙ = f(x) +
m∑
i=1
gi(x)ui, x ∈ Ξ (6.8)
where x is an n-vector of dynamic variables (e.g., line power flows), f(x) is
a vector consisting primarily of the power flow equations, and
∑m
i=1 gi(x)ui
represents the effects of the controls on the system. The scalars ui, i =
1, ...,m, are the system controls (e.g., generator real power injections) and
are usually piece-wise constant in time, due to device physical characteristics.
System state space, Ξ, is an open subset of the n-dimensional Euclidean
space. If X(s1, u, t) ∈ Ξ represents the system movement with the initial
state s1, control u, and 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞, the controllable region satisfies:
X(s1, u, t) = s2, u ∈ U and 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞ (6.9)
where every pair of states s1 and s2 ∈ Z satisfies (6.9). Z is the controllable
region, a subset of Ξ. Therefore, the system presented in (6.8) can be steered
from a state to any other state within the controllable region. Further proofs
and other references can be found in [30]. The set of controls is defined as the
available generators in this work, and ACCS decomposes this set to identify
the critical generators for use in online RAS.
6.6.2 Critical Generators
To identify the critical generators, ACCS processes ΨTTAR using factorization
techniques. The method performs a change of basis that maps available gen-
erators to equivalent controllable states. The equivalent states are the real
power flows of the overloaded lines. Thus, ACCS identifies the set of available
generators needed to control those equivalent overloaded line flows and most
effectively reduce the violation index through generation redispatch. The
generation redispatch output quantities to be assigned to these critical gen-
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erators are found using the automated RAS procedure presented in Section
6.3.
Rows in ΨTTAR correspond to available generators and columns correspond
to the target overloaded line flows. LU factorization is applied to obtain the
change of basis, decomposing the transposed sensitivity matrix to lower and
upper triangular factors; [78] describes the LU factorization method. The









Using the Peters-Wilkinson [78] method, ACCS decomposes ΨTTAR into its
factors, where P is the permutation matrix and LF and UF are the lower
and upper triangular factors of dimension n, respectively. M is a sparse,
rectangular matrix with rows corresponding to the less effective available









The transformed basis, shown in (6.12), must be full rank for a controllable
system and this requires the m × (n − 1) matrix to have a column rank of
(n − 1) to be a controllable n-bus system with m-measurements [77]. Since
LF and UF will be nonsingular for a controllable system, the rank of Ψ
T
TAR
can be confirmed by checking the rank of the transformed factor LCER. Also,
Lb has full rank and with (6.12) multiplied by L
−1
b from the right, the row
identities will be preserved in the transformed matrix LCER. Each row of the
matrix will therefore correspond to the respective available generators [77].
Rows of GCRIT correspond to essential corrective controls, in this case
available generators, that are sufficient to assure independent controllability
of the equivalent overloaded line flows. The rows of GREM correspond to
the corrective controls that can be removed from the generation redispatch
procedure. Columns correspond to the equivalent overloaded line flows which
can easily be mapped back to the original flows using the permutation ma-
trix P obtained from the LU decomposition step. Again, these equivalent
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overloaded lines are composed of the target set of overloaded lines obtained
from the clustered violation groups.
The resultant critical generators are the most effective minimum set re-
sponding to all the line overloads. Thus, the least number of generators can
be used with the automated RAS scheme—reducing computation time signif-
icantly while effectively responding to geographically diverse line overloads.
6.7 Evaluations
The analytic corrective control selection (ACCS) method is summarized in
the flowchart shown in Figure 6.2. For this chapter, the example contingency
of generator outage(s) and resultant overloaded lines is used and reflected in
the flowchart. Nonetheless, this ACCS algorithm is applicable to any con-
tingency and violation; an appropriate sensitivity matrix must be calculated
that reflects the available corrective controls and violated components.
As described in Section 6.2, generator outages are large disturbances that
can have significant impact on the power system. Thus, this work focuses
on such contingencies and the subsequent generation redispatch calculations
to be computed by the presented online RAS design in conjunction with the
ACCS algorithm. Real-world cases such as the large-scale cyber attack on the
Ukraine power grid and the Aurora generator test exemplify the severity of
the consequences that could occur as well as how generators can be prominent
targets by adversaries [11,56,105]. Therefore, when generator outages occur,
from either benign (accidental or malfunction) or malicious (cyber attack)
sources, a quick and effective response is necessitated to maintain the system
reliability via remedial actions such as generation redispatch. As discussed
previously, both cyber and physical responses are required to best respond to
the attack. The compromise and intrusion by adversaries must be removed
using cyber defense mechanisms such as intrusion recovery systems and the
physical, system-side actions are necessary to maintain grid operation and
safety [23].
To protect system reliability during a cyber attack, specifically considering
malicious generator outage(s), the online RAS algorithm with ACCS enables
automatic and immediate response that can be recalculated as the attack
trajectory changes. Thus, as compromise is being investigated by cyber-
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Calculate overloaded line to 




Input 𝐺𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑇 to automated 
RAS method for effective 
generation redispatch






Cluster rows of Ψ using cosine 
similarities and data-
dependent 𝑘
Apply LU factorization to Ψ𝑇𝐴𝑅
𝑇
to determine critical 
generators 𝐺𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑇
Figure 6.2: Flowchart of proposed analytic corrective control selection
(ACCS) method that uses clustering and factorization methods to obtain
critical generators to input to automated RAS designs for generator
outage(s) contingencies.
physical security mechanisms, the effective generation redispatch response
seeks to minimize stressed conditions and prevent damage to sensitive equip-
ment. This response is demonstrated with the IEEE 24-bus and IEEE 118-
bus systems where the cyber attack scenario has the following assumptions:
• Generator outage(s) have occurred due to malicious compromise or
accident/malfunction.
– Cyber adversary may have gained access to generator controls
(e.g., through SCADA distribution management system) and caused
the generator to shut down, damage itself, or vary its output.
• Cyber-physical security mechanisms investigate and seek to mitigate
the compromise.
• During the attack, the online RAS design with ACCS aims to maintain
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Table 6.1: IEEE 24-bus Generator (Gen.) Outage Scenarios: Resultant
Overloaded Lines and Violation Index (Viol.)
Outage Scenarios




system reliability by formulating the most effective generation redis-
patch.
– As the attack trajectory changes, the enhanced RAS mechanism
is able to respond accordingly with its online computation.
6.7.1 IEEE 24-Bus System
The ACCS algorithm is evaluated using an IEEE 24-bus system which has
11 generators and 38 lines, modeled in PowerWorld, a power system simu-
lation software [108]. For this study, ACCS is used to identify the critical
generators to be used in reducing/eliminating line overloads after a gener-
ator outage, from compromise or accident/malfunction, has occurred. The
resultant critical generators will be input for the automated RAS procedure
by Kazerooni [100] to perform generator redispatch. For this system, all sets
of available generators are analyzed, excluding the slack and outaged gen-
erator(s), and three different outage scenarios are considered, as presented
in Table 6.1. These generator outages were simulated in PowerWorld and
the resultant overloaded lines and violation indices are listed. Additionally,
“almost” overloaded lines operating at over 80% of the MVA line limits are
also considered. In this manner, the generators selected as a result of ACCS
secure the system and reduce stress.
The first case considers an outage of generator 7 (Gen.7) and the sub-
sequent line flow violations in Table 6.1. The post-contingency sensitivity
matrix, Ψ, is calculated for the four overloaded lines and nine available gen-
erators. These sensitivities reflect how each overloaded line’s real power flow
responds to each available generator’s real power changes, as discussed in
Section 6.4.
Next, ACCS clusters the rows of Ψ to obtain the violation groups. The
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Table 6.2: Singular Values yi of Ψ
y1 y2 y3 y4
1.7400 0.4590 0.0077 0.0180
Table 6.3: Violation Groups (V.G.) for Gen.7 Outage
V.G. 1 L1,L3,L12
V.G. 2 L13
coupling index (CI) calculation is applied to Ψ and the cosine similarities are
subsequently clustered. To determine a data-dependent k for k-means clus-
tering, singular value decomposition (SVD) is applied to obtain the singular
values, yi, of Ψ. These are listed in Table 6.2. The hard threshold singular
value (HTSV) method by Gavish and Donoho [74] is utilized to determine
the most significant singular values. The algorithm, discussed in Section 6.5,
outputs:
τˆ ∗ = ω(β) · ymed = 0.489 (6.13)
which we relax slightly to include any yi that are within 10% of the threshold.
Therefore, y1 and y2 satisfy the hard threshold and we set k = 2. Next, Ψ is
clustered using the k-means method with k = 2 and the cosine similarities.
Two violation groups are obtained, as shown in Table 6.3.
Figure 6.3 displays the resultant silhouette values from the clustering re-
sults. The silhouette technique is used to evaluate how well each object lies
within its cluster. That is, silhouettes compare how similar an object is to the
other objects in its cluster when compared to the objects in other clusters.
The silhouette value, sili for the i-th object, ranges from −1 to 1, thus the
closer sili is to 1, the more well matched it is to its own cluster and poorly
matched to neighboring clusters [76]. The silhouette values for all four of our
objects, the overloaded lines, are close to 1, and therefore indicate suitable
clustering.
With the violation group results, the target set of overloaded lines, ΨTAR,
is formulated. From V.G. 1, L1 is the most sensitive overloaded line and
V.G. 2 has only one line, L13. Thus, ΨTAR, is comprised of sensitivities
between the target L1 and L13 and the nine available generators.
121








Figure 6.3: Silhouette values for overloaded lines in each violation
group/cluster after Gen.7 outage.
ΨTTAR is processed using LU factorization to identify the critical genera-
tors, GCRIT, the minimum set of available generators needed to effectively
respond or control the overloaded lines. For the Gen.7 outage, ACCS obtains
the result:
GCRIT = [2 15] (6.14)
Gen.2 and Gen.15 are critical and should be input into the automated RAS
algorithm to determine the generation redispatch settings. Table 6.4 summa-
rizes the results where ACCS is compared with the proximity-based critical
generator (PCGI) method developed by Kazerooni where a user-defined de-
fault of five generators is always used. The ACCS results are also compared
with a modified PCGI (MPCGI) method in which the default was set to the
data-dependent number of critical generators found by ACCS, essentially
using the same number of critical generators found by ACCS in the PCGI
method. In this manner, the ACCS algorithm’s ability to find the most
effective generators to reduce the violation index is apparent.
The results indicate that the ACCS method was able to reduce the viola-
tion index (Viol.) most significantly (the original, post-contingency viol. is
shown in Table 6.1). The PCGI method reduces the violation index accept-
ably as well, but has a considerably larger computation time (Comp. Time,
0.5318 s vs. 11.071 s). When the proximity-based method, MPCGI, is set
to the same number of critical generators in ACCS’s GCRIT, the violation
index has not been reduced as effectively. The proximity-based method only
considers the nearby generators and does not find the most effective gen-
erators needed to respond to the line overloads. The ACCS algorithm, on
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the other hand, considers the whole set of available generators to obtain the
overall critical set. The computation time (Comp. Time) reflects the time
for the automated RAS method to determine generation redispatch quanti-
ties. Note that ACCS, PCGI, and MPCGI calculate the critical generators
in less than 1 s, and therefore add minimal computational overhead to the
RAS algorithm.
Since both ACCS and MPCGI consider only two generators, the RAS com-
putation time is similar. The PCGI with the default of five critical generators
takes much longer, as the iterative generation dispatch must search for the
best result between five generators. The critical generators found by each
method are represented in Figure 6.4.
Table 6.4: IEEE 24-bus: Gen.7 Outage Results
Viol. Comp. Time GCRIT
ACCS 0.0371 0.5318 s [2 15]
PCGI 0.0431 11.0171 s [2 13 14 15 23]
MPCGI 0.0819 0.5828 s [2 13]
The Gen.23 outage scenario results are also presented in Table 6.5. It can
be observed that ACCS finds a much smaller critical generator set (Gen.2
and Gen.15) while achieving a low violation index and fast computation time.
PCGI achieves a similar (slightly better) reduction of the violation index,
but does so with five critical generators and, thus, a much longer generation
redispatch calculation. MPCGI has the fastest computation with two critical
generators, as found by the ACCS method, but has the worst performance
and does not reduce the violation index significantly.
Table 6.5: IEEE 24-bus: Gen.23 Outage Results
Viol. Comp. Time GCRIT
ACCS 0.0562 1.0765 s [2 15]
PCGI 0.0517 11.0692 s [2 13 14 15 23]
MPCGI 0.1472 0.6146 s [2 7]
The results for the double outage of Gen.7 and Gen.13 are shown in Ta-
ble 6.6. Additionally, these results in comparison to the PCGI and MPCGI
methods are displayed in Figure 6.5. In this case, the ACCS method has













Figure 6.4: Gen.7 outage in the IEEE 24-bus system with overloaded and
almost overloaded lines highlighted in red and the critical generators found
by the ACCS, PCGI, and MPCGI methods labeled.
PCGI algorithm performs fairly well, but at the expense of excessive compu-
tation time. The MPCGI method does not select the most effective critical
generators and therefore has the least reduction in violation index.
Table 6.6: IEEE 24-bus: Gen.7 and Gen.13 Outage Results
Viol. Comp. Time GCRIT
ACCS 0.0371 0.6734 s [2 15]
PCGI 0.0489 14.3243 s [2 14 15 16 23]
MPCGI 0.0819 0.5818 s [2 14]
6.7.2 IEEE 118-Bus System
The IEEE 118-bus system in Figure 6.6 was also tested with the compromised
generator scenario shown in Table 6.7. The system has 54 generators and




















Figure 6.5: Gen.7 and Gen.13 outage in the IEEE 24-bus system with
overloaded lines highlighted in red and the critical generators found by the
ACCS, PCGI, and MPCGI methods labeled.
generator outage and line overloads (violating MVA limits), specifically the
outage of Gen.10, which results in the largest violation index.
The results, shown in Table 6.8, indicate that the ACCS algorithm selected
the most effective critical generators for reducing the violations. Using only
four critical generators, the violation index was reduced from the original
1.257 to 0.0751. The default number of critical generators for large cases,
such as the IEEE 118-bus, was set to eight generators in the PCGI method.
The PCGI algorithm was able to achieve acceptable reduction of the violation
index but with significantly larger computation time with eight generators to
Table 6.7: IEEE 118-bus Generator (Gen.) Outage Scenarios: Resultant
Overloaded Lines and Violation Index (Viol.)
Outage Scenarios
Outaged Gen.(s) Overloaded Lines Viol.
Gen.10 L21, L33, L37, L40, L57, 1.257
L63, L66, L70, L85, L123
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Figure 6.6: IEEE 118-bus case with 54 generators and 186 lines.
Table 6.8: IEEE 118-bus: Gen.10 Outage Results
Viol. Comp. Time GCRIT
ACCS 0.0751 1.8110 s [4 36 49 73]
PCGI 0.0928 5.3096 s [8 15 18 19 24
25 32 34]
MPCGI 0.1149 1.7704 s [8 15 18 19]
input for generation redispatch. Lastly, the MPCGI method, set to the same
number as ACCS as discovered through clustering, obtains similar computa-
tion time (as expected) but suffers in performance with the least reduction
in the violation index.
6.8 Conclusion
Oﬄine RAS calculations and resultant look-up tables do not suffice for unpre-
dictable events such as cyber attacks on the power grid. In moving forward
to address this shortcoming, this chapter presents solutions to support on-
line RAS through real-time computation of corrective controls, where the
resultant controls are determined based on the current system state and de-
signed to provide the most suitable and effective response. An algorithm is
presented to select the most effective corrective controls to use with online
RAS, significantly reducing computation time. The resulting online RAS
could respond automatically and effectively even as the attack trajectory
changes in the system.
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The analytic corrective control selection (ACCS) method developed in this
work derives a controllability analysis-based formulation that leverages sensi-
tivities and applies clustering and factorization techniques. It demonstrates
the utility and versatility of the distributed controller role and interaction
discovery algorithm presented in Chapter 4 and aids the focus of this dis-
sertation of fast and effective response to distributed controller compromise.
In this manner, the critical corrective controls identified are the most effec-
tive in reducing violations in various, stressed areas of the system and are
the minimum set. For generation redispatch examples, demonstrated with
compromised generator outage(s) in the IEEE 24-bus and IEEE 118-bus sys-
tems, the critical generators selected by ACCS provide significant reduction
in the violation index. Furthermore, only a fraction of the set of available
generators are needed. The computation of RAS for generation redispatch
was much faster, as a small set of generators could be used. These results
indicate that ACCS finds the most comprehensive and effective minimal set
of critical generators or corrective controls to utilize with RAS and plays
an important role in successfully restoring the system to a normative state
while undergoing a cyber attack. The negligible computation overhead by
ACCS and subsequent speedy RAS calculations, with the minimum set, is
promising for use in online RAS designs.
This work can be extended to utilize DCOPF or ACOPF given improve-
ments to their formulations to reduce computation time, as maximizing re-
liability slows down the implementation [109]. This further work could con-
tribute both to improving the violation index calculation to appropriately re-
flect all constraints for different contingencies beyond generator outage and to
developing a systematic approach to selecting weights. Furthermore, when
considering multiple types of violations (e.g., line flow limits and voltage
limits), violation groups derived from clustering the sensitivity matrix must
reflect all limits. An interesting future direction would be to study how ap-
propriate sensitivity matrices could be derived reflecting multiple violation
types or if the overlap of violation groups (calculated separately for each
violation type) provides minimal computational overhead.
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CHAPTER 7
POWER FLOW ANALYSIS FOR
CONTROL INPUT VERIFICATION
7.1 Problem Statement
In the study of power systems, power flow analysis has been both a funda-
mental and critical tool. It has traditionally been applied to estimate power
flows, real and reactive, on all lines of a given system and determine the
bus voltage and phase angle values in steady-state operation. Both AC and
DC methods have been developed, but one of the most notable algorithms is
the Newton-Raphson power flow (NR-PF) [110]. The root-solving technique
is a nonlinear AC method and is utilized to obtain power flow results with
quadratic convergence.
However, for many applications besides planning, adequate speed is not
achieved with NR-PF. For example, congestion-constrained market applica-
tions and contingency analysis both need fast power flow results [111, 112].
Speed is especially important for online protection schemes; the verification of
input control logic programs before execution requires very fast and accurate
power flow results. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs) are prominently
utilized distributed controllers in the power system, used for executing a vari-
ety of system controls. The verification tool developed for the overall project
uses symbolic execution to explore the future state space to determine if the
execution of the control input will lead to a safe or unsafe state. The decision
of safety is determined using power flow results and system constraints. This
tool is described further in [23, 28], as well as in Section 2.3.2, and the case
study later in this chapter; it is the motivation for this work. Nonetheless,
such safety-dependent analysis requires highly accurate results as achieved
with NR-PF but at a higher speed.
The NR-PF requires calculations of both partial derivatives and Jacobian
matrices, slowing down the method. The non-linearity causes the solution of
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very large AC power flow models to be excessively slow, and thus infeasible;
the computational burden and number of iterations increase with the size of
the system. To combat this, alternate methods such as DC power flow (DC-
PF), fast decoupled power flow (FD-PF), and dishonest Newton-Raphson
power flow (DNR-PF) can be used to expedite the process [112–114]. These
algorithms make simplifying assumptions and, as a result, have lower ac-
curacy than the NR-PF result. DC-PF exhibits the least burden but also
implements the most severe approximations. The speed, nevertheless, re-
mains an attractive feature.
Applications such as fault analysis or the control input verification require
fast, reliable calculations for power flow. Speed is of utmost importance
but the trade-off with accuracy in the previously mentioned algorithms is
a significant drawback. A power flow method that preserves the accuracy
of the traditional NR-PF, or comes close, with the speed of the alternative
methods is necessitated. Lu et al. [115] developed a method, improved DC
power flow (impDC-PF), that applies correction terms derived from the NR-
PF formulation and calculates them using historical data. These correction
terms are applied to the DC-PF method, maintaining the linear formulation,
and they improve the accuracy significantly while maintaining the speed.
Yet, there exist some negatives that the proposed algorithm, augmented
DC power flow (augDC-PF), intends to mitigate and improve. The fact
that the correction terms are calculated with historical terms requires this
data to be processed and adapted to the current operation point (hours,
days, seasons). There is some overhead in calculating the correction terms
to correctly reflect the current situation, even if it is only a prior calculation.
Calculation based on historical data also draws attention to the case when
the system topology changes. In this case, the historical data is not accurate
and perhaps not even applicable depending on the extent of the topology
changes.
For both speed and accuracy requirements, the improved DC power flow
method is not the best and viable option. Therefore, this chapter proposes
an augmented DC power flow method that fixes the problems listed above
and offers further improvements. This augmented method uses the addition
of real-time measurements to mitigate the historical data drawbacks and also
achieve greater accuracy. The method’s performance when topology changes
and when full system observability is not achieved is presented. The case
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study involving control input verification is also presented to showcase the
method’s versatility and motivation. In particular, the ability to use the
symbolic power flow results to backsolve for control input safety ranges is
presented. This is demonstrated within the full context of the verification
tool in [28].
7.2 Background
The traditional power flow analysis methods NR-PF, FD-PF, DC-PF, and
DNR-PF are summarized in this section. Background on the impDC-PF
algorithm and the use of real-time measurements is presented as well.
7.2.1 Newton-Raphson Power Flow
The Newton-Raphson method solves a nonlinear equation in the form of













































The x vector includes the voltage magnitude, V , and voltage phase angle, δ,
quantities that are to be solved for. The y vector is composed of the real and
reactive power flow equations shown below:





YknVncos(δk − δn − θkn) (7.4)




YknVnsin(δk − δn − θkn) (7.6)
k = 2, 3, ..., N (7.7)
The slack bus is assumed to be bus 1, when k = 1, and the δ1 and V1 quantities
are known to be 0 and 1 p.u., respectively. The power flow equations are not
written for the slack bus. With this model, the Newton-Raphson root solving
technique is applied: the Jacobian matrix is calculated and iterative Gauss
elimination is used to iteratively solve the system, provided an initial guess.
Convergence criteria are based on the power mismatch and boast quadratic
convergence due to the use of Newton-Raphson. Further details about the
treatment of different kinds of buses as well as the procedure can be found
in [116].
7.2.2 Approximate Power Flow Algorithms
As mentioned previously, many applications that involve large systems and/or
need speed require the use of alternative power flow methods such as the
DC-PF and DNR-PF algorithms. Although they are much faster than the
traditional NR-PF solution, there still exists a trade-off with accuracy. These
techniques are detailed in the following sections.
Dishonest Newton-Raphson Power Flow
The DNR-PF is a variation of the NR-PF algorithm in which the Jacobian
matrix is not calculated at every iteration but is kept constant after being
computed with the initial guess input. This reduces the computational bur-
den as most of the time in the NR-PF iteration is spent dealing with the
Jacobian matrix, both for calculation and factorization [117]. The extreme
case is when it is only calculated once with the initial guess, but typically it is
occasionally recomputed and refactorized. Nonetheless, significant time sav-
ings occur with skipping the Jacobian computations in every iteration. The
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solution is subsequently computed in the same procedure as the traditional
NR-PF. This simplification, however, is severe and results in an increased
number of iterations to reach convergence as well as less accuracy. Thus,
this method is not usually used for power flow analysis in practice as it does
not yield substantially beneficial results.
Fast Decoupled Power Flow
In decoupled power flow, the relationships between the state variables and
power injections are leveraged. The changes in voltage magnitude V affect
imaginary power Q more significantly than real power P , and changes in volt-
age phase angle δ affect P more significantly than Q. Using this knowledge,
a decoupling approximation can be made in which the partial derivatives




, are assumed to be zero since they are
already small. In each iteration, the solution guess for δ and V can be com-
puted separately and, therefore, are decoupled. Two justifications for these
Jacobian approximations are:
1. Usually r << x, and thus, |Gij| << |Bij|, where the impedance is
r + jx; |Gij| ≈ 0.
2. Typically δij is small, so sin(δij) ≈ 0, cos(δij) ≈ 1.
For fast decoupled power flow, further simplification is made by building
and factorizing the Jacobian once, as with the DNR-PF method. Voltage
magnitudes can also be assumed to be 1 p.u. to reduce the burden even
more. This increases the speed of computation (especially when only an
approximate solution is required and the number of iterations can be fixed),
but again, only an approximate solution results. Specifics about the method
can be found in [113,116,117].
DC Power Flow
The DC-PF involves severe approximations in which reactive power is ig-
nored, voltages are assumed to be 1 p.u., and conductances (G) are ignored
where Y = G + jB [112]. This renders the power flow equations as a linear
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set of equations, as follows:
δ = −B−1P (7.8)
where δ is the voltage phase angle vector, B is the vector of susceptances
(the imaginary portion of the admittance), and P is the real power injection
vector. Thus, an approximate solution for the power flow is obtained for
the phase angles while the voltage magnitudes are assumed to be 1 p.u. Yet
this speedy algorithm yields an inexact solution, which is not suitable in all
applications as examined next.
7.2.3 Improved DC Power Flow
The DC-PF is widely used when computational speed is prioritized and ap-
proximate results are suitable to use. In one case study [118], it was found
that the DC power flow was about 60 times faster than AC methods. How-
ever, typical error for DC power flow solutions is about 4.6%, due to the
severe approximations made. Therefore, there are accuracy and speed trade-
offs when dealing with AC and DC power flow methods. Lu et al. [115]
developed an improved DC power flow method using empirical knowledge of
the system from historical data. They found an 80% reduction in error with
their method while maintaining the linear formulation and computational
speed. By deriving correction terms from the AC formulation of power flow
equations, correction terms were created to add to the DC formulation and
still maintain the linear formulation.
The correction terms include bus voltages and phase angles and are based
on the historical data. Historical data is studied to identify patterns and
determine distributions as a function of hours, days, seasons, etc. Essentially,
the historical data must be processed to obtain reasonable estimation of the
current operating point of the system. However, this use of historical data is
not always suitable as the estimate may not be close enough to the current
operating point or satisfactorily adapted to it. The authors state that the
calculation of the correction terms can be done oﬄine or as a pre-processing
step. This derivation and the details of the impDC-PF algorithm are further
discussed in the development of the augDC-PF method.
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7.2.4 Augmented DC Power Flow with Real-Time
Measurements
Phasor measurement units (PMUs) have been broadly deployed in recent
decades for synchronized real-time measurements of power system quantities
such as voltage, current, and frequency [119]. Thus, with PMUs or similar
distributed measurement devices, access to expansive, fast-sampled power
system data can be obtained. These real-time measurements are used in
the formulation of the augDC-PF method and allow for more flexibility and
accuracy in the algorithm, as discussed in the following section.
7.3 Proposed Augmented DC Power Flow Method
The proposed augDC-PF method seeks to achieve both accuracy and speed.
Discussed in the background section, most of the speed-focused power flow
algorithms incur a trade-off with accuracy. The impDC-PF is a first step
towards this goal, but augDC-PF remedies its existing issues and seeks to
improve on it. This section details the augDC-PF method.
7.3.1 Augmented DC Power Flow Method
As discussed previously, impDC-PF requires pre-processing of historical data
to adapt to the current operating point and does not reflect topology changes.
These issues must be addressed for applications in which both speed and
accuracy are vital. Therefore, the proposed algorithm incorporates an aug-
mented DC power flow (augDC-PF) method that solves the problems listed
above and also offers further improvements. The augDC-PF uses the ad-
dition of real-time measurements to mitigate the historical data drawbacks
and achieve greater accuracy. The linear formulation of the DC-PF is key to
preserving this speed.
In this work, we propose an augmented DC power flow method (augDC-
PF) in which the correction terms are derived in the same manner as Lu et
al. [115], but instead of using historical data, we utilize online, real-time data
obtained from distributed monitoring devices such as PMUs. This eliminates
processing steps in estimating current operating points based on the historical
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data and adapting it to the season, day, and hour. The PMU data will
already reflect the present operating points as well as topology changes (the
historical data would not be applicable, in this case). Thus, the correction
terms are more accurately calculated and better results can be obtained. The
augDC-PF algorithm is formulated as follows:
The power flow equation for real power flow (between buses k and m, for




























P ∗k = Pk + Pkcorr (7.14)
B∗km = Bkm ·Bkmcorr (7.15)





The terms are now more accurately calculated; the correction terms include
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Vk, Vm, and phase angles θkm and are based on the real-time PMU data, as
exemplified in the next section.
7.4 Evaluation Results
The augDC-PF method improves the impDC-PF method with the inclusion
of real-time measurements, leading to online calculation of the correction
terms based on the current operating point. Thus, it maintains both speed
and accuracy, which is explored in this section. The effect of reducing the
set of PMU measurements is also investigated. The proposed method has
extended capabilities of dealing with topology changes, which are illustrated
with a small example. Lastly, a control input verification case study is pre-
sented to emphasize the need and usefulness of augDC-PF.
7.4.1 Speed and Accuracy of Method
The augDC-PF method was tested with PowerWorld 37-bus and 5-bus sys-
tem cases [84] and studied in terms of speed and accuracy. The algorithm
was implemented in Matlab and compared against traditional methods such
as NR-PF and DC-PF. To emulate the real-time (e.g. PMU) measurements,
PowerWorld Simulator was utilized. The system is shown in Figure 7.1, with
bus 1 as the slack bus.
Figure 7.1: PowerWorld 5-bus system.
By using the real-time measurements and correction terms, the augDC-PF
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method improved accuracy and preserved speed. The augDC-PF achieves
greater accuracy than DC-PF (as well as impDC-PF, which is based on
historical data) while maintaining the linear formulation. An example of this
improvement is shown in Figure 7.2 where the NR-PF results are compared
with both the DC-PF and augDC-PF methods for the IEEE 37-bus case
system. It was found that the performance of the augDC-PF method was
superior. The average error for augDC-PF is significantly lower than that of
DC-PF, as illustrated in the error plot.
Figure 7.2: The differences between the benchmark NR-PF results (for
phase angles) and both DC-PF and augDC-PF algorithms are compared for
an IEEE 37-bus system; the augDC-PF method exhibits less error, thus
superior performance.
Compared with the NR-PF computation time, the augDC-PF algorithm
is much faster and requires only one iteration. This is shown in Figure 7.3
where the computation time for the NR-PF method, cumulative as the itera-
tions increase, is compared with the computation time of the single iteration
augDC-PF method.
These results indicate that the augDC-PF method is a promising solution
for applications where both accuracy and speed are necessary. The impDC-
PF method and augDC-PF method are directly compared when considering
topology changes, again demonstrating the benefits of augDC-PF.
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Figure 7.3: For the PowerWorld 5-bus system, the computation time for the
NR-PF method involves several iterations, increasing the total time,
whereas the augDC-PF algorithm requires only one iteration.
7.4.2 Addressing Dynamic Changes in Topology
One of the main drawbacks of the impDC-PF algorithm is the inability to
reflect topology changes when calculating correction terms from historical
data. This can be remedied with the use of PMU measurements in the cor-
rection term calculation, as in augDC-PF. In this case, the PMU data reflects
the current operating point automatically, incorporating any changes in the
system. These changes include anything from weather to topology changes
(e.g., line(s) being opened or closed). The impDC-PF method has to adapt
historical data in the pre-processing step to best match the current operat-
ing point (not including topology changes), resulting in varying overhead in
computation.
An example topology change is the line between bus 4 and bus 5 being
opened in the 5-bus system presented in Figure 7.1. For the impDC-PF
method, the historical data used to calculate the correction terms is still
based on the original topology of the system (with the line between bus 4
and bus 5 closed). The subsequent results are less accurate than the results
from augDC-PF where the topology change has been taken into account.
This is exemplified in Table 7.1. Using the NR-PF results as the benchmark,
the error is computed for the impDC-PF and augDC-PF methods with the
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Table 7.1: Comparison of Results with Topology Change; Error Calculated
Using NR-PF Results as Benchmark
NR-PF impDC-PF augDC-PF
θ2 −0.3428 −0.4850 −0.2516
θ3 0.2382 0.0938 0.2489
θ4 0.1991 0.0529 0.2155
θ5 −0.0817 −0.1139 −0.0705
errorNR 0 0.2520 0.0940
Euclidean error norm. The augDC-PF method performs much better than
the impDC-PF method with an error of 0.0940 vs. 0.2520. This is due to
the inclusion of the current operating point PMU measurements that reflect
the topology changes in the augDC-PF formulation. Therefore, the historical
data drawbacks present in impDC-PF are remedied within augDC-PF and
better performance is achieved.
7.4.3 Reduced Set of PMU Measurements
In the preliminary results presented, it was assumed that PMU measurements
from every bus are available, resulting in very accurate correction terms.
However, this is not a realistic assumption as it is not usually available at
every bus in a system. There is ongoing research with the optimal placement
of PMUs to ensure full system observability, in which case augDC-PF would
perform as before. Xu and Abur [120] presented a numerical method that
uses integer programming to determine optimal PMU placement considering
mixed and conventional measurement sets whose objective is to minimize
cost while maintaining system observability.
When this strategy is implemented with the 5-bus system in Figure 7.1
with a simple cost set (assuming the same, average price for every PMU
device and installation), it is found that PMUs at bus 4 and 5 ensure system
observability and incur the least cost. Full system observability is achieved
because given a PMU at a bus, the bus voltage phasor and all current phasors
along lines connected to that bus will also be available. This also implies that
this bus voltage, along with all adjacent bus voltages, will also be available
(solvable). Therefore, quantities reflecting the current operating point of the
system are available/solvable, allowing for the accurate calculation of the
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correction terms and very similar results to before, when assuming PMUs
at each bus. Complete details on the optimal PMU placement strategy are
explained in [120].
However, if full system observability is not achieved and such optimal PMU
placement is not employed, augDC-PF’s correction term computation is not
as accurate. Note that we assume no measurement is corrupted (accidentally
or maliciously) [120]. Yet sample results, shown in Table 7.2, indicate that
the results do not vary too drastically.
Table 7.2: Effect of Reducing PMU Measurement Locations on Results,
Compared with the NR-PF Results as the Benchmark
NR-PF augDC-PF augDC-PF augDC-PF
PMUs at - all buses bus 2, 5 bus 3
θ2 −0.3263 0.3500 −0.2567 −0.3536
θ3 0.0091 −0.0030 0.3872 0.1152
θ4 −0.0349 −0.04881 0.2602 −0.0455
θ5 −0.0720 −0.0805 −0.01290 −0.0812
errorNR 0 0.0294 0.4495 0.1104
As presented in Table 7.2, augDC-PF has the best performance when full
system observability is achieved. In this case, there are PMUs available at
each bus but the same results would be obtainable if optimal PMU place-
ment was conducted (full system observability obtained). Then, the available
PMU measurements would ensure all other bus quantities (e.g., voltages) are
solvable.
Nonetheless, when full system observability is not acquired, as in the case
when there are PMUs only at bus 2 and 3 or just at bus 3, the method
suffers. As expected, the error of the result, expressed as its difference from
that of the benchmark NR-PF results, increases. This is due to the fact that
the correction terms are based on these measurements, and with reduced
observability, many quantities are no longer available. The error when there
is a PMU only at bus 3 is somewhat reasonable, indicating that there may
be certain situations in which the method performs adequately. This will be
investigated further in future work.
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7.4.4 Case Study: Control Input Verification
For various power system applications, such as real-time control, both speed
and accuracy of the power flow algorithm are needed—rough approximations
do not suffice. This is especially the case with the aforementioned control
input verification tool for power systems. In this case, control logic programs
upload to programmable logic controllers (PLCs) by the engineering work
stations. These programs are verified by exploring all feasible execution
paths stemming from them [29]. The states encountered by the paths are
deemed safe or unsafe using power system analyses (such as NR-PF); e.g.,
constraints such as voltage or line flow limits must be satisfied. Thus, if a
control input drives the system to an unsafe state (e.g., violates constraints),
as gleaned from the power flow results, that control input is flagged as “bad”
and not executed.
Symbolic executions of these analyses are utilized to explore all possible
control logic execution paths. The symbolic execution uses symbols as con-
trol inputs and contains logical path conditions, such as satisfying the power
system constraints. All feasible paths are explored using special solvers [121].
Ultimately, using the symbolic power flow results for a symbolic control in-
put, a “safe” range for the control input can be derived by backsolving using
system constraints. This aspect of the control verification tool will be stud-
ied in this case study regarding how augDC-PF handles symbolic variables
quickly and renders accurate results when backsolving for concrete “safe”
values. Crucial aspects of this tool are speed (the commands must be veri-
fied before execution) and accuracy (safety is dependent on it). Details on
symbolic execution and the verification tool are presented in [29].
The inclusion of symbolic variables significantly impacts traditional meth-
ods such as NR-PF. Both partial derivatives and the Jacobian matrix must
be computed with the symbolic variables, slowing the algorithm significantly
as each iteration’s parametric result becomes increasingly complex. When
testing the small 5-bus system in Figure 7.1, without symbolic execution,
each iteration takes only a few milliseconds. However, with symbolic real
power injection, solving the NR-PF is intractable and is excessively slow
even for two or three iterations. The scalability of the symbolic NR-PF is
shown for a 2-bus system and the 5-bus system in Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5.
Therefore, alternate methods must be considered, such as augDC-PF.
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Figure 7.4: As the number of iterations and the number of symbolic
variables increase, the computation time steeply increases for the 2-bus
power system after the inclusion of 3 symbolic variables.
Next, the augDC-PF method was implemented with the inclusion of a
symbolic control input, in this case a real power injection. If the symbolic
control input is b, we can backtrack from the power flow solution and the
safety and reliability constraints and try to find the range of b that satisfies
constraints and is “safe” (for power system operation). Voltage angle con-
straints are derived from FERC standards [122], and for the 5-bus system in
Figure 7.1 the angle constraints are:
|θ1(b)− θ5(b)| < 90◦ (7.17)
|θ5(b)− θ2(b)| < 90◦ (7.18)
|θ4(b)− θ2(b)| < 90◦ (7.19)
|θ4(b)− θ3(b)| < 90◦ (7.20)
The phase angle results from the augDC-PF method are used to compute the
angle difference constraints and the safe range of the symbolic control input,
b. Each phase angle result is in terms of b. Subsequently, the intersection of
the resulting inequality constraints is used as the final angle constraint which
satisfies all angle difference requirements, as shown below (ang as shorthand
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Figure 7.5: Similar to the behavior of the 2-bus system, the computation
time increases as the number of iterations and symbolic variables increases
with relatively longer computation time requirements.
for angle):
bminang < b < bmaxang (7.21)
With this final angle constraint, the range can be narrowed to satisfy other,
more critical constraints. Since the voltage angle constraints are not easily
violated, a large safe range of control input b results. Therefore, further
constraints, more critical to safe system operation, are applied using this
narrowed range.
A more commonly applied constraint is that of the line flows in the system.
By enforcing the MVA ratings of each line in the system, the range of safe
control input is further reduced. Applying line flow constraints, according to
each line’s MVA rating alongside the angle constraints, results in a much nar-
rower safe control input range. With Skm representing the line flow between
bus k and bus m, line flow constraints for the 5-bus system are:
|S15(b)| < 6 p.u. (7.22)
|S54(b)| < 12 p.u. (7.23)
|S43(b)| < 10 p.u. (7.24)
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|S52(b)| < 12 p.u. (7.25)
|S42(b)| < 12 p.u. (7.26)
By again deriving the intersection of these constraints and combining with
the final angle constraint in (7.21), we achieve the following safe range for
the control input (lf stands for line flow):
bminang,lf < b < bmaxang,lf (7.27)
In this case, this new range for the acceptable per-unit real power injection
satisfies both the line flow and angle constraints for continued, secure system
operation. Figure 7.6 exemplifies the concrete case in which both constraints
are applied, resulting in a safe range for b between 4.529 and 14.029 p.u.,
as shown by the shaded region. The accuracy of the phase angle, θ, is
compared against the benchmark NR-PF result (b = 0) for varying values
of b, the control input for real power injection. Figure 7.7 illustrates further
the accuracy of the augDC-PF method in comparison with the benchmark
NR-PF results (b = 0) for varying b values. It can be noted that each phase
angle is impacted differently with the changing control input values; the θ3
error significantly increases as b is varied whereas θ2 error remains relatively
low. Therefore, the augDC-PF method effectively allows for the analysis of
symbolic control inputs with the application of constraints, as derived from
the system. Voltage limits can also be implemented, resulting in an overall
constraint for the control input that satisfies all the safety requirements in
the given system. In this manner, the verification process can proceed to the
next step with the resultant safe control input range. Further details of the
full verification tool are provided in Section 2.3.2 and in [23,28,123].
The use of augDC-PF in this case study was necessary, as both accuracy
and speed were required. Traditional, high-accuracy methods such as NR-PF
were too slow and could not handle the inclusion of symbolic variables. Yet
high-speed methods such as DC-PF or DNR-PF lacked the accuracy needed
to achieve results the control input verification required for thorough safety
analysis. Thus, the augDC-PF method satisfies both needs and performs
efficiently. This application is one of many that could benefit from augDC-
PF; its increased accuracy but maintained speed makes it more valuable than
the existing speed-focused algorithms.
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Figure 7.6: The difference between the benchmark NR-PF result (b = 0) for
each phase angle, θ, and augDC-PF results for varying values of b. The
shaded green region represents the safe range for b with both line flow and
angle constraints applied.
7.5 Conclusions
By using real-time measurements to derive correction terms and deal with
topology changes, the augDC-PF method is a versatile, fast, and accurate
power flow method. The drawbacks in using historical data, in impDC-PF,
such as inability to deal with topology changes and computation overhead
in adapting the data to the current operating point, are remedied in the
proposed method. Greater accuracy is achieved since the correction terms
can be calculated online, using the real-time measurements. Its linear formu-
lation maintains the speed coveted in DC-PF. Reduced PMU measurement
locations can also be handled, with or without full system observability.
The augDC-PF method is flexible and will be useful in a variety of appli-
cations, as exemplified by the control input verification case study. It main-
tained both high accuracy and speed, as needed to determine if a control
logic program would lead to a “safe” or “unsafe” state. In this manner, vio-
lation of safety constraints is determined in a timely manner, to best execute
the Just-Ahead-of-Time verification described in Section 2.3.2. Nonetheless,
the augDC-PF algorithm is broadly useful to many applications and helps
reduce the speed and accuracy trade-off in traditionally speed-focused power
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Figure 7.7: Contour plot of error for each phase angle with varying b values;








Distributed controls play an integral role in the power system, as this work
has exemplified in the previous chapters. Their functions range from roles
in power flow control, such as the D-FACTS devices, to protective relays
to automatic generator control actions (e.g., automatic voltage regulators
(AVRs)). When these control actions occur, they impact the power system
quantities of the local area in a predictable manner. For example, when the
governor setpoint of a generator is changed via a control action, the system
voltage data exhibits discernible effects, dependent on the type of control
action and location. These effects are most significant in the local area of
the generator at which the control action was enacted.
Leveraging this insight into the power system’s behavior, especially its
impact on the voltage profiles, we can enhance classification algorithms. We
can focus only on the localized measurements, reducing the training data
sets—instead of using widespread data from the entire system, as most data
mining algorithms do. Thus, we can improve the usability of data mining
algorithms in power systems, as we can enhance the methods with domain-
specific knowledge to achieve faster and more accurate results.
For this particular problem, the question is: Can we just use a few data sets
(e.g., from generator buses) to classify the generator control actions? In this
manner, we develop a generator control action classification algorithm that
uses a reduced, insightful set of data. In this manner, detection of malicious,
or at least abnormal, control actions can be aided. Any set of voltage data
that cannot be classified as a control action at a certain generator (or as the
normative state with no control actions occurring) is flagged as abnormal
and the operator can be notified.
147
This method aids the efforts of the cyber-physical verification (CPV) project
discussed in Section 2.3.2. It acts as a secondary check that the verified con-
trol commands that are enacted impact the system as expected, as gleaned
from the successful identification of the generator control actions from the
resultant change in the system voltage data. Yet, if abnormal system behav-
ior is observed (the classification fails), the event is flagged and the cyber-
physical response (CPR) system can be called, also presented in Section 2.3.2.
8.1.1 Data Mining in Power Systems
Increasing use of distributed monitoring devices, smart meters and appli-
ances, and other measurement sources has defined an essential and significant
role of data analytics in the realm of power systems. Access to these mea-
surements can be very useful in power systems and improve decision making,
situational awareness, and speed of response; this data has large volume,
high velocity (fast-paced processing and analysis), and is of increasing vari-
ety [124].
Specifically, the study of voltage disturbances has become a principle re-
search topic with the influx of fast-sampled, wide-area voltage data from
the distributed monitoring devices. Voltage disturbances are common oc-
currences in power systems and can be caused by various faults or control
actions. In power systems research, work has been done in identifying the
events that cause voltage dips or swells using signal processing and statistical
methods [125].
Recently, data mining techniques have been applied to power systems,
usually on a larger, macro-scale using whole system data [126]. Such data
include measurements from transmission buses, substations, or other major
components in the network. The increase of near real-time voltage measure-
ments from multiple locations all across the power grid has rendered such
voltage analyses as “big data” problems. To process these large volumes of
data, methods such as neural networks, support vector machines, clustering,
etc., are being applied and integrated into studies [127]. Therefore, data
mining techniques have become integral in power system analyses, especially
in the area of voltage disturbances.
However, although this big data analysis is useful and enables powerful
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insight, further studies on small-scale systems need to be conducted. By
focusing on single components such as generators in the power grid, we can
provide concrete and detailed insights into individual operators to better
understand situational awareness. Furthermore, we would like to leverage our
knowledge of power system behavior, based on its dynamics and topology.
With this insight, we know which parts of the system are most impacted by
different events. Therefore, the training data set can be reduced to include
only the single components or areas that will be impacted by the actions we
seek to classify, enabling faster and more accurate response to unexpected
events in the power system.
This low-level data is also more difficult to mimic than broad system behav-
ior data, helping prevent, or more quickly detect, malicious activity. Those
disturbances not classified can be flagged as outliers or abnormal behaviors
to be investigated for malicious activities or equipment failures. The de-
ployment of distributed voltage monitoring devices allows access to localized
voltage measurements. We can obtain localized data around a single compo-
nent, such as a generator, and perform small scale analysis.
An application for such small-scale analysis is classifying control actions
of generators in a system based on the localized voltage dip measurements.
When a control action such as changing exciter voltage setpoint is enacted,
the bus terminal voltage changes—the magnitude can dip or swell for a spe-
cific duration. Thus, a voltage disturbance occurs. Since the different control
actions cause discernible voltage dip behaviors, one can study the localized
voltage data to determine what control action caused the disturbance.
In this chapter, we develop a generator control action classification method
using wavelet decomposition and support vector machine (SVM) applied to
localized voltage measurements. With this method, a voltage disturbance is
classified as a control action, such as change in governor setpoint or exciter
voltage setpoint, that has occurred at a particular generator in the system.
This work essentially explores root causes of voltage disturbances, focusing
on generator control action events. Furthermore, we investigate the method’s
performance when the availability of training data, the generator bus voltage
measurements, is reduced and we lack data from each generator bus.
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8.2 Background
The behavior of voltage disturbances, either dips or swells, is integral to the
development of this classification method. Background on voltage distur-
bances and a review of the data mining techniques that have been previously
applied to the area are presented in this section.
8.2.1 Voltage Disturbances
Voltage dips can occur due to events such as a motor starting, various faults,
switching of generators, and energizing of transformers. A voltage dip is de-
fined as a reduction of the voltage magnitude from threshold value with a
duration of a few cycles to several seconds [128]. This reduction can be any-
where from 10% to 90% of the supply voltage and last 10 ms to 1 min. Voltage
dips can also be generalized to voltage disturbances, which can be charac-
terized as a dips, swells (increase in voltage), or interruptions. The char-
acterization of voltage disturbances according to voltage magnitude change
and duration is illustrated in Figure 8.1. It is important to determine the
Figure 8.1: Voltage disturbance definition from IEEE Std. 1159-1995 [128].
cause of voltage dips swiftly and accurately to employ mitigation techniques.
Voltage dips can have detrimental effects on the power system; they have
150
been identified as one of the main power quality problems due to their high
costs and potential to damage sensitive equipment.
Nonetheless, voltage dips can be characterized by their magnitude and du-
ration. They can be classified by their signature, or dip type, by defining
complex voltages and phasor diagrams based on the relations between min-
imum line-to-ground voltage and minimum line-to-line voltage. Using such
classifications, the dips can be classified as being caused by faults, motors,
transformer energizing, etc. By defining different classes of voltage dips and
access to power system voltage data, techniques can be applied to identify
voltage dip types using only measurements.
With access to these expansive measurements, characteristic voltage pro-
files can be constructed for particular events. For example, in the case of a
generator control action, a specific control action such as a change in exciter
voltage setpoint (EVS) will have a different effect on the voltage profiles of
the generator buses than a change in governor setpoint (GS). Furthermore,
the behavior of the voltage profiles will be different depending on the gen-
erator at which the action was incurred and the type of control action. In
Figure 8.2, a change in EVS (to 1 p.u.) was enacted on Generator 2 and the
voltage profiles for all the generator buses in the 9-bus system are shown,
where Generator 1 is the slack bus. It can be observed that each of the
voltage profiles, constructed with the localized generator bus voltage mea-
surements (simulated, without noise), is discernible for each generator. As
expected, Generator 2, where the control action occurred, has the most sig-
nificant change in its voltage profile.
Therefore, voltage disturbances caused by events such as control actions
or faults will have discernible effects on the system voltage data, or voltage
profiles. Access to the voltage data from the distributed measurement devices
allows access to broad, fast-sampled voltage data that can be analyzed with
various methods. With the increasing number of measurements, data mining























Figure 8.2: Voltage profiles of all the generator buses after a change in EVS
at Generator 2.
8.2.2 Review of Data Mining Methods for Voltage Dip
Problems
In the power systems domain, data mining (DM) techniques are implemented
for multiple analytical purposes. More relevant studies to this research in-
clude Ipinnimo el al. [128], Li et al. [129], Alluri et al. [126], Seethalekshmi et
al. [130, 131], and Parikh et al. [132]. In reviewing these papers, the general
steps were:
1. Gather voltage data (e.g., from devices or simulated)
2. Convert voltage data (i.e., wavelet) into a format for DM techniques
3. Train a classifying model
4. Choose most suitable parameters
5. Validate accuracy of training model
6. Test/validate
One of the most pertinent steps is the conversion of the data. Voltage
data (i.e., wavelet) needs to be converted into a format (i.e., symbolic string)
that can be used with data mining techniques. A symbolic string such as
Symbolic Aggregate ApproXimation (SAX) used by [126] is one method.
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SAX is a well-known symbolic representation for time-series, similar to dis-
crete Fourier translation (DFT), discrete wavelet translation (DWT), sin-
gular value decomposition (SVD), and piecewise aggregate approximation
(PAA), which are the discretized data representations of time-series.
Although data mining based power system methods require more detailed
measurements, the advent of distributed monitoring devices such as PMUs
enables such data collection. The main benefits of applying DM techniques
in power system analyses include the ability to generalize at high speed,
learn from experience, synthesize complex mappings, and handle noisy or
incomplete data. Moving forward, the use of DWT for data conversion and
SVM based methods are promising techniques for the classification of voltage
disturbance events in power systems. Motivation for using SVM for our work
is explained further in Section 8.3.3.
8.3 Method
To classify the generator control actions based on localized voltage mea-
surements, a method was developed using SVM and wavelet decomposition.
The proposed method is summarized as follows: 1) Events that cause volt-
age dip and disturbances were simulated and samples were generated using
PowerWorld. 2) By iterating through different types of mother wavelets,
we found the optimal mother wavelet used during discrete wavelet transfor-
mation (DWT) that transforms voltage data into a form that can be used
with SVM. 3) For SVM training, different kernel functions and parameters
were tested to find the optimal set that yields the highest accuracy. 4) We
performed k-fold cross-validation to validate our accuracy results (see Fig-
ure 8.3).
8.3.1 Event Simulation and Data Sampling
For method testing, simulation of voltage disturbance events to obtain the
time-series voltage data was necessitated. These simulations were performed
in PowerWorld Simulator, an interactive power system simulation software,
using the transient stability tool. In this manner, time-series voltage data
can be obtained during a specified simulation period, with the event incurred
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Figure 8.3: Process model for the proposed method.
at a certain time point.
By applying the different generator control actions at each of the generators
in the system, the time-series voltage disturbance data was captured for
each event. Noise was added to these data sets in Matlab, a computational
platform, to create further samples and reflect real-world conditions.
8.3.2 Data Conversion
To use signal behaviors as features, wavelet data needs to be decomposed into
localized time and frequency components. Choosing a right mother wavelet is
crucial in characterizing signals. A wavelet is a basis function that is isolated
with respect to time or spatial location and frequency or wave number. It is
defined by the parent wavelets: the mother wavelet characterizes the basic
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wavelet shape (the wavelet function) and the father wavelet characterizes the
basic wavelet scale (scaling function) in the time domain. In power systems,
Daubechies (db) has been known as the best wavelet family for characterizing
voltage signals [132,133]. Discrete wavelet transformation (DWT) is used to
decompose the original signals to two halves of frequency components using
high-pass and low-pass filters. To find the most suitable wavelet type, within
the family of db, all wavelet types, db1 to db45, were tested for our case.
8.3.3 Data Mining Technique for Classification
Among the literature we have surveyed, ANN and SVM are two classifiers
that can be compared against each other and perhaps are the most suit-
able techniques for our purpose. Seethalekshmi et al. [131] claim that SVM
(structural risk minimization) is better than ANN (empirical risk minimiza-
tion). Empirical risk minimization involves many uncertainties associated
with empirical data and is centered around approximation.
Though Tsallis wavelet energy entropy (TWEE) and clustering were used
to classify transient voltage disturbances by Li et al. [129], extensive training
information is required to apply TWEE for feature extraction. Various faults
with different parameters need to be applied to construct the TWEE curves,
which can be system dependent and become computationally burdensome as
the system size increases. The use of particle swarm optimization, genetic
algorithms, and neural networks was also discussed in the context of power
systems with distributed generation. Yet, the need for approximations with
neural networks and increased complexity motivates the use of the SVM
method for our work.
Support Vector Machine
SVM has gained its popularity in power systems due to its effectiveness
in classifying different wavelet behaviors. Classification tasks involve the
separation of data into training and testing sets where each instance in
the training set contains one target value or class label and several fea-
tures/attributes [134]. Ultimately, the SVM method aims to produce a model
using the training data to predict the target values of the test data given only
the data attributes.
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Figure 8.4: Linear SVM classification concept representation.
Figure 8.5: Nonlinear SVM classification concept representation.
SVM solves an optimization problem by fitting hyper-planes or decision
boundaries that divide different sets of points. The linear SVM finds a hy-
perplane by computing a dot-product between the points and a normal vector
to the hyperplane and is expressed as follows:
w · x+ b = 0 (8.1)
where w is a normal vector, x is data points and b is a bias term. The optimal
hyperplane best separates data points with maximized margin between the
vectors (w) of the two classes (see Figure 8.4).
A nonlinear system including higher dimensional spaces requires use of a




γiφi(u) · φi(v) (8.2)
where γi ∈ < and φi are eigenvalues and eigenfunctions [135]. This kernel
trick allows one to nonlinearly partition complicated data in a higher dimen-
sional space. Figure 8.5 illustrates nonlinear separation of data points. There
are multiple kernel functions that can be used to separate data points. For
SVM, selection of a kernel function requires an iterative process to find one
that yields the best accuracy. This process is detailed in Section 8.4.
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8.3.4 Validation
K-fold cross-validation, which is commonly used in predictive models for
adjusting parameters, is used. Input data is divided into training and testing
data randomly with a fixed proportion (i.e., 80% training and 20% testing).
Data is randomly partitioned into k subsets. One subset is used for testing
and the remaining are used for training. This process is repeated k times
and the results are averaged. The cross-validation procedure can prevent
overfitting issues, improving the result accuracy [134].
8.4 Evaluations
8.4.1 Case Study: 9-Bus System
To develop our method, we simulated voltage dip data with different con-
trol actions incurred at different generators. A 9-bus power system case in
PowerWorld was used for this study. The system has 3 generators: one at
the slack bus (bus 1), one at bus 2, and one at bus 3. These are shown in
the one-line diagram in Figure 8.6. Two control actions are used: change in
exciter voltage setpoint (EVS) and change in governor setpoint (GS).
Ignoring the slack bus, the control action and generator combinations we
have are:
1. Change in EVS at Generator 2
2. Change in EVS at Generator 3
3. Change in GS at Generator 3
Input Data Simulation The generator setpoints, for both exciter and
governor, are varied in 0.01 p.u. intervals for a range of 0.9 − 1.1 p.u. in
PowerWorld. We do not consider the change in GS at Generator 2 as it
does not affect the system voltage noticeably. The transient stability tool in
PowerWorld is utilized to capture the effect of the setpoint change in a 10
s simulation, where the change is incurred at 1 s. The time-series voltage
data for the generator bus voltages (bus 1, bus 2, bus 3) are obtained from
PowerWorld and transferred to Matlab. To mimic real world data, normally
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Figure 8.6: PowerWorld 9-bus system case with three generators at bus 1,
bus 2, and bus 3.
distributed random noise is added to the voltage data. For every control
action and generator event, as well as the specific setpoint change, 100 noisy
samples were generated. In total, there are 6, 000 voltage profile sets that
are input into our method.
To use the obtained voltage data with SVM, the voltage signals were de-
composed using DWT. For choosing a mother wavelet, Daubechies (db) has
been used, as discussed further in the next section.
Discrete Wavelet Transformation Within wavelet family db, db1 to
db45 were tested using a grid search to find a mother wavelet that yields
the best result. Decomposition level is chosen as 6, which has a frequency
band range of 31.25 to 62.5 Hz [132]. We found that db25 yields the highest
accuracy for our case.
Support Vector Machine To find the optimal kernel function and pa-
rameters with the best accuracy, a grid search is performed. The grid search
is recommended for finding the optimal set of SVM parameters because it
avoids any approximations or heuristics via the exhaustive search. It can be
easily parallelized because each (C,γ) is independent [134]. It is important
that the optimal set is found, for instance, cost parameter C that optimizes
the margin of a hyperplane and therefore dictates the number of misclas-
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sification and kernel parameters. In other words, SVM draws a decision
boundary (a nonlinear hyperplane) in n-dimensional space that divides each
class from the others. These parameters determine how these divisions are
made; therefore, we have to search for an optimal set of these parameters
that best maximizes the margin of the hyperplane.
The kernel functions tested are as follows [136]:
1. Polynomial: K(u, v) = (γuTv + c)d
2. Radial Basis Function: K(u, v) = exp(−γ ∗ |u− v|2)
3. Sigmoid: K(u, v) = tanh(γ ∗ u′ ∗ v + c)
4. Intersection: K(u, v) = min(u, v)









where c, d and γ are kernel parameters. The cost parameter C and γ were
iterated through ranges of (10 : 107) and (10−6 : 10]), respectively. The
trained models are five-fold cross-validated (i.e., data is randomly partitioned
by a ratio of 80% to 20% for training and testing data, respectively and
repeated five times).
Table 8.1: Summary of the Experiment, Showing Optimal Kernel Function
and Its Parameters
Kernel C γ Accuracy %
Polynomial 106 10−2 86.76
RBF 107 10−5 67.01
Sigmoid 107 10−3 80.81
Intersection 107 10−6 98.14
Jenson-Shannon’s 103 10−4 94.93
Validation The 6,000 noisy data samples were discretized using DWT
with db25 mother wavelet at decomposition level 6, as discussed previously.
The discretized and transformed wavelet data were trained using multiple
kernel functions, varying values of parameters C and γ for comparison. The
trained model was five-fold cross-validated. The model was trained and
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tested five times on 80/20 random split of the data (80% for training and
20% for testing).
The intersection kernel function with parameters C = 107 and γ = 10−6
yielded the best average accuracy of 98.14%. The SVM parameters (C, γ)
were the optimal set found via grid search, and indeed provided the best
results. The results of different combinations of kernel functions and pa-
rameters are summarized in Table 8.1, which shows the parameter combi-
nation that yielded the best average accuracy for each kernel function. As
exemplified, the grid search choice of the intersection kernel and associated
parameters provided the highest accuracy.
8.4.2 Availability of Training Data
The aforementioned results assume that local voltage measurements are avail-
able from every generator in the 9-bus system. That is, we have voltage data
from all 3 generators: one at the slack bus (bus 1), one at bus 2, and one at
bus 3. However, measurements from each generator bus will not always be
available or accessible. Our classification algorithm must be tested for the
more realistic case in which voltage data from particular generator buses is
not available for training the SVM model. We must examine the model’s
performance, with the reduced set of training data, in classifying all the gen-
erator control actions (change in EVS at Generator 2, change in EVS at
Generator 3, change in GS at Generator 3).
The full set of data would include time-series bus voltage measurements for
each of the generators: Generator 1, Generator 2, and Generator 3. The con-
trol actions to be classified occur at Generator 2 and Generator 3. Therefore,
to exemplify when not all measurements are available, the cases presented in
Table 8.2 are evaluated.
Table 8.2: Availability of Voltage Measurements from Each Generator Bus
for Each Evaluation Case
Available Data Unavailable Data
Case 1 Generator 1, Generator 2 Generator 3
Case 2 Generator 1, Generator 3 Generator 2
Case 3 Generator 1 Generator 2, Generator 3
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These cases were input into the method and the results are summarized
(with SVM parameters) in Table 8.3. In addition, the wavelet type and
decomposition level pairs (db,lev) for each case were found via grid search
as (db34, 2), (db27, 3), and (db1, 6), respectively. As observed, Case 1
and Case 2 maintain high accuracy with average accuracy values of 98.97%
and 97.94%, respectively. Therefore, even when Generator 2 or Generator 3
voltage data is not available, control actions occurring at Generator 2 and
Generator 3 are still classified with high accuracy.
However, when data for both Generator 2 and Generator 3 is unavailable,
as in Case 3, a lower average accuracy of 86.62% is obtained. From these tests,
we can glean that the classification method performs fairly well when not all
voltage data is available, but not when the majority is missing. Further study
must be conducted on larger systems to investigate if the location of the
generator, number of generators, and/or slack vs. non-slack bus generators
contribute to these observations.
Table 8.3: Summary Results for Different Data Availability Cases with
SVM Parameters and Average Accuracy Achieved
Kernel C γ Accuracy %
Case 1 Intersection 105 10−5 98.97
Case 2 Intersection 10 10 97.94
Case 3 Intersection 10 10−6 86.62
8.5 Conclusions
A method for classifying generator control actions using localized measure-
ments was developed using SVM and wavelet decomposition. By iterating
through different DWT parameters, kernel functions, and SVM parameters,
the optimal set yielded the highest average accuracy of 98.14%. It was suc-
cessful in identifying the different control actions, as well as the particular
buses in which they were incurred. When the availability of training data,
the generator bus voltage measurements, is reduced, the algorithm still per-
forms with fairly high accuracy. These cases will be investigated further to
gain insight into the range of availability that is necessary.
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To extend this work, future plans include using larger systems and also
testing real data. Furthermore, we would like to include other voltage distur-
bances in our study such as fault, motor starting, and transformer energizing
events. In this manner, a more comprehensive classification of the voltage
disturbance events can be obtained.
All in all, the developed classification method is able to successfully iden-
tify generator control actions (and on which bus they were incurred) based
on localized voltage measurements, even with reduced availability of training
data. This initial study provides the groundwork for applying our classifica-
tion techniques to a broader spectrum of voltage disturbance events. More-
over, by leveraging knowledge of prior power system behavior, we are able
to significantly reduce the training data set. This helps the usability of data
mining algorithms in power systems, as we can enhance the methods with
domain-specific knowledge to achieve faster and more accurate results.
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CHAPTER 9




From load forecasting to dynamic security assessment, artificial neural net-
works (ANN) have prominent and widespread applications in the power sys-
tem domain [137–139]. Machine learning techniques such as ANN, support
vector machine (SVM), clustering, and others have seen an increase in use
over recent years, driven by the growing availability of data [127,139]. Mea-
surement sources include distributed monitoring devices such as phasor mea-
surement units (PMUs) as well as smart meters and home appliances. By
leveraging this access with powerful machine learning tools, power system
decision making, situational awareness, and response are greatly improved.
In particular, ANN is extensively used in formulating power system solu-
tions. This is due to attractive features such as the ability to learn complex
nonlinear relationships and modular structures that can allow parallel pro-
cessing [140]. An ANN is a biologically inspired programming paradigm that
is able to learn from observational data [141]. ANNs are also computing
systems; each is composed of a number of simple, highly interconnected pro-
cessing elements, which process information by their dynamic state response
to external inputs [142]. The large scale and nonlinearity of power systems
are factors that contribute to their complexity, and ANNs hold promise for
tackling these challenges.
Short-term load forecasting, defined as predicting future load series min-
utes, hours, or days ahead, has been achieved with ANN in experiments and
practical tests. However, Hippert et al. [137] conducted a review and eval-
uation of these ANN-based forecasting systems to address skepticism that
the ANN use has been systematically proven. Specifically, the study found
that the neural network architectures chosen for the data samples were not
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suitable and perhaps too large with many parameters to be estimated, often
resulting in overfitting and poor out-of-sample testing results [137]. The au-
thors also noticed that the models were not systematically tested and that
more rigorous results are needed to fully validate.
Besides load forecasting, ANNs have also been utilized to replace complex
power system models to aid computation of different power system analyses.
Xu et al. [143] considered the challenge of modeling nonlinear three-phase
photovoltaic generators (PVGs) for power flow analysis. Transient stability
assessment has been paired with ANN by Bahbah et al. [138] with generator
angle and angular velocity prediction for multi-machine power systems. Ad-
ditionally, Qian et al. [144] performed transient stability studies using ANN
models for generators, excitation systems, and governors individually and
subsequently linked them.
These ANN power system applications, both for load forecasting and re-
placing complex machine models, indicate experimental success. Yet, as
noted by Hippert et al., no systematic approach is apparent, specifically with
regard to selecting the number of ANN parameters (e.g., number of layers,
number of neurons, activation function) and testing approaches. This work
focuses on developing a data-dependent and power system-dependent proce-
dure for the selection of ANN parameters. The approaches used presently rely
on trial-and-error by assessing resultant accuracy iteratively, existing model
setups that may not translate for a different application, and/or outsized
ANNs that may suffer from overfitting.
Nonetheless, we seek to improve the selection of ANN parameters by lever-
aging power system behavioral knowledge. The power system exhibits pat-
terns rooted in the physics of the various components and interconnections
as well as specific topologies. For example, when a disturbance occurs, we
know the oscillatory response of the system will be dictated by the modes
of the system [145] and that the topology of the system will impact the sta-
bility of the system given such a disturbance. We also know that voltage
disturbances, caused by faults or control actions, are localized and studying
only local bus voltage measurements is sufficient for classification methods,
significantly reducing training set size and computation time, as presented in
Chapter 8. We develop analytical methods to reconstruct such insight into
power system behavior and (in this work) to leverage it for ANN modeling
applications, particularly to reduce trial-and-error.
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To explore the connection between power system analyses and ANN pa-
rameter selection, this chapter develops a systematic method for selecting the
number of neurons for a model. Instead of relying on trial-and-error or incon-
sistent heuristics, we present an algorithm that is dependent on the power
system being studied and the data set. For this investigation, we replace
generator models with ANN in a post-fault system. The input data consists
of the generator real power and exciter field voltages, and the generator rotor
angles are obtained as output, assessing the system stability. Modal analysis
is applied to determine dominant modes of the system and we hypothesize
that the number of dominant modes can be equated to the number of neurons
to be used. This idea is developed further in the remainder of this chapter.
9.2 Literature Review
9.2.1 Artificial Neural Networks
An artificial neural network (ANN) processes a set of input data, usually
referred to as training data, through its structure of weights, connections,
and activation functions that are then adjusted using a specific training al-
gorithm. Through these iterative adjustments, the ANN will increase its
ability to correctly recognize patterns and classify or quantify an output. In
this section, we will provide a brief description of ANNs, but comprehensive
and detailed reviews can be found in [137,140–142].
The basic unit of a neural network is an artificial neuron that receives input
data information and processes it. The input values are linearly combined,
using input weights and constant bias terms, and then an activation function
is applied. An example is shown in Figure 9.1 (biases not shown). This non-
linear activation function is required to be non-decreasing and differentiable
(e.g., sigmoid function).
For most power system applications, we utilize multilayer perceptron (MLP)
networks that arrange the neurons, or more generally units, in layers [137].
In the feed-forward network, the outputs of one layer are inputs to the fol-
lowing layer; layers between are called hidden layers. The different weights
on the connections and the bias terms are the parameters of the network,
and estimating them is the focus of training the network using optimization
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Figure 9.1: Example two-layer neural network with four input nodes,
various weights, and two output nodes [137].
functions such as gradient descent.
9.2.2 Power Systems ANN Applications
Since the early 1990s, the electric power system industry has seen a new
movement toward artificial intelligence and machine learning to either model
or predict certain phenomena within the systems. Due to prior successes,
the most researched areas include load forecasting, fault diagnosis, economic
dispatch, security assessment, and transient stability [140].
One notable application is in load forecasting and its effects on economic
development and planning. Current models have had difficulty in many areas
such as finding a relationship between variable and instantaneous load de-
mand and ability to reevaluate the set of laws that govern the complex system
and adjust themselves with rapid nonlinear system-load changes [146]. An-
other prominent application is the ability to diagnose faults, their locations,
and how to most effectively clear them. This is an important application
because during the event of an outage an operator may become overwhelmed
by the excessive amount of alarms and signals. An ANN in this setting has
performed well in identifying problems and successfully diagnosing errors due
to its flexibility in classification and its ability to handle noisy data which is
generally produced during these events [146].
However, in this scenario, it is critical to have best case computational
efficiency in order to avoid serious damage to the power system and the con-
sumers it supports. This is an extremely difficult problem in modern ANN
applications. During the 1990s, expert systems were the main tool used;
however, they had a major drawback of not being able to handle the com-
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plexity of growing power systems. Recently, ANNs have been used to handle
this complex problem; however, they too have a setback. With many neural
units, or neurons, to model such a complex system, the cost, both in time
and computational power, to train the model, whether it be feedforward,
backpropagation, etc., is so large that at times it makes this model obso-
lete. Advancements in processing power and development of new training
algorithms in the past decade have greatly benefited the feasibility of these
models SP8.
Although the application of ANNs in these areas of power systems has
proven useful, improved structure is needed. Of the many necessities of cre-
ating a reliable and accurate neural network, there are two main focuses for
power system ANNs. They are efficiency and the handling of noisy data,
both being mainly driven by the size of the ANN itself; efficiency calls for
fewer neurons (units) and handling noisy data calls for more. For efficiency,
it is important for a model to accurately and, in a timely manner, predict
its output before any damage is incurred to a power system. Any additional
units within an ANN will slow both training and prediction. Conversely,
handling noisy data is a task that generally improves as the number of units
increases. If many units are present in the network, a meaningless input can
be pinpointed during training and have devalued weights so that the values
have minimal effect on the generated output. However, with fewer units in
the network, it is more difficult as each unit is influenced by many input
variables. If one unit is influenced by both an important variable and an
insignificant one, the average will be middle-tier influence on the generated
output that devalues important information and overvalues meaningless in-
formation, which will clearly lead to increased error and inhibit successful
modeling.
9.2.3 Selection of Number of Neurons
The goal of this chapter is to use a deep knowledge of power system behavior
in order to find a balance of the two main focuses provided earlier, to create a
potential best case number of units in a hidden neuron layer within an ANN
model that can generate timely and accurate predictions, even with a set of
noisy data.
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Selection of a neural network structure, in many scenarios, is done through
computation. The number of neurons can be set as an arbitrary value, and
during training, a better number will be found through some algorithm [147].
In almost all cases, this selection increases the computational cost and time
incurred by additional cross-validation. For power systems, this additional
cost may not actually outweigh the small benefit from error minimization if
there is a known value that can perform better under tighter time constraints.
In recent years, there have been many attempts to provide a standard for
the number of neurons in the hidden layer of an ANN. Generally, these all
relate the number of input neurons, output neurons, input variables, and a
few other metrics to generate the appropriate number of units. However, they
are unfortunately too general to be very accurate for all sets of data, as there
are potentially many more unknown variables that go into this calculation
[148].
As mentioned, the goal of this chapter is utilize a deep understanding of
power system behavior in order to set a value for the number of hidden neu-
rons in a neural network model. Through many experiments and generated
results, we seek to link modal analysis of power systems with the number
of neurons in the hidden layer of a neural network as we feel there can be
a qualitative reason to model an ANN using the number of most dominant
power system modes [149].
9.3 Method
9.3.1 Modal Analysis
Small signal stability is the ability of a power system to maintain its syn-
chronism after a small disturbance. Modal analysis is the analysis of small
signal stability through the eigenvalues; it also looks at the eigenvectors, the
participation factors, and the mode shapes [86, 150, 151]. To obtain those
parameters, first the power system is described by a set of equations:
x˙ = f(x,y) 0 = g(x,y) (9.1)
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where x is the vector of state variables (such as the generator rotor angles δi
and rotor speed ωi) and y is the vector of the algebraic variables (primarily
the bus complex voltages). Next, the system can be linearized about the
equilibrium point as:
∆x˙ = A∆x + B∆y (9.2)
0 = C∆x + D∆y (9.3)
The variable ∆y in (9.2) and can be substituted using (9.3) to derive a
differential equation of only variable ∆x as follows:
∆x˙ = (A−BD−1C)∆x (9.4)
Asys := A−BD−1C (9.5)
∆x˙ = Asys∆x (9.6)
Equation (9.6) represents the deviation of the system’s state away from the
equilibrium point. As the result, small signal analysis is done by looking
at the eigenvalues and other properties of Asys. The full derivation of the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors from Asys is provided in Section 5.5.1, but ul-
timately the response ∆x(t) can be rewritten as an equation of individual






9.3.2 Mode-Dependent Neuron Number Algorithm
As described in the previous section, modal analysis provides powerful insight
into a specific power system and its response to various disturbances. We
obtain information on the prominent modes of the system and how they
dominate the response of certain system changes or events. These modes are
unique to the component, system topology, and disturbance that are being
studied. Thus, discovering the dominant modes for a particular situation
provides information on the dominant behaviors and patterns present.
Within our neural network model, the neurons, or units, are “activated”
depending on the input data presented. This activation is dependent on
169
the type of function used as well as the input/output weights and biases,
the latter two of which are the results of the neural network training and
optimization. Ultimately, the activated units determine the output result. A
specific set of units is activated for a particular set of input data. Depending
on the activation function, the activation can have discrete or continuous
values. For example, for a simplistic step function, as shown in Figure 9.2, the
unit is either “on” or “off”. However, for the popular sigmoid function shown
in Figure 9.3, the activation will take on a value between 0 and 1. Different
patterns or behaviors inherent within the input data are what differentiate
the unit activation sets. The dominant modes of a dynamic system determine
how the system will respond to a disturbance. The combination of these
modes dictates the majority of the system response. In that case, what if
the number of dominant modes could be equated to the number of units in
the neural network?














Figure 9.2: Step function.
The units and their combination provide the output result in the neural
network. Our intuition from the power system and modal analysis motivates
the hypothesis that the number of dominant modes represents the most sig-
nificant patterns in the system and thus could capture the different behaviors
successfully, similar to the function of neural network units. At the very least,
the number of dominant modes provides an estimate of the number of units.
To achieve this estimate, we follow the process illustrated in Figure 9.4. First,
we obtain the model of the power system to analyze either mathematically or
with power system simulation software. Depending on the application and
what event is being studied, one may be more beneficial than the other. In
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Figure 9.3: Sigmoid function.
Figure 9.4: Mode-dependent neuron number algorithm.
our case, we model our system in PowerWorld [84], a simulation software, as
we will study generator bus faults and the subsequent impact on rotor angle
response.
The event of interest (EoI) that is being studied using the neural network,
whether it be a change in load or a system fault, is applied to the system and
modal analysis is conducted on the post-EoI system. Depending on the type
of study being conducted, different components will vary the EoI parameters
and modal analysis must be performed for each to obtain the most compre-
hensive result. In our example scenario, we only perform modal analysis once
as we construct the neural network only for generators in various post-fault
systems.
To determine the significant modes, methods using Prony analysis such
as [152–154] can be used. We utilize the largest weighted percentage (LWP)
values of each mode to determine the most dominant in the post-fault re-
sponse, as calculated in PowerWorld. The LWP is the largest signal compo-
nent in the mode weighted by time and is expressed as a percentage of total
signal components. Subsequently, we analyze the LWP values by calculating
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the percent difference (pDiff) of the max LWP against the rest of the val-
ues, shown in (9.8); if pDiff is less than the threshold difference of 50%, we





Finally, we set the number of dominant modes as the number units in the
hidden layer of our neural network.
9.4 Evaluations
To demonstrate the mode-dependent neuron selection algorithm, we studied
a neural network model developed for power system generators. The ANN
takes input of the generator real power and electric field voltage and provides
the rotor angle response after a balanced three-phase fault on a generator bus
(all time-series data). Thus, we achieve the response without requiring the
complex generator and system model. The input data selection is based on
the experiment performed in [138]. The location of this fault varies, excluding
the slack bus, and the clearing time also varies. For the training data set, a
three-phase fault was applied at each generator bus and data was collected
for 20 different clearing times (up to the critical clearing time). These faults
were simulated in PowerWorld and the data was obtained with the transient
stability toolbox [84].
A nonlinear autoregressive network with exogenous inputs (NARX) with
one hidden layer is constructed with the training data set and the mode-
dependent estimate of units is used and compared against other random or
heuristic-based values. The NARX feedback neural network is often utilized
for time-series prediction, as is our goal, and is described further in [155].
The post-fault generator rotor angle scenario is applied to the EPRI 20-bus
system shown in Figure 9.5.
The system has 7 generators of which Generator #1 (at bus 1) is the
slack bus and is excluded. Therefore, faults are simulated and data is ob-
tained from 6 generators at 20 different clearing times for each. The mode-
dependent neuron number algorithm, summarized in Figure 9.4, is applied
and Table 9.1 displays an example set of resultant modes for a fault at Gen-
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Figure 9.5: EPRI 20-bus system [84].
erator #2 (at bus 7) (number of dominant modes similar across generator
buses).
Table 9.1: Resultant Modes and Largest Weighted Percentage








The dominant modes are highlighted, as calculated with (9.8). With 4
dominant modes, we equate to the number of units in the NARX neural
network, as illustrated in Figure 9.6.
We calculate estimates for number of units from known heuristics summa-
rized and discussed in [148]; Table 9.2 lists these estimates for our generator
bus fault scenario. Figure 9.7 illustrates the average mean squared error
(MSE) that represents the difference between the actual rotor angle response
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Figure 9.6: NARX neural network with 4 units [156].
Table 9.2: Heuristic Unit Number Methods [148]
Heuristic Method Unit Estimate
Li et al. method 2
Tamura and Tateishi method 1
Zhang method 3
Jinchuan and Xinzhe method 2
Shibata and Ikeda method 1
Hunter et al. method 3
Sheela and Deepa method 5
(from simulation) and predicted rotor angle response (from the NARX net-
work) for up to 1000 training iterations, in 100 iteration intervals, for various
numbers of units (comparing our modal estimate against heuristics), and
testing 20 different clearing times at Generator #2 (at bus 7). The mean
MSE for each given number of units indicates lower values for 1 and 2 units,
similar values for 4 and 5 units, and high error for 3 and 12 units. The mean
MSEs for 1 and 2 units are misleading as the model prediction for the ro-
tor angle response is inaccurate, and the low MSE results from consistently
producing a relatively flat line through the true rotor angle response as il-
lustrated in Figure 9.8a; it is unsuccessful in capturing all variance in the
data.
However, our estimate of 4 units provides a decent estimate, an example
of which is shown in Figure 9.8c, with comparatively low MSE error while
capturing the variations in the actual response. Figures 9.8a-9.8d show ex-
amples of the NARX model’s prediction of the rotor angle response for faults
at Generator 2 (at bus 7) for different clearing times, number of units, and
training iterations. The average MSE of all clearing time and training itera-
tions is represented in the comprehensive Figure 9.7. Figure 9.8d illustrates
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Figure 9.7: NARX: Average MSE for different unit number estimates over
many training iterations and clearing times for faults at Generator #2 (at
bus 7); the mode-dependent algorithm estimate is 4 units.
an overfitting situation with too many units, resulting in the spikes.
Yet, the NARX feedback neural network with 4 units does not provide
good performance in predicting the rotor angle response and results in gen-
erally high MSE. The NARX network was a first-step selection to explore the
mode-dependent neuron number algorithm and provided a good base in that
respect. To improve our actual model prediction, to explore further in fu-
ture work with the algorithm, we began testing with a layer recurrent neural
network (LRNN) architecture in which each layer has a recurrent connection
with a tap delay associated with it; essentially, the network is enabled to
have infinite dynamic response to time-series input data [156]. The rotor
angle response is greatly improved with this network, with our estimate of 4
units, and is represented in Figure 9.9.
The overall performance of this network is shown Figure 9.10 where train-
ing is performed with 70% of the data, testing and validation with 15% each.
This cross-validation allows for the elimination of overfitting or underfitting
issues [136]. An example testing result (fault at Generator #2 (at bus 7)) is
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(a) Number of Units = 1
(b) Number of Units = 2
(c) Number of Units = 4
(d) Number of Units = 12
Figure 9.8: Comparison of true rotor angle response (blue line) with NARX
network prediction (red line) for various numbers of units.
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Figure 9.9: Layer recurrent neural network with 4 units [156].
Figure 9.10: Overall performance of LRNN with 4 units.
shown in Figure 9.11 where a close prediction of the rotor angle response is
achieved as well as an acceptably low MSE. Finally, preliminary results com-
paring the average MSE between unit estimates are shown in Figure 9.12
where the LRNN achieves significantly lower MSE and the mode-dependent
estimate of 4 units performs best.
9.5 Conclusions and Future Work
Through experimental testing, this work tested a hypothesis that the number
of dominant power system modes for a particular event can be equated to
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Figure 9.11: Comparison of true rotor angle response and LRNN prediction
for 4 units.
Figure 9.12: LRNN: Average MSE for different unit number estimates for
faults at Generator #2 (at bus 7); the modal estimate is 4 units.
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the number of units, or neurons, for construction of a neural network mod-
eling the event and its characteristics. Our results indicate that the mode-
dependent estimate of number of units provides promising performance, es-
pecially compared to known, generalized heuristics. We seek to develop sys-
tematic methods for power system neural network construction that leverages
power system analyses and known behaviors. The generator control action
classification based on localized voltage measurements, as presented previ-
ously in Chapter 8, demonstrated the benefit of incorporating power system
knowledge. It also exemplifies the various machine learning algorithms that
can be improved in this manner, not limited to support vector machine and
neural networks.
This initial work can be extended to mathematically formulate the rela-
tionship between the neural network model and power system modes; future
work can also explore different neural network architectures, increased data
set size and input sources, and larger systems. In this manner, trial-and-error
methods can be eliminated (which could lead to overfitting issues, excessive
training time) and enable systematic, domain-dependent construction of ef-




This dissertation studies distributed controllers in the power system and their
prominent function in the cohesive operation of the grid. These controller
sets are used to achieve a variety of objectives, either individually or in a
coordinated fashion, where a portion of or the entire set works together to
achieve some goal. As such, the failure of one or a fraction of the device
set can have widespread, detrimental impact on the remaining controllers
and system. The rest of the set will struggle to maintain the overall goal,
depending on the objective, and cascading effects can result. Furthermore,
distributed controllers are vulnerable to cyber-physical compromise. Again,
compromise within the set, single or multiple, will have broad impact. These
compromised devices, under the control of an attacker, can be manipulated
to drive the system to an unsafe state. From surpassing system limits to
targeting sensitive equipment, the compromise of distributed controllers has
serious consequences.
Distributed controllers are ubiquitous in the grid, yet they are susceptible
to and prime targets for malicious compromise, as well as accidental failures.
Proactive strategies must be developed to protect against these adverse in-
cidents. Additionally, the existent vulnerabilities and risks need to be fully
understood to best design these strategies. Several pertinent discussions,
analyses, and methods are presented and developed in this dissertation to
contribute to that effort.
10.1 Contributions
To protect against distributed controller compromise or failure, an analytic
algorithm was developed that derives insight into the distributed controller
set. With the controller role and grouping results, a control response frame-
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work was formulated to react immediately to compromise/failure using the
remaining, “safe” controllers. The automatic response seeks to reduce sys-
tem stress and mitigate compromise consequences, monitoring both system
controllability and stability. The versatility of the analytic algorithm, which
processes sensitivities using clustering and factorization techniques, is demon-
strated with application to remedial action scheme (RAS) designs. In partic-
ular, an analytic corrective control selection algorithm was derived to identify
the most effective controls, significantly reduce computation time, and there-
fore enable real-time RAS execution.
To further explore real-time applications, especially for control input ver-
ification in a cyber-adversarial environment, an augmented DC power flow
algorithm was developed that used real-time measurements. The method
achieved improvements in both speed and accuracy compared to existing
linear algorithms. To aid detection of abnormal behavior and also lever-
age known power system behaviors, a generator control action classification
method was designed using localized voltage measurements. Finally, to fur-
ther explore enhancing machine learning algorithms with power system anal-
yses and behavioral knowledge, neural networks were studied. Specifically,
improved neural network construction was obtained using modal analysis to
systematically select the number of neurons.
10.2 Extensions
The algorithms and techniques presented seek to aid in developing proactive
strategies for distributed controllers, verification and classification of control
actions, and enhance the use of data mining tools. Addressing and mitigat-
ing distributed controller compromise was the main focus of this dissertation.
Specifically, system control, control actions, and control response were stud-
ied and incorporated into the methods.
A natural extension to this work, especially the overall control response
framework presented in Chapter 5, is to integrate stability analysis. As
mentioned previously, stability of the system must be prioritized and appro-
priate stability control strategies must be deployed to mitigate any detected
stability. A simplistic stability assessment was presented using linear sys-
tem stability concepts, but more rigorous analyses are warranted. Different
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categories and types of stability must be studied, as presented in Chap-
ter 3. For example, the use of real-time metrics that estimate modes from
PMU measurements could be applicable and suitable for a control response
framework [157]. Subsequently, a stability criterion, such as requiring posi-
tive damping and above 3% damping ratio in the system, can be integrated
and/or developed [158].
Trudnowski [159] presented a theoretical connection between the eigenvec-
tor properties of a system and measurable spectral properties. In particular,
he described how the mode shape could be estimated using only system mea-
surements. Although modal damping provides direct assessment of a mode’s
stability, the mode shape provides information on where the particular os-
cillation is most energetic [160]. Thus, it helps the control decision-making
for mitigating a modal oscillation. Methods were proposed to achieve the
application of this approach in near real-time [159].
Additionally, an interesting and related research direction would be to per-
form similar controller and support group analysis in terms of stability for a
distributed controller set. Stability control is challenging and requires sophis-
ticated solutions; perhaps insight into the device set can enhance strategies.
Lastly, improving power system machine learning applications by lever-
aging domain-specific analyses and known behaviors has promising results,
as demonstrated by both the support vector machine and neural network
studies. In particular, methods using power system knowledge (i.e., local-
ized voltage impact, system modes) can be developed to enable systematic
use of machine learning algorithms, specifically to enhance the “learning”
component. Instead of relying on excessive training and very large data
sets to construct effective models, the aim should be to incorporate power
system analyses that already discover certain patterns. The combination
of these patterns with the training would facilitate grounded, efficient, and
more powerful machine learning applications in power systems.
10.3 Final Remarks
The power system is rapidly changing and is an amalgamation of various
algorithms, components, and individuals. It is composed of cyber and phys-
ical layers that employ a variety of operational tools such as monitoring
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and control to enable a united implementation. Distributed controllers are
pervasive in and pertinent to this execution, and as such, must maintain
their objectives and integrity. The challenges to that commitment are inad-
vertent failures and increasing cyber-physical attacks that can compromise
controllers. Resilient and dynamic defenses are needed that understand the
vulnerabilities and risks present and respond quickly and effectively. This
dissertation directly contributes to this effort by analytically gaining insight
into the distributed controller set, employing those insights to respond to
compromise or failure, and developing control action verification and clas-
sification techniques. The proactive strategies for responding to distributed
controller compromise are a crucial part of protecting the power grid and
just one piece of the puzzle for comprehensive system defense. The solution
of this puzzle requires interdisciplinary and cyber-physical approaches from
various perspectives and continuous validation and improvement. This dis-
sertation is a part of that effort and helps realize a more resilient, efficient,
and robust power grid.
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IEEE 118-BUS SYSTEM CONTROL
SUPPORT GROUPS
Figure A.1 is a one-line diagram of the IEEE 118-bus system with lines
colored according to cluster group. Each cluster represents a control support
group; black lines indicate no support group and that the line/device is
independently controlled.
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